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ABSTRACT
Evidentials are expressions used to indicate the source of evidence and
strength of speaker commitment to information conveyed. They include
sentence adverbials such as 'obviously', parenthetical constructions such as
'I think', and hearsay expressions such as 'allegedly'. This thesis argues
against the speech-act and Gricean accounts of evidentials and defends a
Relevance-theoretic account
Chapter 1 surveys general linguistic work on evidentials, with particular
reference to their semantic and pragmatic status, and raises the following
issues: for linguistically encoded evidentials, are they truth-conditional or
non-truth-conditional, and do they contribute to explicit or implicit
communication? For pragmatically inferred evidentials, is there a
pragmatic framework in which they can be adequately accounted for?
Chapters 2-4 survey the three main semantic/pragmatic frameworks for the
study of evidentials. Chapter 2 argues that speech-act theory fails to give an
adequate account of pragmatic inference processes. Chapter 3 argues that
while Grice's theory of meaning and communication addresses all the
central issues raised in the first chapter, evidentials fall outside Grice's
basic categories of meaning and communication.
Chapter 4 outlines the assumptions of Relevance Theory that bear on the
study of evidentials. I sketch an account of pragmatically inferred
evidentials, and introduce three central distinctions: between explicit and
implicit communication, truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional
meaning, and conceptual and procedural meaning. These distinctions are
applied to a variety of linguistically encoded evidentials in chapters 5-7.
Chapter 5 deals with sentence adverbials, chapter 6 focuses on
parenthetical constructions, and chapter 7 looks at hearsay particles. My
main concern is with how these expressions pattern with respect to the three
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distinctions developed in chapter 4. 1 show that although all three types of
expression contribute to explicit rather than implicit communication, they
exhibit important differences with respect to both the truth-
conditional/non-truth-conditional and 	 the conceptual/procedural
distinctions.
Chapter 8 is a brief conclusion.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
EVIDENTIALS: THEIR NATURE AND FUNCTIONS
1.1	 Defming evidentials
In A Dictionary of Linguistics & Phonetics (1991), David Crystal defines
evidentiality as
'A term used in SEMANTICS for a type of EPISTEMIC MODALITY where PROPOSITIONS
are asserted that are open to challenge by the hearer, and require justification.
Evidential constructions express a speaker's strength of commitment to a proposition in
terms of the available evidence (rather than in terms of possibility or necessity). They
add such nuances of meaning to a given sentence as "I saw it happen", "I heard that it
happened", "I have seen evidence that it happened" (though I wasn't there), or "I have
obtained information that it happened from someone else". ...' (ibid. 127)
There are two points worth noticing in Crystal's definition. First, he defines
evidentiality as a semantic notion, although in the literature evidentials have
been primarily examined in terms of their pragmatic function, e.g.
modifying (weakening, or strengthening) the speaker's degree of commitment
to the information communicated (Urmson 1963, Palmer 1986, Chafe 1986,
Mayer 1990). This raises a fundamental question about the scope of the term
'evidential'. Crystal seems to be suggesting that the term 'evidential' should
be exclusively used for constructions which linguistically encode information
about the speaker's degree of commitment. This implies that the role of
pragmatic inference in the interpretation of 'evidential' utterances can be
safely ignored. Second, according to Crystal, the term 'evidential' does not
apply to consti-uctions that express possibility or necessity. Thus, modals such
as must, may, might, can, could, ought to, shouId, are excluded. This raises
the question of where the borderline between evidentiality and other types of
epistemic modality is to be drawn. Presumably, adverbials such as possibly
and necessarily are to be exdudeth but what about expressions such as
perhaps and maybe, or constructions such as 'I think/I suppose/I guess John
is in Berlin' and 'Iknow/I tell you that John is in Berlin'? Which 'nuances of
meaning' are specifically evidential and which are not?
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The answers to these questions can not be obtained from Crystal's brief and
rather vague definition. A survey of the literature, however, shows two
things. First, the notion of evidential is basically a functional one: that is, it is
applied to linguistic expressions in virtue of their pragmatic function.
Second, modals, adverbials and other epistemic modifiers of the type
described above are standardly treated as evidentials (Urmson 1963, Givón
1982, Anderson 1986, Chafe 1986, Mithun 1986, Mayer 1990, Blakemore
forthcoming). A sample of these approaches is given below.
Jacobsen (1986: 3-28), in a concise historical review of evidentlailty in
linguistic description, points out that although the concept of evidentials as a
category has existed in Americanist circles for some decades, the label
EVIDENTIAL is relatively recent. The concept is traced back to the work of
Franz Boas on Kwakiutl (1911a, 1911b, 1947, 1911 ed.), who examined
certain 'Suffixes denoting the source of information' (1911b: 496). The term
EVIDENTIAL occurs in Boas' posthumously published Kwakiutl Grammar
(1947) as applied to just one of 'a small group of suffixes [which] expresses
source and certainty of knowledge ...' (ibid.: 206). As Jacobsen shows, since
then there has been a line of Americanist descendants of Boas who have
referred to evidentiality (E. Sapir 1921, M. Swadesh 1939, 1). D. Lee 1938,
1944, 1959, R. Jakobson 1944/1971, 1957/1971, 1959/1971, etc., and
more recently L. C. Thompson 1979 and W. L. Chafe 1979). The concept of
evidentials is absent, however, from linguistics textbooks and surveys of
grammatical categories, mainly due to a lack of European and classical
languages with distinctive evidential forms (Jacobsen 1986: 7).
Chafe and Nichols (1986), in their Introduction to Evidentiality: The
Linguistic Coding of Epistemology1 , introduce evidentiality as follows:
'There are ... things people are less sure of, and some things they think are only within
the realm of possibility. Languages typically provide a repertoire of devices for
conveying these various attitudes towards knowledge. Often enough, speakers present
things as unquestionably true: for example, "It's raining". On other occasions English
speakers, for example, may use an adverb to show something about the reliability of
what they say, the probability of its truth: "It's probably raining" or "Maybe it's
raining". Inference from some kind of evidence may be expressed with a modal
auxiliary: "It must be raining". Or the specific kind of evidence on which an inference is
1 This is a comp ilation of papers presented at a conference in Berkeley (1981),
especially organized to compare evidentiality and the nature of evidential devices in a
variety of languages, mainly those where evidentiality is encoded in the inflectional
morphology.
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based may be indicated with a separate verb: "it sounds like it's raining". The view that
a piece of knowledge does not match the prototypical meaning of a verbal category
may be shown formulaically: "It's sort of raining". Or an adverb may suggest that some
knowledge is different from what might have been expected: "Actually, it's raining".'
(ibid.: vii)
The Evidentials Symposium at Berkeley in 1981 and the proceedings volume
(Chafe and Nichols eds. 1986) was the first step towards broadening our
knowledge in this area. According to Chafe and Nichols, evidentials are
devices used by speakers to mark the source and the reliability of their
knowledge. They do not attempt to delimit the boundaries of evidentiality,
and acknowledge that the volume they are introducing represents a stage of
exploration where heterogeneous perspectives are presented. Again, they
point Out that the original interest in evidentiality was aroused by American
Indian languages, especially those of Northern California, where the marking
of evidentiality is systematized mainly in verb suffixes. The book covers a
wide range of such languages: for example Kashaya (Northern California),
Wintu (Northern California), Patwin (Northern California), Maricopa
(Arizona), Northern lroquoian languages (New York, Quebec, Ontario), Jaqi
languages (Peru, Bolivia, Chile), Quechua (Peru). Evidentiality is also
examined in Turkish, Balkan languages, Tibetan languages, Akha (Lob-
Burmese family), Japanese, and Chinese pidgin Russian. The research was
focused on these languages precisely because they exhibit elaborated
inflectional evidential systems, and hence lend themselves to relatively
straightforward investigation and neat results.
Let us examine the way some of the contributors to this volume define
evidentiallty. Mithun (1986: 89-112) defInes evidentials as
markers [which] qualify the reliability of information communicated in four
primary ways. They specify the source of evidence on which statements are based, their
degree of precision, their probability, and expectations concerning their probability.'
(ibid.: 89)
Among what she calls 'lexical evidential markers' in English, she indudes I
suppose, I guess, maybe, must have been, seems, looks, smells like, they say, I
hear, probably, itis highly improbable, he is sure to (ibid.: 89-90).
Anderson (ibid.: 273-3 12) attempts a more precise defmition, in four parts:
'(3a) Evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to
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the person making that claim, whether
direct evidence plus observation (no inference needed)
evidence plus inference
inference (evidence unspecified)
reasoned expectation from logic and other facts and
whether the evidence is auditory, or visual, etc.
(3b) Evidentials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a
specification added to a factual claim ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE.
(3c) Evidentials have the indication of evidence as in (a) as their primary meaning, not
only as a pragmatic inference.
(3d) Morphologically, evidentials are inflections, clitics, or other free syntactic
elements (not compounds or derivational forms).' (ibid. 274-275)
On the basis of this definition, Anderson claims that the bracketed
constructions in (la-e) are, indeed, evidentials:
(1)	 a. The toast [must have] burned.
b. [I hear] Mary won the PRIZE.
c. [I heard] (that) Mary won the PRIZE.
d. [I understand that] Mary won the PRIZE.
e. [I have it on good authority that] Mary won the PRIZE.
f. [I smell] a pie baking.
(if) qualifies as an evidential by definitions (3a,b,d) but not by (3c):
perception verbs are not primarily evidentials, i.e. they do not have the
indication of evidence as their primary meaning, but they often carry
epistemically qualified implicatures (ibid.: 276-277). Thus, Anderson
considers (if) a borderline case and labels it as 'evidential USAGE' (ibid.).
It is clear, then, that according to Anderson, (a) the term 'evidential',
although it is a special grammatical phenomenon which does not simply
include anything that might have an evidential function, does include
constructions which are not primarily evidential but which have an evidential
use, (b) constructions that express possibility or necessity fali within the
range of evidentials, and (c) evidentials do not constitute the main point of
the proposition expressed; they are specifications added to the proposition
expressed. According to Anderson, then, evidentials are used
'...(a) to specify factual claims and (b) indicate the justification available TO THE
PERSON MAKING THE CLAIM ...' (ibid.: 277)
Based on these claims, Anderson arrives at the following generalizations:
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'(8) Evidentials are normally used in assertions (realis clauses), not in irrealis clauses,
nor in presuppositions.
(9a) When the claimed fact is directly observable by both speaker and hearer,
evidentials are rarely used (or have a special emphatic or surprisal sense).
(9b) When the speaker (first person) was a knowing participant in some event
(voluntary agent; conscious experiencer), the knowledge of that event is normally
direct and evidentials are often then omitted.
(9c) Often, it is claimed, second person in questions is treated as first person in
statements. (But such examples may contain ordinary perception verbs rather than
archetypal evidentials, ...).' (ibid.: 277-278)
Anderson's discussion still leaves a few questions unanswered. For example,
are discourse connectives which mark the drawing of inference, such as so
and therefore, to be considered as evidentials under his defmition? Are
intonation and prosodic features which indicate degree of speaker
commitment to be included in the range of evidentials? Does the
paralinguistic quotative device of two index fingers forming invisible
quotation marks around part of the utterance, in combination with the right
intonational features, constitute an evidentiality marker? And what about
cases of pure pragmatic inference where nothing is linguistically encoded,
prosodically signalled or bodily expressed? These are certainly cases where
the context enables the hearer to infer that the information being
communicated has a certain source, and hence a certain degree of strength.
Crystal and Anderson apparently exclude such utterances from the range of
evidentials; but is such a dividing line the most theoretically interesting one?
1.2	 The functions of evidentials
We saw above that the notion of an evidential is basically a functional one. Let
us look a little more closely at the functions that have been proposed. Most
authors agree that evidentials have two main functions: they indicate the
source of knowledge, and the speaker's degree of certainty about the
proposition expressed:
(a) Evidentials indicate the source of knowledge (Bybee 1985, Chafe and
Nichols eds. 1986, Mithun 1986, Chafe 1986, Mayer 1990, GivOn 1982,
Willett 1988). Information can be acquired in various ways, for example:
(i) By observation (sensory/perceptual evidence) (Chafe 1986, Anderson
1986, Woodbury 1986, Palmer 1986).
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(2)	 a.Iseehimcoming.
b. Ihear her cooking.
c. I feel water in my shoes.
d. It tastes good.
and the less reliable
e. He looks like he's drunk.
f. She sounds like she's upset.
g. It feels like a hot sauna.
h. It smells like roasted chicken.
(II) By hearsay (from other people) (Chafe 1986, Anderson 1986, Mithun
1986, Palmer 1986, Blakemore forthcoming)
(3)	 a. John tells me you got a job.
b. Ihearyougotajob.
c. People say he's trustworthy.
d. He is said to have done it.
e. He is reputed to be very learned.
f. Allegedly, the computer has been stolen.
g. Reportedly, he is the burglar.
and several less direct hearsay devices which primarily perform other
functions (Chafe 1986, Mithun 1986, Blakemore forthcoming):
h. It seems he is the burglar.
i. It's supposed to be the best play of the year.
j. Apparently, she is very efficient.
(ffl) By inference (GivOn 1982, Chafe 1986, Mithun 1986, Mayer 1990,
Blakemore forthcoming)
(4)	 a. Presumably, he is capable of teaching 'A' levels.
b. John seems to/must be here now.
c. John must have arrived.
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d. I gather that Tom's in town.
Although not standardly included in evidential treatments, the inferential
expressions in (4e-f) might be induded in this class:
e. So you've spent all your money.
f. I deduce that he has worked hard.
g. Consequently, I will give him a first.
(iv) By memory. Although not standardly treated as evidentials, there is a
class of expressions which indicate that information is simply recalled:
(5)	 a. I remember that John won the prize.
b. I recall that it was raining on my wedding day.
c. As I recollect, his childhood was not easy.
Since memory is variably reliable, such expressions have a claim to be a
considered as evidentials.
(b) Evidentials indicate the speaker's degree of certainty (Derbyshire 1979,
Givón 1982, Palmer 1986, Chafe 1986, Mayer 1990). People communicate
information being aware, though not necessarily consciously aware, that not
all knowledge is equally reliable. Thus, they qualify their statements by
means of certain evidential constructions, for example:
(i) By certain propositional attitude and parenthetical expressions (Urmson
1963, Givón 1982, Chafe 1986, Mithun 1986)
(6)	 a. I think that John is in Berlin.
b. Iknow John is in Berlin.
c. I suspect that he is the burglar.
d. I guess that he will have to resign.
e. I suppose that he will have to resign.
and
f. John is in Berlin, I think.
g. John is, I know, in Berlin.
h. He is the burglar, I suspecL
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i. He will have, I guess, to resign.
j. He will have to resign, I suppose.
(ii) By certain adverbials (Urmson 1963, GivOn 1982, Chafe 1986, Mayer
1990, Blakemore forthcoming)
(7)	 a. He is probably the best actor of the year.
b. It is certainly very beautiful.
c. John is possibly coming tonight.
d. The answer is undoubtedly 'no'.
e. Surely, you know what I mean.
f. Evidently, the ball was over the line.
g.The ball was, obviously, over the line.
(iii) By epistemic modals (GivOn 1982, Chafe 1986, Anderson 1986, Mayer
1990).
(8)	 a. I maynot come tonight.
b. He might tell us the truth.
c. She can claim that you were there.
d. He could be ill.
e. Helen must be better today.
f. That'li be the postman.
g. He ought to/should be there.
Generally, this functional criterion is combined with more or less restrictive
linguistic criteria, which I shall consider below.
1.3	 Linguistic rroterties of evidentials
1.3.1	 Decoding versus inference
As we have seen, evidentials are generally treated as a semantic category,
linguistically encoding information about the source and reliability of the
information being offered. Before turning to the various linguistic criteria
that have been proposed to distinguish evidentials, let me ifiustrate first how
an utterance may function evidentially without this information being
17
linguistically encoded at all. Consider (9):
(9) There are 2,712 beans in the bag.
If produced as a guess in a fairground competition, this would be understood
as communicating a much lower degree of certainty than if produced in an
official announcement of the results. Or consider (10):
(10) John is feeling miserable today.
The information in (10) would be understood as having different sources if
produced by a speaker who had just seen John's miserable expression
(observation), was reporting what John had said (hearsay), had just observed
John's behaviour (inference), and so on; and such implicit assumptions about
the source of the information might play a role in the interpretation of the
utterance itself. Such pragmatic inferences about the source and reliability of
information are interesting in their own right, and may well interact with the
linguistic encoding of evidentiality.
Blakemore (forthcoming) is one of the few linguists to draw attention to non-
linguistic 'evidentials', such as intonation, prosodic features and the two-
index-fingers quotation marks used to attribute the words quoted to someone
else. Blakemore wonders whether the above should be considered as
grammatical devices used to indicate the type of evidence the speaker has.
Regardless of the answer to this question, Blakemore points out that there is a
substantial element of pragmatic inference in the interpretation of
evidentiality. On her view, those aspects of evidentiality which are derived
pragmatically through the interaction of linguistic form with context,
pragmatic principles and inference must be taken into account too.
Interestingly enough, in certain Balkan Slavic languages (e.g. Bulgarian) the
expression of evidentiality relies to a considerable extent on the context.
According to Friedman (in Chafe and Nichols eds. 1986: 168-187)
evidentiality is 'the chief contextual variant meaning (HAUPTBEDEUTUNG)' in
Balkan Slavic languages. Here, certain forms can be used evidentially, and
often are, but
'the fact that this is not always the case means that evidentiality is not inherent in
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these forms but results from a combination of whatever meaning is always present
when the form is used (which meaning must then be sought) and the surrounding
context. These forms are thus not special evidenitial forms but rather forms
contextually capable of expressing evidentiality.' (ibid.: 169)
In other words, he continues, in some Balkan Slavic languages
'...evidentiality does not constitute a generic grammatical category on a level with, for
example, mood, tense and aspect Rather, evidentiality is a meaning, whether contextual
or invariant, expressed by the generic grammatical category which indicates the
speaker's attitude toward the narrated event' (ibid.)
One point to notice is that the forms Friedman considers mark the speaker's
attitude toward the information communicated. The other point is that
identification of this attitude depends both on decoding and on inference,
which must therefore be dealt with in any adequate account
'The question of whether the source of information was a report, deduction, direct
experience, or something else is answered by the context in which the speaker's choice
of form occurs.' (ibid.: 185)
1.3.2	 Syntax versus morphology
Among linguists who restrict their attention to linguistically encoded
information, the most general definition is proposed by Chafe (1986: 261-
272), Mayer (1990: 101-163), who treat as evidentials all linguistic
expressions encoding evidential information - i.e. all the functionally
evidential expressions listed in (a(i-iii)) and (b(i-iil)). Chafe (1986) considers
a wide range of evidential linguistic expressions such as the ones in (a(i-iii))
and (b(i-iii)). Mayer (1990) defines evidentials as
'items that have to do with the way information is graded in respect of certainty and
source.' (ibid.: 103)
He discusses the German equivalents of must, obviously, surely/certainly,
seem and supposedly (ibid.). On this approach, the notion of an evidential is
construed in the broadest possible terms.
1.3.2.1 Morohological criteria
At the opposite extreme are linguists like Levinsohn (1975), Derbyshire
(1979), GivOn (1982), Barnes (1984), Willett (1988), Palmer (1986), Chafe
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and Nichols (eds) (1986) who treat as evidentials only those expressions
which encode evidential information as part of the inflectional morphology.
Tuyuca (Colombia and Brazil), for example, is famous for its complex system
of five evidentials which enables the speaker to communicate how and when
he obtained his information (Barnes 1984). It is obligatory that speakers of
Tuyuca indicate whether they obtained their information in one of the
following ways: (i) visually (II) nonvisually (iii) through evidence of the state
or event ('apparent') (iv) by being told about the state or event ('secondhand')
and (v) by assuming what happened ('assumed'). A typical example is given
in (11):
(11)	 a. diiga ape-wi
'He played soccer' (I saw him play).
b. diiga ape-ti
'He played soccer' (I heard the game and him, but I didn't see it
or him).
c. diiga apé-yi
'He played soccer' (I have seen evidence that he played: his
distinctive shoe print on the playing field. But I did not see him
play).
d. diiga apé-yigi
'He played soccer' (I obtained the information from someone
else).
e. dIiga apé-higi
'He played soccer' (It is reasonable to assume that he did)
(Barnes 1984: 257).
Within this overall morphological approach, further subdivisions are
possible. Palmer (1986) draws a distinction between two systems of epistemic
modality: judgements and evidentials (ibid.: 5 1-76). The system of
judgements includes the notions of possibility/necessity which are expressed
by modals, e.g. may, must, will, can, might, would, ought to, should, or by
mood, e.g. subjunctive (ibid.: 5 7-66). The system of evidentials typically
includes the 'hearsay' and 'sensory' types of evidence which, in English at
least, ale conveyed by expressions such as It is said that, X said that, It
appears that, I saw, I heard (ibid. 52 and 66-76). The two systems are quite
closely connected and often overlap. Both are concerned with the indication
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by the speaker of his degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition
expressed (ibid.: 51). Thus, in English for example, it is possible to have
combinations of the two systems as in I can see, I can hear, I could tell, I
wouldn't know, it might be thought that, it might seem, it can possibly be
said. Still, Palmer thinks it is worth drawing the distinction and pointing out
that certain languages, e.g. English, only granimaticalize judgements, whereas
others, e.g. Tuyuca, only grammaticalize evidentials, and others, e.g. German,
combine the two in their system of grammatical marking.
Palmer's (1986: 51-54, 66-7 6) survey of evidentials is restricted to languages
which grammaticalize evidentiality in terms of formal markers (inflections,
particles, clitics) indicating whether information is 'visual', 'reported',
'deduced', 'speculative', and other finer evidential distinctions such as
'witnessed positive', 'witnessed negative', 'firsthand information' and
'emphatic firsthand information'. One of the languages he considers is
Hixkaryana (Carib, N. Brazil - Derbyshire 1979: 143-145), which has specific
particles for expressing:
(12)	 a. hearsay:	 -ti
nomokyan	 ha-ti
'He's coming' (they say)
b. uncertainty:	 -na
nomokyan	 ha-na
'Maybe he'll come'
c. deduction:	 -mi
nomokyan	 ha-mi
'He's evidently coming' (on hearing the sound of an outhoard
motor).
d. positive doubt, sceptidsm -mpe
nomokyaxow	 ha-mpe
'They're coming! I don't believe it' (Palmer 1986: 54)
Palmer also refers to Inga a Qjiechuan language of Colombia) (Levinsohn
1975: 14-15), which has five particles for encoding evidentiality. Examples of
three of them are given in (13):
(13)	 a. action witnessed: -mi
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ins	 pun uncuna-mi
'There they slept'
b. action deduced by the speaker: -cha
chipica diablo-char ca
'A devil was presumably there'
c. action reported to the speaker: -Si
chacapi-si	 yailinacü
'They were crossing the bridge' (Palmer 1986: 52)
Between the two extremes set out so far, one can imagine a whole range of
linguistic criteria for evidentiality, most of which are more relevant than
Palmer's morphological restrictions to the issues I want to discuss in this
thesis.
1.3.2.2 Syntactic criteria
One distinction worth noting is between evidential expressions which are
syntactically parenthetical, i.e. in some sense syntactically independent of the
main clause, and those that are not. Consider, for example, true
parentheticals versus their main-clause counterparts as in (14):
(14) John is, I think, in Berlin	 vs.	 I think John is in Berlin.
This is a distinction which has hardly ever been drawn by linguists dealing
with evidential expressions, yet it might have significant effects on
interpretation.
Similarly, consider parenthetical sentence adverbials versus integrated VP-
adverbials (Hartvigson 1969, Schreiber 1972, Jackendoff 1972, Goral 1974),
as in (15):
(15) Obviously, John was stealing vs. 	 John was obviously
(=openly) stealing.
What is the relation between the two occurrences of 'obviously'? Generally,
the sentence adverbial is seen as an evidential, whereas the VP manner
adverbial is not. Yet the meanings of the two adverbials are clearly related,
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and in fact either occurrence can be interpreted in either way. Can some
systematic statement be made?
From a syntactic point of view, evidentials of the type illustrated above, i.e.
true parenthetical verbs, as in (14), and sentence adverbials, as in (15),
belong to a more general class of parenthetical constructions. Examples of
such constructions are given in (16):
(16)	 a. John, who is an economist, registered for an MA in Linguistics.
b. Peter was there, if that makes any difference.
c. Bill has, by the y, accepted the invitation.
d. Mary seems, to put it mildly, to be quite ineffident.
e. Frankly, my dear, I don't know how to handle that.
f. Mary's book, a best seller, hasn't impressed me in the least.
g. Bill, and prepare yourself fora shoclç is getting married.
h. Three people, or maybe more, came to the party.
i. It has been raining, because the grass is wet.
j. It was raining, but the grass is not weti
Similarly, evidential sentence adverbials belong together syntactically with a
much broader range of sentence adverbials. Examples are given in (17):
(17)	 a. Frankly, he is a bore.
b. John has, unfortunately, failed the exam.
c. I don't care, honestly!
d. Confidentially, Peter broke up with Jane.
e. Very sadly and regrettably, he lost his job.
Recently, it has been suggested that none of these constructions are
syntactically integrated with the sentences they modify (Mittwoch 1977,
1979, 1985, Haegeman 1984, 1991, Fabb 1990, Espinal 1991, Burton-
Roberts forthcoming). The suggestion is that the two syntactically separate
parts form a unit only in discourse structure; their relation is, in other words,
established at the level of utterance interpretation rather than in the syntax.
This raises the following questions: (a) what is the relation between the truly
parenthetical evidentials and their non-parenthetical counterparts? and what
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is the relation between the truly parenthetical evidentials and the broader
class of parenthetical constructions illustrated in (16) and (17)? They are
certainly syntactically similar. Are they semantically similar too?
1.3.3	 Semantic criteria
The syntactic distinction between parenthetical and non-parenthetical
constructions seems to correlate to some degree at least with a semantic
distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional expressions.
Roughly, expressions which are syntactically external to the main clause seem
to be semantically external to the proposition expressed and hence to make
no contribution to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur.
On this view, (18), for example, would be true or false depending on whether
John did or did not leave, and the evidential 'obviously' would merely
indicate the speaker's degree of certainty or source of evidence, but make no
contribution to the truth conditions of the utterance itself:
(18) Obviously, John left
By contrast, the manner adverbial 'obviously' in (15) above is truth-
conditional in the regular way. A hypothesis I would like to examine is the
one outlined above: that only the truly parenthetical evidentials are non-
truth-conditional, whereas their main-clause counterparts such as those in
(19):
(19) a.Ithinksheisill.
b. Bill tells me she is ill.
are not.
This is not a hypothesis that has generally been made in the semantic
literature on evidentials. Many semanticists seem to assume that all
evidentials, both main-clause and parenthetical, are non-truth-conditional
(Benveniste 1958, Austin 1962, Urmson 1963, Holdcroft 1978, Anderson
1986). These two hypotheses need further investigation, and one of my main
aims is to explore them further. Because my central interest is in the truth-
conditional or non-truth-conditional status of evidentials, I will feel free to
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compare my chosen evidentials with a variety of non-evidential phenomena
which are standardly treated as non-truth-conditional and which seem to fall
into the same syntactic class as the evidentials I will be considering.
Parentheticals in general, as in (16), and sentence adverbials in general, as in
(17), are cases in point.
One of the reasons for looking at evidentials, then, is to see whether their
similarities in function reflect deeper similarities in their semantic status,
and whether these similarities are shared by other items with similar
syntactic properties, or not. Moreover, can some pragmatic statement be
made regarding truly parenthetical evidentials and parenthetical
constructions in general?
As regards the defmition of evidentiality, I shall take the broadest possible
approach, allowing myself to consider both semantically encoded and
pragmatically inferred aspects of meaning. Within this framework, there are
three main questions which I would like to investigate.
1.4	 The issues
1.4.1	 Pragmatic inference and evidentials
As we have seen, linguists dealing with evidentiality have been primarily, if
not solely, concerned with linguistically encoded information about the source
and reliability of the information being offered. One of the issues I will be
investigating is the extent to which evidential information can be
communicated in ways other than encoding/decoding. It has hardly ever
been pointed out that the source of knowledge or the speaker's degree of
certainty about the proposition expressed, can be pragmatically inferred.
Granting that this is so, it would be interesting to know whether there is a
pragmatic framework which can account for such pragmatically inferred
evidential information, and its interaction with what is linguistically
encoded.
1.4.2	 Truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional semantics
Standardly, semanticists distinguish between truth-conditional and non-
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truth-conditional meaning. Evidentials in general have been treated in non-
truth-conditional terms, i.e. as contributing not to the proposition expressed
by the utterance, its truth-conditional content, but to indicating the source
and reliability of the information being offered. Is this, indeed, true for all
evidential sentence adverbials and verbs, both truly parenthetical and main-
clause ones, as semanticists have claimed? As already suggested, it may turn
out that only the truly parenthetical evidentials are non-truth-conditional,
whereas the main-clause ones are not.
1.4.3	 Explicit versus imtlicit communication
Standardly, pragmatists distinguish between explicit and implicit
com.munication. Is the information which speakers successfully communicate
about the evidential status of their utterances typically explicit or implicit?
Does the distinction between explicit and implicit communication coincide
with those between decoding and inference, or between truth-conditional and
non-truth-conditional status? These questions will be another main focus of
my research.
In the next chapters, three approaches to pragmatic inference, to non-truth-
conditional semantics, and to the distinction between explicit and implicit
communication will be outlined: the speech-act approach, Grice's approach
and the relevance-theoretic approach developed by Sperber and Wilson. In
subsequent chapters, the application of these approaches to various
evidential constructions will be investigated in more detail.
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CHAPTER 2
SPEECH-ACT THEORY
2.1	 Soeech acts. language and communication
My aim in this chapter is not to provide yet another introduction to speech-
act theory, since several good ones exist (Lyons 1977, Bach and Harnish 1979,
Récanati 1987, Vanderveken 1990). My aim is, instead, to see what light
speech-act theory can shed on the specific questions raised in the previous
chapter, about (a) the nature of pragmatic inference, (b) the distinction
between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional semantics, and (c) the
distinction between explicit and implicit communication. More detailed
discussion of the speech-act approach to evidentials will be given in chapters
4 and 5.
Following Wilson (1992), I shall draw a distinction between speech-act theory
(the study of speech acts), speech-act pragmatics (the view that utterance
interpretation is largely a matter of recognizing what speech acts the speaker
intended to perform) and speech-act semantics (the view that speech-act
information is often linguistically encoded). Since this distinction is central to
the three questions that concern me, I will say a word about each.
2.1.1	 Speech-act theory
Speech-act theory developed as a reaction to an over-emphasis on the
descriptive use of language, on truth-conditional approaches to sentence
mepning. The philosopher J. L. Austin in his book How to Do Things With
Words (1962) claimed that language is used not only to describe the world,
but to act upon, or in, it: language is used to perform actions - speech acts:
making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises,
predicting, warning, apologizing, guessing, congratulating, begging,
baptizing. Language, according to Austin, is not only a tool for representing
reality or expressing thoughts; more importantly, it is used to change the
27
world: to influence others, to create new states of affairs, to express social
roles, to arouse emotions. Language was no longer viewed simply as a means
of conveying information: it was primarily a soda! phenomenon, reflected in
social institutions which enable a wide variety of actions to be performed
(Lyons 1977: 725, Bach and Harnish 1979, Sperber and Wilson 1986,
Récanati 1987).
Speech-act theorists were much concerned with describing and classifying
speech acts. One basic distinction drawn by Austin was between locudonary,
illocutionaiy and perlocudonary acts. A locutionary act is an act of saying
something meaningful, e.g. of saying that the dog went off its leash. An
ifiocutionary act is an act performed in saying something, e.g. in saying that
the dog went off its leash Imay request you to leash it. A perlocutionary act is
an act performed by saying something, e.g. by saying that the dog went off its
leash I may frighten you. Identifying the locutionary act performed by a
speaker, i.e. 'the act ... with a certain more or less definite "sense" and a
more or less definite "reference" (which altogether are equivalent to
"meaning")' (Austin 1962: 93) involves the resolution of ambiguities and
fixing of referents in the way intended by the speaker; it yields, in other
words, the proposition expressed, the truth-conditional content or 'what is
said'.
The main concern of speech-act theorists, however, has been with
ifiocutionary acts: acts such as asserting, promising, warning, ordering,
requesting, threatening, etc. Speech-act theorists have dealt primarily with
descriptive issues: what types of speech act are there, and how should they be
grouped together? The standard classification is in Expression and Meaning
(Searle 1979: 1-29). Searle distinguishes five major categories of speech acts:
(i) Assertives (e.g. statements) which are defined as committing the
speaker (in varying degrees) to the truth of the proposition expressed by the
utterance. Assertive speech acts include asserting that p. swearing that p.
insisting thatp as well as boasting that p, complaining that p1.
1 Searle (1979: 13) claims that concluding, deducing, and Austin's verdictives, e.g.
assessing, interpreting as, analysing, calculating, (Austin 1962: 153) as well as most of
his expositives, e.g. deducing, concluding by, ?doubting, ?knowing, ?believing (Austin
1962: 162-3) are further types of assertives. However, these are not, strictly speaking,
speech acts since they can be performed silently and mentally.
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(ii) Directives (e.g. orders) which are defined as attempts (of varying
degrees of strength) to get the hearer to do something. Directive speech acts
include advising somebody to do something, requesting someone to do
something, entreating someone to do something. Qjjestions come under this
category of speech acts, according to Searle, since they are attempts by the
speaker to get the hearer to do something, namely answer the question.
(iii) Commissives (e.g. promises) which commit the speaker to some future
course of action, e.g. undertaking to do something.
(iv) Expressives (e.g. apologies) which are defined as communicating the
speaker's emotional attitude to the state of affairs described by the utterance,
e.g. congratulating, thanking, welcoming someone.
(v) Declarations (e.g. declaring the court open) which are defined as
bringing about the state of affairs described in the proposition expressed by
the utterance, e.g. firing somebody, declaring war, baptizing someone.
Searle's definition of assertive speech acts, and in particular his claim that
these commit the speaker ith varying degrees of strength to the truth of the
proposition expressed, offers to shed some light on the analysis of
evidentials. According to Searle, assertives are 'assessable' or 'determinable'
on a true-false dimension and the speaker should specify the extent to which
he commits himself to the truth of the proposition expressed. For example,
the degree of commitment may vary between suggesting or putting foiward
as a hypothesis, on the one hand, and insisting, or swearing, on the other
(Searle 1979: 12-13). Evidentials can, presumably, be considered further
linguistic means of spedfying degree of commitment.
In the same descriptive vein, speech-act theorists have defined various
felicity conditions which illocutionary acts must fulfil if they are to be
successful and non-defective. Austin (1962, Lecture II) offered an elaborate
classification of infelicities, i.e. ways in which various acts can go wrong,
mainly in terms of misfires (the act is not achieved) and abuses (the act is
achieved, but is 'unhappy': 'hollow' or 'not implemented'). Misfires can be
avoided as long as conventional procedures with conventional effects are put
into action by the appropriate persons in the appropriate circumstances,
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both correctly and completely. Abuses can be avoided as long as the persons
involved in the action have the thoughts and feelings required by the action
in question, the intentions to act accordingly, and they actually do act
accordingly (ibid.: 14-15). Searle (1969: 57-61) classified felicity conditions
under three main heads, as preparatoiy conditions, sincerity conditions and
essential conditions. To satisfy preparatory conditions, the person and the
situation must be appropriate for the performance of the act. If not, the act
will be, in Austin's terms, a misfire. For example, the person who pronounces
two people man and wife must be authorized to do so, and he must, probably,
produce the utterance in the course of a more or less established procedure.
To satisfy sincerity conditions, the person performing the act must do so
sincerely, i.e. with the appropriate beliefs or feelings. If not, the act will be,
in Austin's terms, an abuse. For example, the person who thanks someone for
a service must feel gratitude or appreciation towards him. Essential
conditions are those that must be satisfied for the act to be performed at all.
For example, the person who promises, essentially undertakes the obligation
or expresses the intention to perform a certain act. If the speaker can show
that he did not have this intention, he can prove that the utterance was not a
promise.
It is not dear where within this framework of felicity conditions evidentials
would fit in. According to Austin, our assertions are not valid unless we have
evidence for them (Lyons 1977: 733-734). According to Searle, as noted
above, the speaker of an assertive speech act makes a stronger or weaker
commitment to the proposition expressed. Both these conditions on
assertions can be explicitly signalled by use of evidentials. But are they
preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions or essential conditions on speech
acts such as asserting, suggesting, guaranteeing? One might say, perhaps,
that having an appropriate degree of evidence is an essential condition on
performing the speech act of suggesting, that believing one has an
appropriate degree of evidence is a sincerity condition on suggesting, and
that being regarded as having access to an appropriate degree of evidence is
a preparatory condition on suggesting. Discussions of felicity conditions
generally do not look at speech acts of this type at great length. However, the
standard speech-act position is that believing the proposition expressed by
an utterance is the sincerity condition of asserting, having a basis for
presenting the asserted proposition as true is the preparatory condition of
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asserting and the proposition's representing an actual state of affairs is the
essential condition of asserting (Searle 1969: 64, Vanderveken 1990: 117-
118). Sincerity conditions come with varying degrees of strength
(Vanderveken 1990: 119-12 1). Thus, putting forward as a positive assertion
that the state of affairs represented by the proposition expressed is (or will
be) true is a special sincerity condition expressed by guaranteeing, and
putting forward as a tentative assertion is a special sincerity condition
expressed by suggesting. A higher degree of strength of sincerity conditions
is also expressed by adverbs such as frankly, sincerely (Vanderveken 1990:
119). It seems, then, that evidentials would be analysed as further linguistic
means to express degree of strength of the sincerity conditions of assertions,
i.e. the degree with which the speaker asserts: weaker for suggest stronger
for guarantee (Vanderveken 1990: 172, 183).
2.1.2	 Speech-act pragmatics
This approach views speech-act theory as a useful framework for studying
pragmatics. Within such a framework, utterance interpretation would largely
consist in identifying the set of speech-acts, and in particular illocutionary
acts, the speaker intended to perform (Wilson 1992, Lecture 2). For example,
consider (1):
(1)	 I'll stay until 5.00.
For speech-act pragmatics, having identified the intended locutionary act, the
main question the hearer is faced with in interpreting (1) is deciding which
illocutionary act the speaker intended to perform: a straightforward
assertion, a promise, a warning, a threat, and so on. Such an approach is well
illustrated in Bach and Harnish's book Linguistic Communication and Speech
Acts (1979), which discusses in some detail how such a pragmatic theory
might work. According to Bach and Harnish, the hearer will reason along the
following lines in inferring the illocutionary act intended by the speaker of
(1):
Li	 Sisutteringe.
12	 S means 'S will stay until 5.00' by e.
13	 Maiyis saying that she will stay until 5.00 at ... place on ... day.
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L4	 Mary, if speaking literally, is constating that she will stay until
5.00.
13	 Mary could be speaking literally.
and ending with
L6	 Mary is promising that she will stay until 5.00.
(Bach and Harnish 1979: 61)
On this approach, some account of pragmatic inference will be needed to deal
with, for example, disambiguation and reference assignment, and hence the
identification of the intended locutionary act, which in Bach and Harnish's
schema occurs at L3. There are also cases where utterances do not encode a
full proposition: e.g. 'Red light', 'Hurrah for Manchester United' or 'Down
with Caesar' (Searle 1969: 31, Vanderveken 1990: 23-24). Such cases
presumably call for further pragmatic inference in order to be interpreted.
Similarly, some account of pragmatic inference will be needed to account for
indirect speech acts, which are a major feature of speech-act pragmatics. Bach
and Harnish further develop the above schema in order to show how hearers
reason in inferring indirect speech acts. How, for example, might the hearer
infer that (1) was intended as an offer to help the H with preparing a dinner
party? The hearer will go on to reason along the following lines:
L7	 Mary could not be merely stating that she will be staying until
5.00. (It is mutually believed that H is having a dinner party and
needs some help).
L8	 There is some F-mg that P connected in a way identifiable under
the circumstances to stating that Mary will stay until 5.00, such
that in stating that Mary will stay until 5.00 Mary could also be F-
Lug that P.
L9	 Mary is stating that she will stay until 5.00 and thereby offering to
help H with preparations for the dinner party.
(Bach and Harnish 1979: 73)
Moreover, in cases such as (1), i.e. cases where the illocuttonary acts are not
linguistically encoded, speech-act pragmatics must provide an account of how
hearers infer them, how hearers choose, in context, an actual illocuilonary
force from a range of semantically possible illocutionary forces assigned to the
32
sentence uttered. This is directly relevant to my work on evidentials, since, as
I have shown in chapter 1, the degree of strength of an assertive speech-act
often appears to be contextually inferred. The question I will be asking in a
later section is what light speech-act pragmatics sheds on this process of
pragmatic inference.
2.1.3	 Steech-act semantics
Speech-act semantics involves the study of how speech-act information is
linguistically encoded (Wilson 1992, Lecture 2). The obvious way to do so is
by means of performative verbs. These can be used precisely to name the
speech-act, or illocutionary act, that is being performed. Examples are given
in(2):
(2)	 a. I promise you that I'll stay until 5.00.
b. I warn you that nil stay until 5.00.
Speech-act theorists claim that such verbs in their first-person present-tense
uses make no contribution to the truth conditions of the utterances in which
they occur. (2a) and (2b) are true if and only if the speaker will stay until
5.00, and they are in this respect equivalent to (2c):
c. I'll stay until 5.00.
All three utterances express the same proposition, and hence have the same
truth conditions. In other words, they perform the same locutionary act.
Performative verbs are devoid of any descriptive meaning; their only
function is to disambiguate the illocutionary force of the utterance. They
indicate what speech act is being performed.
On this approach, a fundamental distinction is made between two types of
information that can be linguistically encodedi some words contribute to the
proposition expressed by an utterance, whereas others encode information
about illocutionary force. Hence Searle's famous representation of
sentence/utterance meaning as F(P) - i.e. as illocutionary force applied to a
propositional content. (2a-c) above would have the same propositional
content, but would, or could, differ as to their illocutionary force, encoded in
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(2a) and (2b) by the performative verbs. However, most speech-act theorists
claim to be doing more than mere lexicology of performative verbs. Speech-
act semantidsts claim that the class of linguistic constructions which encode
speech-act information - i.e. the class of illocutionary force indicators - is
much wider than the class of performative verbs. Mood indicators, i.e
linguistic features that distinguish declarative, interrogative, imperative,
exdamative, optative, subjunctive, conditional sentence types, are seen as a
further device for encoding speech-act information. The standard speech-act
claim about interrogatives and imperatives, for example, is that they are used
to ask questions, or request information, and issue commands, or request
action, respectively. 'Asking whether' and 'telling to' are speech acts
belonging to the directive class: to ask whether is to attempt to get the hearer
to answer the question, whereas to tell to is to attempt to get the hearer to
perform some action (Searle 1979: 13-14, Bach and Harmsh 1979: 48,
Sperber and Wilson 1986: 246, Wilson and Sperber 1988: 80, 91,
Vanderveken 1990: 15).
According to Vanderveken (1990: 16) different imperative sentences can be
used to encode different types of directive speech-acts by means of further
linguistic indicators. Examples are given in (3 a-b):
(3)	 a. Frankly, do it!
b. Please, do it!
c. Whether you like it or not, do it!
(3 a-c) have different directive illocutionary forces encoded by specffic
linguistic indicators such as frankly, please, conditionals. Frankly in (3a)
indicates that the speaker is granting honest permission to the hearer to do
something. This imperative sentence has the illocutio nary force of permitting
and it is a special (sincere) type of directive speech act. Please in (3b)
indicates that the speaker gives an option of refusal to the hearer. This
imperative sentence has the illocutionary force of a request and it is a special
(polite) type of directive speech act The conditional Whether.. . or not' in
(3c) indicates that the speaker does not give an option of refusal to the
hearer. This imperative sentence has the illocutionary force of an order and
it is a special (enforcing) type of directive speech act.
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Thus, speech-act semantics is the study, on the one hand, of the linguistically
encoded aspects of the locutionary act, and on the other, of the various
ilocutionary force indicators available for encoding information about
intended ifiocutionary acts. Evidentials, as we wiil see, are generally regarded
as contributing to the illocutionary force of an utterance rather than to the
proposition expressed (the locutionary act). This is one of the claims I
propose to investigate in later chapters. In the rest of this chapter, I will be
looking at how much light this general framework sheds on the three specific
questions that interest me: about the nature of pragmatic inference, the
dislinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional semantics,
and the distinction between explicit and implicit communication.
2.2	 Speech acts and pragmatic inference
The main questions to be addressed in this section are (a) whether speech-act
theorists subscribe to a distinction between semantic decoding and
pragmatic inference; (b) whether they are aware of the extent to which
pragmatic inference is necessary for utterance interpretation; (c) whether
they shed any light on the nature of the pragmatic inference processes
involved; and (d) whether they offer any criterion for choosing the intended
interpretation from a range of possible ones.
Early (pre-Gricean) speech-act theorists such as Austin, Strawson, Urmson,
early Searle, do not subscribe to a semantics-pragmatics distinction. Sentence
meaning is identified with ifiocutionary force potential: to give the meaning
of a sentence is to specify the range of speech acts that an utterance of that
sentence could be used to perform (Wilson and Sperber 1988: 77). Thus,
Searle (1969), for example, concluded that utterance interpretation can be
reduced to sentence interpretation: to interpret an utterance, i.e. to
determine the illocutionary act performed by the speaker, it is sufficient in
principle to understand the sentence uttered - or at least some sentence that
could have been uttered (Récanati 1987: 26). According to Searle:
'Wherever the illocutionary force of an utterance is not explicit it can always be made
explicit. This is an instance of the principle of expressibility, stating that whatever can
be meant can be said. Of course, a given language may not be rich enough to enable
speakers to say everything they mean, but there are no barriers In principle to
enriching it. ... whatever can be implied can be said, ...' (Searle 1969 68)
35
Essentially, the interpretation of utterances was seen as a matter of linguistic
decoding. Hence the emphasis on illocutionary force indicators such as
performative verbs, verb mood, and other devices mentioned above.
There are, on the other hand, some speech-act features which are clearly
pragmatically inferred: indirect speech acts are the paradigm examples of
pragmatically inferred speech acts. The question is how do speech-act
theorists account for them? Non-Gricean speech-act theorists such as Austin
(1962) only refer to indirect illocutionary acts that can be identified because
of some convention. According to Austin:
'...the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially, but by convention
(which is, of course, a fact). These features serve to pick out illocutionary acts most
satisfactorily.' (Austin 1962: 128)
By 'convention' Austin means a socially recognized criterion on the basis of
which the hearer can recognize the actual illocutionary acts. Thus, one act can
be performed indirectly by means of another: in saying, during a game of
bridge, 'I bid three clubs' I inform my partner indirectly that I have no
diamonds (Austin 1962: 130, Récanati 1987: 117). Such conventions are
non-linguistic, and illocutionary acts which are identified on the basis of
these are the only types of indirect illocutionary acts mentioned by Austin.
However, what happens in the case of standard indirect speech acts
illustrated by the famous example in (4)?
(4)	 Can you pass the salt?
Strictly speaking, this is a question requiring an answer but, usually, it is also
a request for action, i.e. to pass the salt. How do hearers infer the intended,
indirectly performed, fflocutionaiy act?
Searle in his early work (1969) explained indirect speech acts on the basis of
felicity conditions: performing an indirect speech act is, essentially,
indicating the satisfaction of an essential condition by means of asserting or
questioning one of the other conditions, i.e. preparatory conditions,
propositional content conditions, sincerity conditions (Searle 1969, Chapter
3: 68). Thus, (4) indicates the satisfaction of the essential condition for a
request by asserting that the sincerity condition that the speaker wishes the
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act to be performed holds and by questioning whether the preparatory
condition that the hearer has the ability to perform the act holds (see also
Searle 1975: 60, 1979: 31, Lyons 1977: 784-785). It is still not clear how
hearers infer the indirect speech act, although it might be clear how speakers
reason in producing them, how 'it is possible for the speaker to say one thing
and mean that but also to mean something else' (Searle 1979: 31). In later
work, Searle (1975, 1979) specifically uses Gncean machinery to deal with
indirect speech acts. He admits that the above account is 'incomplete' and
modifies it by taking into consideration Grice's principles of cooperative
conversation, mutually shared background information and the hearer's
ability to infer (Searle 1975: 59-82, 1979: 30-57).
Pragmatic inference as it has been dealt with by contemporary pragmatists
(Bach and Harnish, Récanati, Sperber and Wilson) does not come into pre-
Gricean theorists' machinery at all. After all, even when it is not explicitly
indicated which illocutionary act was intended, the speaker could have
chosen to use an explicit performative, which reinforces the same idea,
namely that utterance interpretation is, in principle at least, a matter of
sentence interpretation (Récanati 1987: 26). This emphasis on linguistic
decoding, or linguistically encoded illocutionary forces, gave pragmatics a
minimal or non-existent role in early speech-act theory.
How, then, do speech-act theorists deal with disanibiguation and reference
assignment, which are needed in order to recover the locutionary meaning of
a sentence; and how do they say hearers choose among a variety of speech
acts all compatible with the linguistic properties of the sentence uttered? Pre-
Gricean theorists usually appeal to 'context' when it comes to dealing with
these issues, but they never really explain what they mean by it. According to
Austin:
'...the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and ... the words used are to some
extent to be "explained" by the "conte,cf in which they are designed to be or have
actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange.' (Austin 1962: 100)
Similarly, Searle in discussing reference claims:
'In the above example ["That criminal is your friend"] ... it is clear that the context is
sufficient to provide an identifying description, for the word "that" in "that criminal"
indicates that the object either is present or has already been referred to by some other
referring expression ...' (Searie 1969: 90)
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In later work, Searle goes into the issue at greater length:
the sentence only determines a definite set of truth conditions relative to a
particular context. That is because of ... some indexical element, such as the present
tense, or the demonstrative "here", or the occurrence of contextually dependent
definite descriptions, such as "the cat" and "the mat".' (Searle 1979: 79)
In fact, Searle's chapter on Literal Meaning (1979: 117-136) is dedicated to
defending the thesis that the meaning of a large number of sentences
depends on 'certain factual background assumptions which are not part of the
literal meaning' or part of 'the semantic content of the sentence' (ibid.: 1979:
80). He refers to vagueness, indexicality, ambiguity, as some of the
indeterminacies that have to be resolved when interpreting an utterance.
'Contextual dependencies' or 'inexplicit assumptions', which are 'variable
and indefinite', are necessaiy in order to determine the truth conditions of
utterances. It is not clear, though, what Searle means by some of these terms:
what are these background assumptions and how exactly do they enable
hearers to disambiguate, assign reference, resolve vagueness etc.? We are
still a long way from having a pragmatic inference process described, let alone
explained.
Regarding the disambiguation of illocutionary force, Searle claims, as vaguely
as Austin, that:
'Often, in actual speech situations, the context will make it clear what the ilocutionary
force of the utterance is, without its being necessary to invoke the appropriate explicit
ilocutionary force indicator.' (Searle 1969: 30)
Again, it is not enough to know that in cases where an explicit ifiocutionary
force marker is absent, the 'context' will do the work. We need to know how
this is so.
In more recent work, speech-act theorists become slightly more specific about
the nature of 'context':
'Context is, ... one of the determinants of the illocutionary act performed by an
utterance. For the purposes of formalization a context of utterance consists of five
distinguishable elements and sets of elements: a speaker, a hearer, a time, a place, and
those various other features of the speaker, hearer, time and place that are relevant to
the performance of the speech acts. Especially important features are the psychological
states - intentions, desires, beliefs, etc. - of the speaker and the hearer.' (Searle and
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Vanderveken 1985: 27)
This is still vague: what does the speaker take into account when formulating
and producing an utterance? How does the hearer reason when interpreting
an utterance? Do place and time play any significant role in utterance
interpretation and in a process of pragmatic inference other than the obvious
fixing of time and place specifications? And what about the intentions,
desires and beliefs attributed to speaker and hearer? If they affect utterance
interpretation, which they obviously do, how exactly? How, for example, do
hearers know which is the intention, desire or belief of the speaker when he
produces an utterance? This amounts, speech-act theorists might say, to
identifying the ifiocutionary act being performed, which essentially brings us
back to where we started: how do hearers identify the intended illocutionary
act?
It seems, then, that early speech-act theorists (a) are aware of the importance
of general pragmatic factors such as 'context' in utterance interpretation but
do not specify their nature or how they operate. A pragmatic inference
process as such does not come into their machinery, hence (b) they do not
shed any light on the nature of the pragmatic processes involved and (c) they
do not have any criterion for choosing the intended interpretation from a
range of possible ones.
Post-Gricean speech-act theorists such as Searle (1975) and Bach and Harmsh
(1979), do draw the distinction between semantic decoding and pragmatic
inference, but rely on a Gricean pragmatic s to deal with the pragmatic side.
Bach and Harnish are, indeed, aware of the extent to which pragmatic
inference is necessary for utterance interpretation. They have developed an
inference model, the speech act schema (SAS), designed ito deal with
linguistic underdeternünades, such as ambiguity and reference assignment,
with how hearers identify the locutionary acts or 'what is said'. This inference
pattern also ams at describing how hearers identify the speaker's
illocutionary act, or the attitude expressed. Mutual contextual beliefs (MCBs),
i.e. contextual information, enable hearers to do so, granting that the speaker
has spoken contextually or conversationally appropriately. A speaker's
contribution to the talk-exchange is conversationally appropriate if and only
if it accords with certain maxims - conversational presumptions in their
terms - which are in effect at that time (ibid.: 62-65). Regarding the question
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of how hearers determine which of the possible ifiocutionary acts the speaker
is actually performing, they claim that if the Communicative Presumption
(CP):
'Communicative Presumption (CP): The mutual belief in CL [linguistic community] that
whenever a member S says something in L to another member H, he is doing so with
some recognizable illocutionary intent.' (ibid.: 7)
and the conversational presumpdons
'Relevance (RE): The speaker's contribution is relevant to the talk-exchange at that
point
Sequencing (SE): The speaker's contribution is of an illocutionary type appropriate to
that stage of the talk-exchange.
Sincerity (SI): The speaker's contribution to the talk-exchange is sincere - the speaker
has the attitudes he expresses.' (ibid.: 63)
are in effect, speakers will be presumed to be speaking with recognizable
ifiocutionary intent and hearers will recognize the intended ifiocutionary
force (ibid.: 65). In Bach and Harnish's schema, then, mutual contextual
beliefs and the relevant conversational presumptions interact with what has
been said to enable the hearer infer the speaker's specific illocutionaiy force.
However, a number of issues remain unresolved: they admit, for example,
that the presumption of Relevance is a very 'powerful' one, but a 'vague' one
too: they do not specify what 'being relevant' really means. Moreover, as they
themselves admit, although the SAS represents the pattern of inference
followed by the hearer, it does not represent how the inference is made (Bach
and Harnish 1979: 18, 76-81). It describes the inference process in steps but
it does not give us an explanation of why hearers follow it. A related question
is whether hearers do always follow the inference process described by the
SAS. And is it really legitimate or even possible to describe, or rather
prescribe, a pragmatic inference process in steps? Hearers might follow all
different types of inference routes, short and uncomplicated, or at times,
longer and more complicated, as long as this is the only possible, or most
efficient way to get to the intended interpretation. Clearly, this is Gricean
machinery. Hence, speech-act pragmatics is really a combination of speech-
act semantics with Gricean pragmatics. If so, the discussion of pragmatic
inference can be deferred to the chapter on Gnce.
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2.3	 Speech acts and non-truth-conditional semantics
As noted above, for speech act theorists, the propositional content, or truth-
conditional content, of utterances is distinguished from their illocutionaiy
force. The point is clearly made by Searle:
'... I am distinguishing between the illocutionary act and the propositional content of
the illocutionary act. ... From this semantical point of view we can distinguish two (not
necessarily separate) elements in the syntactical structure of the sentence, which we
might call the propositional indicator and the illocutionary force indicator. The
illocutionary force indicator shows how the proposition is to be taken, or to put it
another way, what illocutionary force the utterance is to have: that is what
illocutionary act the speaker is performing in the utterance of the sentence.
illocutionary force indicating devices in English include at least word order, stress,
intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and the so-called performative
verbs. I may indicate the kind of illocutionary act I am performing by beginning the
sentence with "I apologize", "I warn", "I state", etc.' (Searle 1969: 30)
Searle goes on to illustrate his views:
'If this semantic distinction is of any real importance, it seems likely that it should
have some syntactic analogue, even though the syntactical representation of the
semantic facts will not always lie on the surface of the sentence. For example, in the
sentence, 9 promise to come", the surface structure does not seem to allow us to make
a distinction between the indicator of illocutionary force and the indicator of
propositional content. In this respect, it differs from, 9 promise that I will come",
where the difference between the indicator of illocutionary force ("I promise") and the
indicator of propositional content (that I will come") lies right on the surface.' (ibid.)
The same views show in later work too:
'...the illocutionary force determines how that tpropositionall content is supposed to
relate to the world.' (Searle 1979: 4)
and
'The ilocutionary force indicating device in the sentence operates on the propositional
content to indicate among other things the direction of fit between the propositional
content and reality.' (Searle 1979: 18)
The standard way to represent this distinction is:
F(p)
where F is a variable for illocutionary force Indicating devices and p is a
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variable for propositions expressed (Searle 1969: 31, Searle and
Vanderveken 1985: 1-2, 8-9, Vanderveken 1990: 13). The illocutionary force
of the utterance is its status as a promise, a request, a threat, a warning, a
prediction, a statement, a guess. For example, in the case of 'Leave!' uttered as
an order, rather than a threat or a request, the illocutionary force is that of an
order whereas the proposition expressed is 'John leave place ... at time ...'.
Thus, speech-act theorists claim that utterances such as (5a-b):
(5)	 a. You will leave the room.
b. Leave the room!
have the same propositional content, namely that the hearer will leave the
room, but different potential illocutionary forces: (5a) can have the
illocutionary force of a prediction whereas (Sb) has the ifiocutionary force of
an order (Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 1). Similarly, (6a-e)
(6)	 a.Paulwilldoit.
b. Please, Paul, do it.
c.Will Paul do it?
d.lfonlyPaulwoulddoiti
e. Whether you like it or not, Paul, do it!
have the same propositional content, namely that Paul does something, but
different potential illocutionaiy forces: (6a) can have the iflocutionary force of
a prediction, (6b) the force of a polite request, (6c) the force of a request for
information, (6d) the force of a wish and (6e) the force of an order
(Vanderveken 1990: 11, 14, 16).
or consider (7a-d):
(7)	 a. Yes, he is dead.
b. Frankly, he is dead.
c. Alas, he is dead.
d. He is dead.
Again, these utterances have the same propositional content, namely that a
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male individual is dead, but different potential illocutionary forces: (7a) can
have the force of an emphatic assertion, (7b) the force of a sincere assertion,
(7c) the force of a lamentation and (7d) the force of a simple assertion
(Vanderveken 1990: 16-17).
Finally, the same is true for (Ba), (8b) and (8c):
(8) a. I promise you that I won't stay very long.
b. I warn you that I won't stay very long.
C. I won't stay very long.
(8a), (8b) and (8c) have the same propositional content, namely that the
speaker will not stay very long, but different potential illocutionary forces:
(8a) has the illocutionary force of a promise whereas (8b) has the force of a
warning (Récanati 1987: 20). (8c) is either a simple assertion or is
illocutionarily ambiguous: depending on the context it could be a promise, a
warning, a prediction etc.
Consider now the truth-conditional status of the illocutionary-force indicators
listed above. According to Austin (1962), (9a) and (9b):
(9) a. George didn't come.
b. I state that George didn't come.
have the same truth conditions and represent the same states of affairs,
namely one in which George didn't come. They are both true as long as this
state of affairs holds, that is, as long as George didn't come. This obviously
implies that the performative prefix 'I state' does not contribute anything to
the truth-conditional content of the utterance it introduces. Being devoid of
any descriptive meaning, its only function is to render the ifiocutionary force
of the utterance unambiguously explicit (Récanati 1987: 21). Clearly, the
same applies to (8a-b) and (8c) or (7a-c) and (7d).
According to speech-act theorists, propositional contents have truth
conditions, whereas illocutionary acts have conditions of success and of
satisfaction. As Vanderveken puts it
elementary speech acts of the form F(P) have conditions of success and of
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satisfaction and their conditions of satisfaction include the truth conditions of their
propositional content' (Vanderveken 1990: 29)
However:
'the conditions of satisfaction of elementary speech acts ... are sometimes stronger than,
the truth conditions of their propositional content.' (ibid.: 28)
The important point is that only the propositional content of the utterance
has truth conditions, and these detennine the truth or falsity of the
utterance. The conditions of success are the conditions that must hold in a
possible context of utterance for the speaker to succeed in performing an act
in that context. For example, the condition of success of a promise is that the
speaker commits himself to performing a future act. The conditions of
satisfaction are the conditions that must hold in the context of an utterance
for the act to be satisfied in this context. For example, a condition of
satisfaction of a promise is that the speaker does what he has committed
himself to doing (Vanderveken 1990: 27). Sometimes, by an ifiocutionary act
being satisfied, e.g. an order obeyed, a promise kept, a permission granted
etc., the propositional content of the utterance is automatically made true, the
state of affairs described comes into existence. These are cases where the
conditions of satisfaction of speech acts and the truth conditions of their
propositional content are interdependent they are cominissive or directive
ifiocutionary acts which have the 'world-to-words direction of fit', and they
are satisfied if and only if their propositional content is true because of their
performance. By contrast, in the case of assertive illocutionaiy acts such as
statements, reports, predictions, the propositional content is expressed as
corresponding to a state of affairs independently, regardless of how the
represented state of affairs got into existence: these have the 'words-to-world
direction of fit' (Vanderveken 1990: 28). In this case, then, it is legitimate to
draw a line between the truth conditions of the propositional content of an
utterance, on the one hand, and the conditions of success and satisfaction of
illocutionary acts, on the other.
For speech-act theorists, then, the truth cc falsity of the utterance depends on
the locutionary act, which communicates what they call the propositional
content, and what Grice calls 'what was said'. In this framework, the
ill ocudonaiy force indicator, i.e. a linguistic expression which encodes not
locutionary but illocufionary information, is automatically treated as non-
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Iruth-conditional.
Since I am particularly interested in the truth-conditional status of
evidentials, it might be useful here to summarize the history of the claim
made by early speech-act theorists that performative verbs are non-truth-
conditional. History shows that this claim has not been universally accepted.
Austin (1962) initially drew a distinction between constative and
performative utterances. Constative utterances are statements, descriptions
of reality: they describe states of affairs and they, or the propositions they
express, are true or false. A constative utterance such as 'The rain has
stopped' describes a state of affairs and is true or false depending on whether
the rain has, or has not, stopped. Performative utterances, by contrast, are
not true or false descriptions of states of affairs; they perform various acts;
they are used to do something, rather than to say that something is, or is not,
the case (Lyons 1977: 726, Récanati 1987: 68). Performative utterances such
as 'Leave now!' or 'Is he coming?' do not describe existing states of affairs in
any sense; they aim at creating new ones instead.
The constative/performative division reflected the distinction between
saying something and doing something with language, as well as between
truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional types of utterances or uses of
expressions. However, Austin soon called the distinction into question. He
realized that constative utterances are merely a special type of performatives:
saying (or asserting) that something is the case is also a type of doing. As we
have seen, for him the constative utterance in (lOa):
(10)	 a. The rain has stopped.
is truth-conditionally equivalent to the explicit performative in (lOb):
(10)	 b. I state/I tell you that the rain has stopped.
The speaker of (lOb) does not describe the fact that he is performing the act
of stating (or telling) that the rain has stopped; he is performing this act.
Austin concluded that 'constative' utterances both perform a speech act, that
of making an assertion, and hence give rise to a new state of affairs, and
describe the new state of affairs. All utterances, then, are
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'...performative in the sense that the speaker who utters them thereby carries out an
act - an order, a promise, a warning, an assertion, and so forth. If the act is named in
the utterance itself, then the latter is an "explicit performative", if not, it is a "primary
performative." What were originally taken to be constative utterances are nothing more
than primary performatives bearing the force of an assertion.' (Récanati 1987: 70)
Austin's later idea, then, was that eveiy utterance both describes a state of
affairs and performs an act, that every utterance has both a performative and
a constative element, or else a non-descriptive, non-truth-conditional
dimension, and a descriptive, truth-conditional dimension. The difference is
that some utterances indicate their performative nature explicitly, whereas
others do not (Récanati 1987: 69-70).
What is important to notice here is that speech-act theorists were genuinely
interested in the distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-
conditional semantics. However, later work seems to have shown that they
often got it wrong. It has been repeatedly argued (Lenunon 1962, Hedernus
1963, Lewis 1970, Wiggins 1971, Warnock 1971, Bach 1975, Ginet 1979,
Cresswell 1979, Bach and Harnish 1979, Récanati 1987) that Austin was
wrong to say that performative verbs make no contribution to truth-
conditional content. Performative verbs do have a descriptive content and,
moreover, they are truth-conditional. Surely, the utterances in (11) and (12)
below do not have the same truth conditions, as they would on the
performative analysis:
(11) A: I tell you that the rain has stopped.
B: And I tell you it hasn't
(12) A: The rain has stopped.
?B: And it hasn't.
Récanati (1987) makes this point by noting that (i) performative verbs are
different from mood, another illocutionary force indicator, precisely because
they have a descriptive meaning, which mood clearly does not, and in this
respect they are similar to any ordinary lexical item,, in a way moods are not;
(ii) the utterance 'Mary states that the rain has stopped' differs from 'I state
that the rain has stopped' only in replacing the name of the speaker, i.e.
'Mary', for 'I'. But the truth conditions of the utterance should not change
under this substitution: the state of affairs represented in both cases is not
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merely that the rain has stopped but that Mary says so (Récanati 1987: 23-
24); (iii) omitting some performative verbs clearly shows that the truth
conditions of an explicit performative and a primary performative do differ,
e.g. 'I deny that this is so' does not include the corresponding primary
performative 'This is not so'. Similarly, 'I promise to come' does not include
the corresponding primary performative 'I will come' (Récanati 1987: 48-49)
and (iv) in the case of 'I believe', if I am asked in a po11 to give my belief(s), I
might say 'I believe that the new tax system is unfair', in which case I am
clearly describing one of my beliefs (Récanati 1987: 49).
These and other arguments suggest that performative verbs contribute to the
truth conditions of utterances in the same way as any truth-conditional item
does. They perform the direct act of declaration and the indirect act of a
command, a promise, a threat, a prediction etc. Récanati (1987) argues for
this conclusion in great detail. If he is right, then the truth-conditional status
of other 'illocutionary force indicators' - including evidentials - may need
reconsideration.
Performative verbs are the best-known illocutionary force indicators. Other
types of expression which have been standardly considered illocutionary
force markers are mood indicators, word order, intonation or punctuation
signs. These, however, are not always precise enough to determine the exact
illocutionary force conveyed by the utterance (Searle and Vanderveken 1985:
1-7, Vanderveken 1990: 16-17, 23-25). More complex ifiocutionary forces are
expressed in natural language by means of additional linguistic indicators:
ifiocutionary adverbia.ls e.g. frankly, moreover, if I may say so, by the way,
speaking of ..., (Bach and Harnish 1979: 2 19-225), other types of adverbial
e.g. please, alas, yes, to be sure (Vanderveken 1990: 16-17, Récanati 1987:
21) illocutionary connectives e.g. and, but, after all, if, even (Searle and
Vanderveken 1985: 3, 5, Vanderveken 1990: 25, Récanati 1987: 15-16, 21),
performative verbs in a parenthetical use, e.g. I'll be there, I promise
(Urmson 1963: 220-246, Lyons 1977: 738). The meaning of these indicators
is seen as determining the specific illocutionary forces of the utterances that
indude them by expressing additional components of illocutionaiy force or
'an increase or decrease in the degree of strength of illocutionazy point'
(emphasis added) (Vanderveken 1990 17). Evidentials would presumably be
treated as such special features specifying the degree of strength of the
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illocutionary point of the utterance.
One class of items I will be looking at more closely are the attitudinal
adverbials, e.g. happily, unfortunately, lucidly. These have been dealt with by
speech-act theorists (Urmson 1963: 220-240) as ifiocutionary force indicators
indicating the type of speech act the speaker intends to perform. On
Urmson's approach, the attitudinal adverbial happily would be treated as
indicating that a speech act of rejoicing or felicitating is being performed, the
attitudinal adverbial unfortunately would be treated as indicating that a
speech act of complaining or lamenting is being performed etc. These are
expressive speech acts which 'express the psychological state specffied in the
sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional
content' (Searle 1979: 15). Examples of expressive verbs are thank,
congratulate, apologize, condole, deplore and welcome. It might be
questioned whether the expression of attitudes - thoughts and emotions - is
really best analysed in speech-act terms. Typically, speech acts are acts that
can not be performed without speaking - or at least without acting publicly.
Warning, threatening, promising, asserting are examples. Thoughts and
emotions, though, are primarily private. You may be sitting quietly, and I
may nonetheless infer that you believe something, or suspect something, or
regard something as fortunate or unfortunate. I cannot infer in the same way
that you are warning me, or promising me, or asserting something.
Attitudinal adverbials, then, fit much less naturally into the speech-act
framework than the other 'ifiocutionary-force indicators' discussed above. I
will return to these points in chapters 4 and 5.
Speech-act theorists treat evidentials as non-truth-conditional illocutionary
force indicators, along very similar lines to those just proposed for attitudinal
adverbials. Sentence adverbials, e.g. obviously, apparently, evidently,
undoubtedly, and genuine parentheticals, e.g. He is, I think/I suppose/I
conclude, a fool, are analysed by speech-act theorists as indicating the degree
of strength of the ifiocutionary act the speaker intends to perform (Urmson
1963, Palmer 1986).
To conclude, speech-act theorists systematically distinguish between (truth-
conditional) propositional content and (non-truth-conditional) illocutionary
force indicators. Such indicators have been claimed to include performative
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verbs, illocutionary, evidential and attitudinal adverbials, and various types
of parenthetical construction. The claim that performatives are non-truth-
conditional has been seriously challenged. My aim in later chapters is to
establish whether speech-act theorists might have been as mistaken about
evidentials as they appear to have been about performative verbs
themselves.
2.4	 Speech acts and explicit vs imolicit communication
The main question to be raised in this section is whether speech-act theorists
have a conception of explicit versus implicit, and if so, whether they talk of
illocutionary force indicators as falling on the explicit or the implicit side. To
answer these questions, we need to know how the distinction between explicit
and implicit communication should be drawn. There are two different ways of
drawing this distinction: (a) to claim that anything that is linguistically
encoded is explicitly communicated and anything that is pragmatically
inferred is implicitly communicated and (b) to draw the distinction in some
other way - for example, to distinguish, as Grice does, between two types of
implicit information: conventional implicatures are decoded but implicit, and
nonconventional, i.e. conversational and other, implicatures are inferred and
implicit2.
Both ways of drawing the explicit/implicit distinction capture a central, pre-
theoretical intuition about the distinction between explicit and implicit
communication. It is dear that most of us would agree that in the exchange in
(13):
(13) Peter. Would you like to go to the movies?
Mary I'm handing in an essay tomorrow.
Mary has explicitly communicated (for example) the information in (14):
(14) Mary is handing in an essay on 11th May 1993.
and implicitly communicated the information in (15):
2 In this section, I am drawing on Deirdre Wilson's Semantic Theory Lecture Notes
(1992) and on Wilson and Sperber (1993).
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(1 S)	 Mary doesn't want to go to the movies.
However, as Wilson (ibid.) ooints out, these pre-theoretical intuitions may
not be so clear in other cases. Consider (16):
(16) a. Peter' Is Bill awake?
b. Mary: He is.
What Mary
 has communicated by (16b) is that Bill is awake. But has she
communicated it explicitly, or not? Here our pre-theoretical intuitions may
pull us in different directions. One reaction to (16b) is to say that
communication is implicit because Mary has not linguistically encoded the
information that Bill is awake: she has used the pronoun he rather than the
name Bill, and the predicate has been left unrealized. As a result, the hearer
will have to go through some pragmatic inferencing in order to derive the
information that Bill is awake; hence the tendency to say that this information
has not been explicitly communicated. This idea is further reinforced by the
intuition that Mary could have made her utterance more explicit by saying
Bill rather than he, and by saying awake rather than leaving an empty
predicate. It is, then, possible to argue that only what is linguistically encoded
is explicitly communicated, and any element of pragmatic inference falls on
the implicit side.
Similar problems over how the explicit/implicit distinction should be drawn
arise with examples such as (17a) and (iTh):
(17) a. Bill bought a bat.
b. Bill said he was leaving on Tuesday.
(17a) is a case of lexical ambiguity and (1Th) a case of syntactic ambiguity. If
in saying (17a) Mary communicates that Bifi has bought a cricket bat rather
than a flying rodent, and if in saying (17b), Mary communicates that Bifi is
leaving on Tuesday rather than that he spoke on Tuesday, has she
communicated this information explicitly? As in (16b) above, where
reference has to be assigned and some ellipsed material to be recovered, the
intended interpretation must be pragmatically inferred in disambiguation
too, hence the tendency to say that this interpretation has been implicitly
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rather than exolicitiv communicated. This tendenc y
 is further reinforced by
the intuition that Mary could have made her utterances more explicit by
encoding the intended interpretation in an unambiguous way. This could be
seen as further evidence for the claim that the distinction between explicit
and implicit communication maps onto the distinction between linguistic
decoding and inference. Notice that on this approach, the non-truth-
conditional ifiocutionary force indicators would fall on the explicit side, since
what they communicate is linguistically encoded. By contrast disambiguating
the illocutionary force of utterances when no illocutionary force indicator
appears in the utterance would fall on the implicit side.
Another way to draw the distinction between explicit and implicit
communication is to base it on Grice's distinction between saying and
implicating. Here, I shall simply sketch the lines along which this distinction
is drawn, since a detailed account of Grice's theory of meaning will be given
in chapter 3. Grice's saying/implicating distinction is essentially a
distinction between what is said, i.e. the proposition expressed by an
utterance, its truth-conditional content, and what is implicated, i.e.
everything communicated by an utterance that is not part of what is said. For
Grice, reference assignment and disambiguation are resolved at the level of
'what is said'. Thus, in (16b) Grice would daim that Mary says that Bill is
awake, in (17a) she says that Bill bought a cricket bat and in (17b) she says
that Bill is leaving on Tuesday. If for Grice the saying/implicating distinction
roughly coincides with the explicit/implicit distinction, which seems to be
then explicit communication clearly involves elements of pragmatic
inference. On the other hand, Grice treats standard non-truth-conditional
words such as the discourse connectives but;, moreover and so, as carrying
conventional implicatures, i.e. as implicit, although the information they
communicate is linguistically encoded. Thus, Grice's distinction allows for
explicit and truth-conditional information at the level of what is said, and
implicit and non-truth-conditional information at the level of what is
implicated: some of this is linguistically encoded, i.e. conventional
iniplicatures, and some of it is pragmatically inferred, i.e nonconventional
(conversational and other) implicatures. On this approach, the non-truth-
conditional illocutionary force indicators would presumably fall on the
implicit side, since what they communicate is linguistically encoded and non-
truth-conditional. The issue of how Grice would analyse a variety of
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illocutionarv force indicators will be discussed in more detail in later
chapters.
As Wilson ooints out (1992. Lecture 4). if we are interested in a theoretically
adequate distinction between explicit and im plicit communication, the first
way of drawing
 it does not seem to have much to recommend it. hi the first
place. there is no reason to proliferate distinctions by develorilng an
explicit/implicit distinction that simply coincides with the already existing
one between decoding and inference. In the second place, what is
linguistically encoded is very often only a fragment of the intended
information which does not in itself amount to a full proposition. Surely,
when considering what is communicated, we think of the communication of
full propositions rather than fragmentary linguistically encoded information.
Thus, a distinction along the lines of Grice's distinction between saying and
implicating is a much more promising candidate for development than a
distinction that simply maps explicit/implicit communication onto
decoding/inference.
Early (pre-Gricean) speech-act theorists such as Austin, early Searle,
Strawson, do not have a technical working distinction between explicit vs.
implicit meaning. Instead, they seem to be using the terms in various pre-
theoretical, intuitive ways that allow at least some ifiocutionary force
indicators to fall on the explicit rather than the implicit side. Thus, according
to Austin (1962):
'...performative verbs serve the special purpose of making explicit (which is not the
same as stating or describing) what precise action it is that is being performed by the
issuing of the utterance: ...' (Austin 1962: 61)
Austin contrasts explicit performatives, e.g. 'I order you to go', with implicit
('inexplicit') performatives, e.g. 'Go', where it is unclear whether the speaker
is ordering or advising or pleading the hearer to go and where the
'circumstances', the 'given situation' will do the work of the absent explicit
performative (Austin 1962: 32). This way of defining explicit/implicit seems
to run more along the lines of (a) than of (b) above, i.e. anything that is
linguistically encoded is explicitly communicated whereas anything that is
pragmatically inferred is implicitly communicated. However, it is not dear
exactly how Austin would have drawn the distinction. According to Austin,
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'domg' something non-verbal. e.g. bowing and raising one's hat. could count
towards making explicit the intended illocutionary force, i.e. paying respects.
as much as saying something would (Austin 1962: 69-70). His claim that:
'To do or to say these things is to make plain how the action is to be taken or
understood, what action it is. And so it is with putting in the expression "I promise
that".' (Austin 1962: 70)
might suggest that 'explicit', in the way Austin used it, is a quite broad term
covering not only linguistic devices that make the illocutionary force of the
utterance clear, but any type of paralinguistic device that serves the same
purpose, hence pragmatically inferred information too. If this is so, the
mapping between explicit/implicit and decoding/inference breaks down. In
any case, our speculations about how Austin would draw the explicit/implicit
distinction merely suggest that he was far from having a technical working
distinction. Moreover, as Lyons observes:
'...Austin certainly argues throughout (Austin 1962] as if the only way in which the
illocutionary force of the utterance can be made explicit is by means of a performative
verb (in the first-person singular); and his examples all suggest that this is so. It very
much looks, in fact, as if Austin is covertly and perhaps illegitimately restricting the
interpretation of "making explicit". ... Presumably, it is a precondition of something
being an explicitly performative element for Austin that it should be part of what we
say (in the sense "sayf [uttering, pronouncing]) rather than part of our manner of
saying it; and he does operate with this distinction between what is said and the manner
of its being said. But the distinction itself is never made precise.' (Lyons 1977: 743-744)
Lyons concludes that Austin was using a notion of 'explicit' which maps,
indeed, onto linguistic decoding. If this is so, illocutionary force indicators,
being linguistically encoded, would fall on the explicit side.
Another way in which the terms have been extensively used in speech-act
theory is in order to describe indirect ifiocutionary acts. 'Implicit' is used as
equivalent to 'indirect' and 'explicit' as equivalent to 'direct'. Thus, for
example, in saying (18a), (18b) or (18c):
(18)	 a. Can you open the window?
b. Do you know the way to Oxford Circus?
c. You are sitting on my linen dress!
the speaker is, most probably, not performing the speech act of asking a
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straightforward question, i.e. requesting information about the hearer's
physical ability to open a window in (18a), or requesting information about
whether the hearer does or does not know the way to Oxford Circus in (18b).
Similarly, in (18c) the speaker is not performing the speech act of making a
simple assertion. Instead, utterances such as (18a-c) are typically used as
requests for action, i.e. Open the window, Show me (or tell me) how to get to
Oxford Circus and Get off my linen dress,. For speech-act theorists the terms
'implicit' and 'indirect' are interchangeable:
'Such implicit acts are called indirect speech acts.' (Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 10)
According to speech-act theorists, the speech-act that is 'directly' performed,
i.e. 'explicitly' expressed, is linguistically encoded, and the speech act that is
'indirectly' performed, i.e. implicitly conveyed, is inferred pragmatically.
Notice, moreover, that for speech-act theorists the use of 'indirect' in the
phrase Indirect speech acts' is parallel to the use of 'indirect'/'implicit' in
describing exchanges such as (13). Here is how Searle opens the main part of
his chapter on Indirect Speech Acts:
'Let us begin by considering a typical case of the general phenomenon of indirection
1. Student X Let's go to the movies tonight.
2. Student Y: I have to study for an exam.
The utterance of (1) constitutes a proposal in virtue of its meaning, in particular
because of the meaning of "Let's". ... The utterance of 2 in the context just given would
normally constitute a rejection of the proposal, but not in virtue of its meaning. In
virtue of its meaning it is simply a statement about Y.' (Searle 1979: 33)
But this is exactly how 'iniplicW is pre-theoretically, intuitively understood in
(a): as meaning that is implicitly communicated in the sense of being
pragmatically inferred. In such a framework, speech-act theorists
concentrated on ifiocutionary force indicators that make the illocutionary
force of an utterance explicit, i.e. linguistically encode it Hence the emphasis
on performative verbs, word order, verb mood, exclamatory adverbs,
illocutionary connectives, punctuation signs. This is dearly further indication
that some speech-act theorists at least operated with something like criterion
(a).
This view is reinforced by recent work in speech-act pragmatics. The
54
performance of indirect speech acts is explained by post-Gricean speech-act
theorists (e.g. Vanderveken) in terms of conversational maxims such as
'Speak truly!', 'Be sincere', 'Let your utterance be a successful and non-
defective illocutionary act!', 'Let your utterance be an appropriate linguistic
means to attain your ends!' (Vanderveken 1990: 72-73). When the speaker
intends to perform an indirect speech act, he exploits some such
conversational maxim and the hearer recognizes the intended speech act by
reasoning (calculating the indirect speech act) along familiar Gricean lines.
Clearly, 'indirect/implicit' meaning, for some speech-act theorists at least,
was understood as 'pragmatically inferred' meaning. Illocutionarily
ambivalent utterances, i.e. utterances with no explicit illocutionary force
indicator, fall on this side. ifiocutionary force indicators, on the other hand,
fall on the explicit side.
Modern speech-act theorists (e.g. Bach and Harnish, Vanderveken) have
adopted Grice's pragmatic theory, and hence they usually operate with his
distinction between explicit and implicit communication. This is how indirect
speech acts have come to be accounted for in terms of exploitations of
conversational maxims (Vanderveken 1990: 71-75). Bach and Harnish
(1979) do not seem to have developed a different way of drawing the
explicit/implicit distinction from Grice's. They concentrate on contextual or
pragmatic implicatures, i.e. on Grice's conversational implicatures. They
accept Grice's division between explicit/implicit communication as well as his
other main meaning divisions and usually modify the finer distinctions, in
terms of, for example, defmition or number of maxims, principles,
presumptions. They leave conventional implicatures completely aside since,
as they claim, Grice himself had 'little to say' about them (Bach and Haniish
1979: 166), which, however, makes saying something about them all the
more important! If we assume that Bach and Harnish accept Grice's notion of
conventional implicatures, ifiocutionary force indicators will be treated in
Grice's way, Le. in terms of conventional implicatures as implicit and non-
truth-conditional.
In the next chapter Grice's theory of meaning will be examined, which will
give us an insight into speech-act pragmatics too.
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CHAPTER 3
GRICE AND COMMUNICATION
3.1	 Introduction
There are several good introductions to Grice's work on meaning and
communication (Bennett 1976, Harnish 1977, Bach and Harnish 1979,
Levinson 1983, Blackburn 1984, Sperber and Wilson 1986, Récanati 1987,
Avramides 1989, Neale 1992). My aim in this chapter is not to add to them
but to pick out the features of Grice's approach that seem to me most relevant
for the study of evidentials.
As pointed out in the introduction, the study of evidentials involves
considerable interaction between linguistic encoding and pragmatic
inference. While speech-act theorists have been most interested in the
linguistic encoding side, Gnce was particularly interested in the borderline
between encoding and inference, and the nature of the pragmatic inference
processes themselves. Grice was the first to develop a theory of
communication that showed how communication could take place in the
absence of a code, and I will be considering what light this might shed on the
role of pragmatic inference in evidential constructions. In addition, however,
Grice proposed a new analysis of a class of non-truth-conditional expressions
such as but, so, moreover, which seems to bear some relation to evidential
expressions, and I will be considering to what extent his approach might shed
light on the semantics of evidenthls.
3.1.1	 Grice on communication
Grice, in his William James Lectures (1967), offered the first known
alternative to the code model of communication. Pre-Gricean theories viewed
communication as a complex process of coding and decoding. In verbal
communication, the code is seen as pairing messages, I.e. the thoughts the
speaker intends to communicate, with signals, i.e. the utterances she
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produces. The code is a set of shared rules or conventions, determining the
pairing between signals and messages, or utterances and thoughts. On this
approach, verbal communication involves the speaker encoding her private
thoughts into public utterances, which the hearer would observe and decode,
and the goal of pragmatic theory is to describe the code employed.
Grice paved the way for an inferential model of communication, where
communication is viewed as mtentional behaviour, and understanding an
utterance as recognizing the intentions behind it. Grice starts by defining the
communicative intention as follows:
'A speaker S means something by uttering u if and only if S utters u intending:
(1) S's utterance u to produce a certain response r in the audience A
(2) A to recognize S's intention (1)
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2), i.e. his recognition of
S's intention (1).'
(see Grice 1989: 92, Récanati 1987: 177)
Here, there are two points worth noticing. Firstly, for Grice, communication
need not involve the use of a code - either linguistic or non-linguistic. He uses
the term 'utterance' to refer to any type of communicative behaviour, verbal
or non-verbal. As Avramides points out:
'Under Grice's broad reading of "utterance" can be included such things as flag waving,
air raid whistles, nods of the head, hand waving, etc., as well as sentences of a language.'
(Avramides 1989: 42)
And it is clear that many cases of non-verbal communication do not involve
the use of a code. To illustrate, suppose Mary asks Peter whether he enjoyed
his skiing holidays in France and Peter, instead of giving a straightforward
answer, shows Mary his leg in plaster. Mary will, clearly, infer the answer,
which will be along the lines of 'Breaking my leg ruined my skiing holidays in
France'. Similarly, if Mary asks Peter how he feels, he might simply cough,
thus allowing her to infer that he has a chest cold. Clearly, no code is involved
here and such types of communication would fall outside the scope of a code
modeL
Secondly, for Grice, communication is viewed in terms of beliefs and
intentions, in terms of the thoughts communicated, rather than, say,
messages deciphered or speech acts performed. On Grice's approach, the
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emphasis is on the fact that language is used to convey the thoughts of the
speaker. But the thoughts behind an utterance are far from fully decodable.
They are partly decoded, but partly inferred on the basis of contextual
information: the form of the utterance only partly encodes the thought the
speaker intends to communicate.
A code model of communication offers little insight into these two types of
case: in the first, there is nothing for hearers to decode, and in the second, by
simply decoding, hearers would recover only some aspects of what the
speaker intended to communicate.
What is crucial, according to Grice, is the recognition of the communicator's
intention to convey one piece of information rather than another. A
fundamental Gricean thesis is that mere recognition of an intention - by
whatever means - is enough for communication to succeed (Bach and Harnish
1979: Introduction xiv-xv, Sperber and Wilson 1986: 2 1-28, Récanati 1987:
177-178, Avramides 1989: 15-16). But how do we recognize the intentions
of others? Suppose, for example, that Mary sees me approaching the counter
of a shop, and opening my bag. She will assume that I intend to pay for the
items I got, rather than, say, put the items in my bag and go, or take out a gun
and force the cashier to surrender the money therein. Mary does not decode
my intentions: there is no code according to which opening a bag means that
I intend to pay. In all these cases, Grice claims, the intentions are inferred on
the basis of some observable evidence. This is done by hypothesis formation
and evaluation: that is, by a process of non-demonstrative inference. Grice's
main contribution to theories of utterance interpretation was to show how
this process might go.
Grice spent some time trying to distinguish the particular type of overt
communication (meaning nn) that he was interested in, from a variety of
more covert but still intentional forms of communication. He first drew a
distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning. Natural meaning is
dosely related to the idea of a natural sign or symptom of, or evidence for,
something. Smoke is a natural sign of fire, and hence naturally means fire
(Grice 1989: 213). Similarly, black clouds are a natural sign of rain, and
hence naturally mean rain (ibid.). Forms of behaviour can be examples of
natural meaning too: a (spontaneous) groan or a screech is a natural sign of
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pain, and hence naturally means pain, and a (spontaneous) cough is a natural
sign of a chest cold, and hence naturally means a chest cold (Wilson, N. L.
1970: 298, Bennett 1976: 12). These are nonconventional, non-codified
types of meaning and are, for Grice, prior to nonnatural meaning.
With nonnatural meaning, by contrast, the communication vehicles do not
have to be natural signs of what they are used to communicate. Nonnatural
meaning is intentional communication: it is the type of meaning whereby a
person, rather than an event or a state of affairs, means something (Bennett
1976: 12, Blackburn 1984: 110-111); it is the type of meaning that an
utterance conveys, not because it is a natural sign or symptom of something,
but because it is intended to mean something. Thus, I might leave some
incriminating evidence in the scene of a murder in order to make the
investigators think that Peter was the murderer, or I might show Peter a
photograph of his wife intimately involved with Mr X to let him know how
things really are. Similarly, Herod presented Salome with the head of St. John
the Baptist in order to show her that he is dead, and I might throw a pillow at
you intending to suggest that you leave my room (Grice 1989: 2 17-220).
However, these are not the types of nonnatural meaning that Grice is
primarily interested in: in all the above examples the 'utterer' (in Grice's
sense which includes nonlinguistic types of behaviour) does intend that the
audience comes to believe something, but the audience's recognition of this
intention does not bear on the fulfillment of the intention. For example, the
investigators might well think that Peter was the murderer regardless of
whether they also think that I intended them to do so; Peter might well
become aware of his wife's intimacy with Mr X quite independently of his also
believing that I intended him to do so; after all, the result would be exactly
the same if I had left the photograph on his desk accidentally.
By contrast, consider the case where I have myself drawn a picture of Peter's
wife being intimate with Mr X and then show it to Peter, or the case where I
point at the door or push you towards it in an attempt to make you leave.
Here, the effect brought about clearly depends on my audience's recognition
of my intention to produce the effects in question. The cases of
communication that Gnce was primarily interested in all involve the
recognition of an intention. But in fact they involve more than this. Grice was
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interested in distinguishing a certain 'overt' type of communication from a
variety of more covert forms of communication also involving the recognition
of an intention. His early work on non-natural meaning provoked a major
debate on how 'overt' communication should be characterized. What is
crucial to overt communication is that the intention behind it should be
openly displayed, rather than concealed behind layers of deception or
manipulation (For examples and discussion, see Sperber and Wilson 1986:
28-31). There were attempts to characterize the relevant notion of overtness
in terms of the absence of certain types of (deceptive) intention, and in terms
of a concept of mutual knowledge (see Schiffer 1972). What is important
about these debates is the assumption that lay behind them: that in a certain
type of 'overt' communication, humans have spedal help in recognizing the
communicator's intentions. 'Overt' communication, in other words, is a
separate domain, with its own theoretical principles and generalizations.
Granted the existence of a special domain of overt communication, the
question arises: how are communicators' intentions recognized at all? Grice,
as we have seen, sketched a general answer: these intentions are inferred, by
a non-demonstrative inference process in which the fact that overt
communication is being attempted provides some special help. In overt
communication, according to Gnce, the audience is entitled to assume that
the communicator is aiming at certain standards. The standards are
described in his famous Co-operative Prindple and Maxims, to which I wifi
now turn.
3.1.2 The CP and maxims
Before looking at the Co-operative Principle and Maxims, let me first set out a
general picture of the various categories of overtly communicated meaning
that, in Grice's framework, an utterance could convey
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what is meant
/	 \
	what is said
	what is
	 implicated
	
/	 \
	
conventional	 non-conventional
/	 \
conversational	 other (non-
/	 \	 conversational)
generalized	 particularized
I will comment briefly on each of the categories before considering where the
CP and maxims fit in.
A fundamental distinction in Grice's framework is between saying and
implicating. Grice uses the expression 'what is said' to refer to the truth-
conditional content of utterances, i.e. to what is explicitly or literally said
(Levinson 1983: 97). What is implicated is everything that is overtly
communicated by an utterance but is not part of what is said.
Gnce also distinguished between various types of implicatures. Conventional
implicatures are linguistically encoded, and hence semantic, but do not affect
the truth conditions of the utterance (Blakemore 1992: 148). To ifiustrate the
distinction between saying and conventionally implicating, consider (1):
(1) Mary John is a linguist but Peter is an astronomer.
What Mary has 'said', according to Grice, is given in (2):
(2) a. John isalinguist.
b. Peter is an astronomer.
What Mary has conventionally implicated is given in (3):
(3) There is a contrast between (2a) and (2b).
The information in (3) does not affect the truth conditions of the utterance in
(1), and hence but is non-truth-conditional. It is precisely the fact that
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conventional implicatures are non-truth-conditional that distinguishes them
from other types of linguistically encoded meaning.
Non-conventional implicatures fall into further sub-types, of which the best
known are the conversational ones. These are crucially not decoded but
inferred. It is partly to explain the recovery of conversational implicatures
that Grice's norms of rational communicative behaviour are introduced into
the framework.
Grice's pragmatic theory is based on two fundamental assumptions about
communication: (i) that it is rational and (ii) that it is co-opera tive
'Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks,
and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at
least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a
common purpose or purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. ... at each stage,
some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable.
We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected
(ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged.' (Grice 1989: 26)
This 'rough general principle' is the Cooperative Principle (CP). Grice
developed the CP into a number of conversational maxims:
Maxims of Quantity
1 Make your contribution as informative as is required.
(for the current purposes of the exchange).
2 Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required.
Maxims of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1 Do not say what you believe to be false.
2 Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Maxim of Relation
Be relevant.
Maxims of Manner: Be perspicuous.
1	 Avoid obscurity of expression.
2 Avoid ambiguity.
3	 Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4 Be orderly.
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(Grice 1989: 26-27)
The role of the CP and maxims is to explain how it is possible for speakers to
communicate more than they actually say. According to Grice, conversational
implicatures are beliefs that have to be attributed to the speaker in order for
the assumption that she has been observing the CP and conversational
maxims to be preserved. Notice that the maxims of Quality have a clear
connection to evidentiality and the speaker's degree of certainty concerning
the proposition expressed. Thus, a Gricean approach to evidentials might
start from the Quality maxims. I will be discussing possible Gricean analyses
of evidentials in the next section.
Grice seems to have seen the CP and maxims as functioning solely in the
recovery of implicatures, and as making no contribution at the level of what is
said. However, we do need to know how hearers identify the proposition
expressed by an utterance: how reference is assigned, ambiguities resolved,
elliptical material restored. One question worth considering, then, is whether
pragmatic principles or maxims might not play a role in determining what is
said. This issue is discussed in the next section.
According to Grice, speakers are expected to observe the maxims and hearers
to assume, in turn, that speakers are doing so. His idea was that even if
speakers appear to be violating a particular maxim at the level of what is said,
hearers will provide any assumptions needed to make the utterance satisfy
the maxims, or at least the CP. Hearers will, in other words, fill in the thought
behind the utterance so that the assumption that the speaker is both rational
and co-operative is maintained. To ifiustrate how an implicature of this type
might be generated, suppose that Sue asks Mary:
(4)	 Sue: Whom would you consider getting married to?
and Mary replies:
(1)	 Mary. John is a linguist but Peter is an astronomer.
According to Grice, Mary has said that
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(5) a. John Clark is a linguist.
b. Peter Smith is an astronomer.
and she has conventionally implicated that
(6) There is a contrast between the fact that John Clark is a linguist
and the fact that Peter Smith is an astronomer.
If this is all Mary intended to communicate, her utterance would fail to satisfy
the CP and maxims: Sue has just asked a question which Mary seems to be
ignoring. It would violate the first maxim of Quantity, because Sue has asked
for some information, which Mary has not given. It would also violate the
maxim of relation because Sue has asked a question and Mary is not
addressing it. The question is whether there is a way of interpreting Mary's
utterance so that these violations of the CP and the maxims can be
eliminated. According to Grice, there is. Here is how Sue might reason in
order to infer the implicatures of Mary's utterance: Suppose that Mary
believes that astronomers are more clever or more interesting or more
wealthy than linguists; suppose too that these are good reasons for wanting to
marry someone. By attributing these beliefs to Mary, and assuming that she
intended to communicate them, Sue will be able to recover an interpretation
on which the CP and the maxims are satisfied. Mary's utterance satisfies the
maxim of Qpantity because it gives the information Sue asked for, and it
satisfies the maxim of relation because it answers Sue's question. In Gnce's
terms, Mary has conversationally implicated that she would prefer to get
married to Peter rather than John.
According to Grice, in this and similar cases, implicatures are generated
without any maxim being dearly violated because:
the speaker implicates that which he must be assumed to believe in order to
preserve the assumption that he is observing the maxim[s] ...' (Grice 1989.32)
Here is a slightly different case, in which two maxims clash and one must be
violated. Suppose that on being asked where exactly Peter lives, I say
(7)	 He lives near Cambridge.
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Here I have said that Peter Smith lives near Cambridge. However, according
to Grice's first maxim of Qjiantity, a speaker should make her contribution as
informative as required by the situation, and (7) fails in this respect: I have
given less information than I was asked to give, and hence violated the maxim
of Quantity. However, Grice claims, the hearer will assume that I have
violated this maxim in order to avoid violating another, in this case, the
second maxim of Quality. According to this, I should not say something for
which I lack adequate evidence. I am then conversationally implicating that I
do not know, or do not remember, where exactly Peter lives, and thus I cannot
be more informative without violating the second maxim of Quality.
Reasoning along these lines will allow my hearer to assume that I am not able
to name the town where Peter lives but I am respecting the CP and the
maxims to the extent that this is possible. In this and similar cases,
implicatures are generated by a maxim-violation due to a clash between
maxims (Grice 1989: 32-33). Grice also considers a range of overt, blatant
violations, which generate figurative implicatures. Since these are not
directly relevant to the analysis of evidentials, they will be ignored here,
though I will take up the issue briefly in a later section.
Within the category of conversational implicatures, Grice further
distinguished between particularized conversational implicatures (P.C.I.) and
generalized conversational implicatures (G.C.I.). The former are cases in
which iniplicatures are generated in virtue of special features of the context,
cases where, except on that particular occasion, the implicatures would not
normally arise. The latter are cases in which implicatures are generated in all
normal contexts, but are still conversational and derived by inference rather
than decoding.
Grice's account of utterance interpretation, important and exciting as it
might be, raises a number of problems and leaves many fundamental
questions unanswered. Regarding the Co-operative Principle itself, it is not
dear that every conversation has an 'accepted purpose or direction'. Often,
people engage in verbal interaction without a specific purpose or direction: I
might, for example, meet my boss who happens to be walking the same way. I
will, necessarily, engage in conversation with him, but no 'accepted purpose
or direction' need guide it. Moreover, as Wilson ('Relevance and
Understanding' forthcoming) observes, it is not dear how the purpose or
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direction of a conversation is identified, and how, even if identified, it helps
comprehension:
'... how is the accepted purpose of an utterance identified? Grice gives no answer to
this. Like many theorists of communication, he seems to have assumed that the
purpose of an utterance, like the set of intended contextual assumptions, is somehow
given in advance of the comprehension process, or identifiable independently of it. In
fact, it could not be identified by the use of the Co-operative Principle itself, on pain
of circularity: to identify the purpose of an utterance by use of the Co-Operative
Principle, one would already have to know it.' ('Relevance and Understanding'
forthcoming)
Another problem is the source of the CP and maxims: what is their origin and
nature? Why should speakers obey them? Are they universal? Are they
innate? Or are they socially variable and hence, culture specific? If so, we
need an account of the social parameters that cause this variation. Is the CP
really the overarching principle governing conversation? Is the number of the
maxims adequate? Do we need more? Or could we do with less? (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 35-3 8, Blakemore 1992: 26, Smith and Wilson 1992, Wilson
'Relevance and Understanding' forthcoming).
Grice acknowledged many of these problems himself, and proposed answers
to some. As we have seen, he considers the CP and maxims as universal and
rational:
'...I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not
merely as something that all or most do in fact follow but as something that it is
reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon.' (Grice 1989: 29)
He adds:
'So I would like to be able to show that observance of the Cooperative Principle and
maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that anyone who cares about
the goals that are central to conversation/communication ... must be expected to have
an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be
profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with
the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. Whether any such conclusion can be
reached, I am uncertain; in any case, I am fairly sure that I cannot reach it until I am a
good deal clearer about the nature of relevance and of the circumstances in which it is
required.' (Grice 1989: 29-30)
Which brings us to another widely recognized problem with Grice's maxims:
their vagueness. According to Lyons:
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'The usefulness of Grice's maxims is further reduced by the generality, not to say
vagueness, with which they are formulated. ... As for relevance and perspicuity, it is, if
anything, far more difficult to evaluate utterances in terms of these two properties
than it is to quantify the amount of semantic information in the utterance. The fact
that Grice's maxims have not been, and perhaps cannot be, fully formalizable makes his
notion of implicature rather less precise ...' (Lyons 1977: 594)
The most famous indeterminacy is the one that Gnce himself recognized: the
lack of a definition of relevance (Grice 1989: 30). The problem has been
acknowledged by some of his successors, e.g. Bach and Harnish, but in
general they have chosen to concentrate on questions of informativeness (see
e.g. Levinson, Horn). Or consider the Manner Maxims. Here, Grice does not
spedfy what 'Be brief' and 'Avoid obscurity of expression' really amount to.
How exactly is brevity to be measured: in terms of words, syllables,
phonemes, letters? When is an expression obscure or 'perspicuous'?
For the Quantity maxim, what makes our contribution 'as informative as is
required (for the current purposes of the exchange)', and how should we
formulate it so that it is not 'more informative than is required'? As they
stand, the CP and Maxims raise as many questions as they answer.
However, while Grice's account is vague in many respects, he clearly
establishes an alternative to the code model of communication. There is no
denying his central achievemenc to show how inferential communication is
possible at all. In later chapters, I will adopt the framework of relevance
theory, which was directly inspired by Grice's work. In the rest of this
chapter, I will consider what light Gnce's framework sheds on the analysis of
evidentials.
3.2	 Pragmatic inference and evidentials
In this section I intend to examine how a Gricean would answer one of the
questions I have set myself: how are degrees of speaker commitment
pragmatically inferred? The first problem is that they are - at least primarily -
degrees of commitment to what is said, i.e. the proposition expressed. As we
have seen, it is not clear that Grice thought that his CP and maxims had any
role to play at this level. As noted in the previous section, in discussing the
CP and maxims, he concentrated on the implidt aspect of communication
rather than the recovely of what is said.
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However, it has been claimed that the CP and maxims do in fact play a role at
the level of what is said, and in particular in disambiguation and reference
assignment (Katz 1972: 449-450, Walker 1975: 156-157, Wilson and
Sperber 1981: 156-159). According to Walker (1975):
'...,in ordinary cases of ambiguity we rely on that principle [the Co-operative Principle]
to determine which sense is intended; ... '(Walker 1975: 156)
and
'The Co-operative Principle often helps to determine to what item a speal.er is referring
when he uses a proper name or a definite description, because there is more than one
object in the world that satisfies the predicate from which the description is formed.'
(ibid. 157)
Thus, we cannot disambiguate the meaning of 'bank' in 'I am going to the
bank' or recover the referent for 'Bill' in 'Bill left' unless we assume that the
speaker has been obeying the Co-operative Principle. The assuniptions that
the speaker is being rational, co-operative, relevant or truthful, will enable
the hearer to recover the 'financial institution' sense for 'bank', and identify
the Bifi we both know, rather than the president of USA.
An example similar to the following one was used by Katz (1972) to make
essentially the same point. Suppose someone says on public television:
(8)	 Bill Clinton is a crook.
When he is prosecuted for libelling the president of the USA, his defence
lawyer argues that the speaker of (8) was not referring to the President but a
local shopkeeper who had cheated him. Katz argues that such a defence is
bound to fall: the audience were entitled to assume that the £peaker was
referring to their President. If this was not what he intended to say, he ought
to have used some qualifying expression such as: 'who runs a shop in my
neighbourhood'. This line of argument depends on the assumption that the
speaker is assumed to have been obeying the CP and maxims. Katz concludes:
the machinery of Grice's theory enters into not only what is conversationally
implied but also into what is said, ...' (Katz 1972:450)
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Wilson and Sperber (1981) took the same point further by pointing out that
it is not only in disambiguation and reference assignment that the CP and
maxims have a role to play. There are other aspects of what is said that are
determined by pragmatic principles too. Suppose that while John Smith is
playing the violin, I say:
(9) John plays well.
You will recover 'what I said' as in (10):
(10) John Smith plays the violin well.
Yet all that is warranted by reference assignment and disambiguation alone
appears to be the much weaker proposition in (11):
(11) John Smith plays some musical instrument well.
The idea that pragmatic principles play a major role in determining not only
what is implicated, but also what is said, has been an important feature of the
relevance-theoretic approach (see Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston 1988,
Blakemore 1992).
Having established that the CP and maxims can play a role in determining
what is said, I turn now to the question that is central to the analysis of
evidentials: can the CP and maxims help to determine the speaker's degree of
commitment to its truth? This is a question not about what the speaker has
said, but about the speaker's attitude to what was said. It therefore raises a
further question: where, in Grice's framework, does the communication of
propositional attitudes fit in?
Consider first the fact that in saying (12a), Mary would typically communicate
the information in (12b):
(12) a. The sun is shining.
b. Mary believes that the sun is shining.
In Grice's terms, (12b) is not part of what Mary has said. Hence, according to
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our diagram above (p. 61), it must be part of what she has implicated. Yet
Grice specifically denies that (12b) is a conversational implicature of (12a).
The passage is an interesting one, because it makes clear the link between the
maxims of Qpality and expressions of propositional attitude such as belief:
'On my account, it will not be true that when I say that p, I conversationally implicate
that I believe that p for to suppose that I believe that p (or rather think of myself as
believing that p) is just to suppose that I am observing the first maxim of Quality on
this occasion.' (Grice 1989: 42)
What Grice is saying is that (12b) above follows from the CP and maxims, but
is nonetheless not a conversational implicature. Since it is clearly not part of
what is said, nor is it a conventional implicature (since its recovery depends
on the CP and maxims), it appears that there is no place at all for it in Grice's
framework. Thus, the framework must be extended in some way in order to
accommodate this very basic information about propositional attitude. I will
return to this point below.
By invoking the maxims of Quality, from the fact that the speaker says 'F, the
hearer can infer not only (a) she believes that P, but also (b) she has adequate
evidence for 'P'. Bach and Harnish (1979, chapter 4) use this assumption to
explain how various types of assertive speech acts are recognized. Different
types of assertive speech act (e.g. assertives, predictives, confirmatives,
suggestives) are linked to differences in the strength of belief or amount of
evidence involved (ibid. 41-42). Thus, if the speaker is
asserting/claiming/declaring that P, she must believe that P; if she is
confirming/concluding/assessing that P, she must believe that P on the basis
of some truth-seeking procedure, which arguably results in a stronger degree
of commitment; if she is suggesting/guessing/speculating that P. she must
believe that there is not sufficient reason to believe that P, which is the
weakest degree of commitment (Bach and Harnish 1979: 42-46). Thus, the CP
and maxims play a role in the recovery of speech-act descriptions in just the
same way as they contribute to the recovery of propositional-attitude
descriptions. Hence, from the fact that Mary has said (12a) above, and the
assumption that she is obeying the maxims of Quality, together with further
contextual assumptions the hearer is entitled to infer (13):
(13)	 Mary asserts that the sun is shining.
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Again, this falls outside Grice's framework, being neither part of what is said
nor (arguably) a conversational implicature. This point will be taken up in a
later section.
Récanati (1987: 225) discusses how a particular type of assertive speech act
might be identified on the basis of the linguistic content of the utterance, the
CP and maxims, and contextual information:
having to select the direct speech act among several possible candidates, the hearer
uses the conversational maxims as a guide; he eliminates the speech acts that, if
performed by the speaker, would (even apparently) violate them.' (ibid. 225)
Thus, if it is dear in the circumstances that the speaker has minimal evidence
for the truth of her utterance, and if a guess would, in the circumstances, be
appropriate, he might interpret her utterance as a guess. Against such a
background, the evidential markers might be appropriately analysed as overt
indicators of the type of speech act the speaker has in mind, to be used where
purely inferential mechanisms might lead the hearer astray. It follows that
Grice's inferential account of degrees of speaker commitment fits well with
the speech-act account of evidentials discussed in chapter 2.
Grice dealt with the speaker's propositional attitudes to implicatures in much
greater detail, and he saw the CP and maxims as playing a crucial role in this
aspect of comprehension. For example, he analyses the use of the disjunctive
'or' in 'P or Q as con versationally implicating that the speaker does not know
that P, and does not know that Q He comments:
'The fact that it would be inappropriate to say "My wife is either in Oxford or in
London" when I know perfectly well that she is in Oxford has led to the idea that it is
part of the meaning of "or" (or of "either ... or") to convey that the speaker is ignorant
of the truth-values of the particular disjuncts.' (Grice 1989: 8-9)
He goes on to argue against a decoding account of this phenomenon and for
an inferential account
'One who says that A or B, ... could be shown in normal circumstances to implicate
(conversationally) that there are non-truth-functional grounds for supposing that AvB.
For to say that A or B ... would be to make a weaker and so less informative statement
than to say that A or to say that B, and ... would therefore be to make a less informative
statement than would be appropriate in the circumstances. So there is an implicature
that he is not in a position to make a stronger statement, and if in conformity with the
second maxim of Quality, the speaker is to be presumed to have evidence for what he
71
says, then the speaker thinks that there are non-truth-functional grounds for accepting
A or B.' (Grice 1989: 46)
Building on these ideas, one might construct a Gricean account of the fact that
someone who says 'I think that P' generally communicates that she does not
know, or is not certain, that P. The idea would be that in using evidential
expressions such as I think, I suppose, that P, the speaker suggests that by
being more specific, she would violate either the supermaxim of Quality - not
trying to make her contribution one that is true - or the second maxim of
Qpality - making a claim for which she lacks adequate evidence. In using the
evidential expression, the speaker is implicating that she is not able to be
more informative or more certain than she is.
An account along these lines is sketched by Lyons (1977):
'Taken together, the maxims of quantity and quality can be invoked, ... to account for
the fact that, if someone says I think it's raining or It may be raining, he can be held to
have implied that he does not know for certain that it is raining .......The speaker would
presumably have said It is raining, without qualifying in any way his own commitment
to the truth of the proposition "It is raining", if he had known for certain that it was
raining. For knowledge that p is true constitutes adequate evidence for asserting that p.'
(Lyons 1977: 594-595)
Lyons claims that the evidential I know should be treated in a similar way:
'...also It must be raining and I know it's raining, involve a weakening of the speaker's
commitment to the truth of the proposition "It's raining" ... This too can be explained
in terms of the Gricean maxims: if the speaker's evidence is unimpeachable or his
commitment to the truth of the p so firm that there is no doubt at all in his mind that
p is true, he will not feel obliged to make explicit the fact that this is so.' (Lyons 1977:
595)
Surely, however, I know is often used to communicate the speaker's
strengthened degree of commitment, as in (14b):
(14)	 a.IknowBilhiscoming.
b. I know for certain that Bill is coming, I saw him this morning.
These utterances, where evidentials indicate an increased degree of
certainty, would presumably be treated in terms of the second maxim of
Quantity, which says that we should not make our contribution more
informative than required. If (14b) is not to be more informative than is
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required, it must presumably allow the hearer to infer that the speaker's
evidence for the claim she makes is stronger than would have been realized
without the presence of the evidential.
Levinson (1983) accounts for degrees of speaker's commitment in terms of
conversational implicatures too.
'... if I use some linguistic expression that fails to commit me to some embedded
proposition, in preference to another available stronger expression that would so
commit me, then I may be taken to implicate that I am not in the (epistemic) position
to make the stronger statement. Thus if I say (127) instead of (128),
(127) 1 believe John is away.
(128) 1 know John is away.
I implicate that it is possible, for all I know, that John is in fact not away.' (Levinson
1983: 136)
These are, according to Levmson, Generalized Quantity implicatures: they
arise in all normal contexts, and are recognized by reference to the maxims of
Quantity. Levinson characterizes a range of linguistic constructions that give
rise to implicatures concerning speakers' degrees of commitment in the
following way:
'A sentence of the form p or q has these implicatures by reference to the availability of
other sentences like p and q or simply p or q which are stronger or more informative
because they do entail p or q or both. Similar pairs of "stronger' and "weaker"
constructions are illustrated in (131):
(131)	 (a) stronger form
'p and q'
'since p. q'
'a knows p'
'a realized p'
'necessarily p'
(Levinson 1983: 137)
(b) weaker form
'p or q'
'if p then q'
'a believes p'
'a thought p'
'possibly p'
(c) implicatures of(b)
{Pp, P-p. Pg. P-q}
Pp, P-p. Pg. P-q}
{Pp, P-p}
{Pp, P-pt
{Pp, P-.p'
So, it is easy in prindple to see how a combined Gricean/speech-act theory of
evidentials could be developed, in which both decoding and inference could
play an appropriate role. This looks like quite a reasonable approach, but
there are questions about the adequacy of the Qjiantity and Quality Maxims
which play a crucial role in Grice's account. As regards the Quality Maxims,
and in particular the first Maxim of Qjiality ('Do not say what you believe to
be false'), it has been argued by Sperber and Wilson (1985/6) that no such
maxims exist. The existence of loose talk and metaphor, free indirect speech
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and irony, present problems for the Quality Maxims which, according to
Sperber and Wilson, the Gricean framework has never satisfactorily solved. In
the next chapter I will outline these problems, and sketch an alternative
framework in which there are no maxims of Qj.iality, and hence a different
analysis of evidentials and degrees of speaker comnutment must be found.
As regards the Quantity Maxims, there is a problem about the notion of
'required' information, and about Grice's claim that speakers are expected to
give the 'required' information regardless of whether it is in their own
interests to do so. This claim plays a crucial role in the communication of
negative propositional attitudes (as where the speaker who says 'I think that
P' implicates that she does not know that P, because otherwise she would have
said so). It will need more careful investigation in the light of Sperber and
Wilson's arguments that speakers have no obligation at all to provide
information just because it is 'required'.
3.3	 Grice and non-truth-conditional semantics
As we saw in section 3.1.2 above, Grice thought that not all linguistic
meaning was truth-conditional. He introduced the term conventional
irnplicattzre to accommodate non-truth-conditional linguistic meaning. The
issue I want to investigate in this section is whether the meaning encoded by
evidential expressions can be analysed in terms of Grice's notion of
conventional implicature. I will argue that Gricean conventional implicatures
are carried by a subset of speech-act indicators as defmed in chapter 2, so
that Grice's account is not really distinct from the speech-act account of non-
truth-conditional meaning. Moreover, evidential expressions do not fall into
the subset of speech-act indicators with which Grice was concerned. Hence,
the notion of conventional implicature is inadequate for the analysis of
evidentials.
Grice's remarks on conventional implicatures were very brief, but entirely
consistent with each other. He was concerned with a small class of non-truth-
conditional connectives, including 'but', 'so' and 'moreover'. These
connectives, he argued, did not contribute to the truth-conditional content of
utterances, or, in his terms, to what was said. Rather, they carried
information about a certain type of speech act that the speaker intended to
74
perform.
The following is a sample Gricean analysis. In saying (15), according to Grice,
the speaker communicates the following information:
(15) He is an Englishman; he is therefore brave.
what is saic±
	 a. X is an Englishman.
b. X is brave.
what is con ventionaily implicated
	 (b) follows from (a).
Similarly, in saying (16), the speaker communicates the information below
(16) Jane was awarded a scholarship; her sister, on the other hand, got
married.
what is said:
	 a. Jane was awarded a
scholarship.
b. Her sister got married.
what is conventionallyiinplicated	 (a) contrasts with (b)
Similar points apply to (17) and (18):
(17) Mary failed the exam; moreover, her husband lost his job.
what is saict	 a. Mary failed the exam.
b. Her husband lost his job.
what is conventionally implicatect
	 (b) is additional to (a)
(18) Mary is back, so Peter is happy.
what is said:	 a. Mary is back.
b. Peter is happy.
what is conventionally implicatect	 (a) is an explanation of (b)
Here, Grice comments, in saying (15),
'...1 have said that he is an Englishman, and said that he is brave, [but] I do not want to
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say that I have said (in the favoured sense) that it follows from his being an Englishman
that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated that this is so. I
do not want to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, strictly speaking, false
should the consequence in question fail to hold. So some implicatures are conventional,
...'(Gricel989:25)
Similarly, with regard to (16), Grice remarks:
'...the nonrealization of this condition [condition of contrast conventionally signified
by on the other hand"] would ... be regarded as insufficient to falsify the speaker's
statement. So we seem to have a case of a condition which is part of what the words
conventionally mean without being part of what the words say;' (Grice 1989: 361)
For Grice, then, (19a) and (19b):
(19)	 a. It's midnight and the pubs are open.
b. It's midnight but the pubs are open.
would be true if and only if (a) the time of the utterance is indeed midnight,
and (b) the pubs are open at that time. Thus, according to Grice, (19a) and
(19b) express the same proposition. Clearly, though, they differ in meaning,
a difference which is attributed to the lexical meaning of 'and' and 'but'. In
Gncean terms, 'but' conventionally implicates that there is a contrast between
the fact that it is midnight and the fact that the pubs are open. Hence the
connotation of contrast carried by (19b), but not by (19a).
Grice generalizes his claims in the following way:
'I would wish to maintain that the semantic function of the word "therefore" is to
enable the speaker to indicate, though not to say, that a certain consequence holds.
Mutatis rnutandis, I would adopt the same position with regard to words like "but" and
"moreover".' (ibid. 121)
Notice that Grice sees these non-truth-conditional constructions as indicating,
which suggests that he is analysing them in familiar speech-act terms. The
question is, what is the relation between Grice's notions of saying and
conventionally implicating, on the one hand, and the speech-act distinction
between describing and indicating, on the other? Does Grice see expressions
like 'but', 'moreover', 'therefore', as encoding information about the type of
speech-act the speaker intends to perform? If so, then Gnce's notion of
conventional implicature offers no real alternative to the standard speech-act
account.
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In fact, Grice thought it was possible to distinguish between two types of
speech acts: central, or lower-order, speech acts, e.g. saying, telling, asking,
and less central, or higher-order speech acts, e.g. adding, contrasting,
concluding, which comment on the lower-order ones. Consider (20):
(20)	 My brother-in-law lives on a peak in Darien; his great aunt, on the
other hand, was a nurse in World War I.
In discussing this example, Grice comments:
'...speakers may be at one and the same time engaged in performing speech-acts at
different but related levels. One part of what the cited speaker in example two ["My
brother-in-law lives on a peak in Darien; his great aunt, on the other hand, was a nurse
in World War I"] is doing is making what might be called ground-floor statements about
the brother-in-law and the great aunt, but at the same time as he is performing these
speech acts he is also performing a higher-order speech act of commenting in a certain
way on the lower-order speech acts. He is contrasting in some way the performance of
some of these lower-order-acts with others, and he signals his performance of this
higher-order speech acts in his use of the embedded enclitic phrase, "on the other
hand". The truth or falsity and so the dictive content of his words is determined by the
relation of his ground-floor speech acts to the world; consequently, while a certain kind
of misperformance of the higher-order speech-act may constitute a semantic offense, it
will not touch the truth-value, and so not the dictive content, of the speaker's words.'
(Grice 1989: 362)
According to Grice, it is the central, or lower-order, speech acts which
determine the truth conditions of utterances. These speech acts are (at least
in part) linguistically encoded by means of mood indicators (ibid. 118-119).
Higher-order speech acts, by contrast, do not affect truth conditions, and it is
these that are treated in terms of conventional implicatures.
In Grice's view, the performance of a less central speech act is dependent on
the performance of a more central speech act. For example:
the meaning of "moreover" would be linked with the speech act of adding, the
performance of which would require the performance of one or another of the central
speech-acts.' (Grice 1989: 122)
One cannot add something, or contrast, conclude and so on, without first
asserting, ordering or asking something. On this account, then, the speaker
simultaneously performs speech acts on two levels, as illustrated in (15)-( 18).
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This account suggests that Grice indeed viewed discourse connectives as a
subset of speech-act indicators in the sense discussed in chapter 2. For
example, the function of 'moreover', 'on the other hand', 'therefore' and 'so'
above is to indicate that the higher-order speech acts of adding, contrasting,
conduding and explaining are being performed. Conventional implicatures
express such additional comments on more basic speech acts being
performed.
Notice that this type of information is often encoded by parenthetical
comments or adverbials. Thus, the functions of 'moreover', 'on the other
hand' and 'therefore' above run parallel to the function of the parentheticals
in (21a), (22a), (23a) and the adverbials in (21b), (22b) and (23b):
(21) a. Her husband - to add to that - lost his job.
b. In addition, her husband lost his job.
(22) a. Her sister - and this contrasts with what I've just said - got
married.
b. By contrast, her sister got married.
(23) a. He is - I conclude - brave.
b. Consequently, he is brave.
This suggests at least the possibility that evidential adverbials (dearly,
obviously) and parentheticals (I guess/I conclude) might be analysable as
carrying conventional implicatures, i.e. as non-truth-conditional indicators of
non-central speech-acts commenting on more basic speech-acts performed.
However, it seems pretty clear that evidential adverbials and parentheticals
do not, in fact, perform higher-order, less basic, speech acts. Speech acts such
as asserting, guessing, conduding, confirming, are analysed by Griceans, e.g.
Bach and Harnish (1979, chapter 4), as basic speech acts. Thus, evidential
adverbials and parentheticals are, if anything, indicators of such basic, lower-
order, speech acts, and Grice's notion of conventional implicature is not
suitable for the analysis of evidentials.
To conclude, Grice distinguished between what is said, the truth-conditional
content of an utterance, and conventional implicatures carried by non-truth-
conditional indicators. Examples of such indicators are various discourse
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connectives. However, evidentials do not seem to be analysable as carrying
conventional implicatures. Hence the standard speech-act account is the only
one available so far. The question I would like to consider in subsequent
chapters is whether there is any alternative to this standard speech-act
approach.
3.4	 Grice and the explicit/implicit distinction
As suggested in the previous chapter, Grice appears to see the distinction
between explicit and implicit communication as coinciding roughly with the
saying/implicating distinction. However, as we saw in section 3.3 above, this
distinction is not exhaustive. Certain types of speech-act and propositional-
attitude information communicated by an utterance appear to fit into neither
side of the dichotomy. In this section, I shall pursue the question of where
they fit in.
Grice's main concern was with the implicit aspect of communication. He used
the term 'implicature' for everything communicated by an utterance other
than 'what is said'. This is how he introduced the term 'implicature' into the
framework:
'...whatever B implied, suggested, meant .., is distinct from what B said, ... I wish to
introduce ... the verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf. implying)...'
(Grice 1989: 24)
For Grice, 'indicate' is one of the words that 'implicate' is used to cover. As he
comments:
'"Implicature" is a blanket word to avoid having to make choices between words like
Imply", suggest", "indicate" and "mean".' (Grice 1989: 86)
Implicatures can be either conventional or nonconventional (Grice 1989: 24-
26, 118). Conventionally implicated meaning is, as we have seen, semantic,
but non-truth-conditional. By contrast, nonconventionally implicated
meaning is pragmatic or social, i.e. it is inferred on the basis of pragmatic or
social principles, induding the CP and maxims (For examples and discussion,
see sections 3.1.2, 33, Neale 1992: 520-526).
Notice here that Grice differs from speech-act theorists in that he regards at
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least some indicators, i.e. the discourse connectives, as falling on the implicit
rather than the explicit side, even though they carry linguistically encoded
meaning; and the fact that he regards indicating as a sub-type of implicating
seems to suggest that he might want to treat other indicators as falling on the
implicit side, although new categories would have to be added to handle
them, as we have seen.
By 'what is said', Gnce meant the truth-conditional content of an utterance
(Grice 1989: Logic and Conversation, Essays 2, 6, Levinson 1983: 97, Neale
1992: 520, 556). Grice remarks:
'In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be
closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered.'
(Grice 1989: 25)
However in his framework, recovering what is said involves not only knowing
the meaning of the words used but disambiguation and reference assignment
too. With regard to the utterance 'He is in the grip of a vice', he comments:
for a full identification of what the speaker had said, one would need to know (a)
the identity of , (b) the time of utterance, and (c) the meaning, on the particular
occasion of utterance, of the phrase in the grip of a vice [a decision between (1) x was
unable to rid himself of a certain kind of bad character trait and (2) some part of x's
person was caught in a certain kind of tool or instrument].' (Grice 1989: 25)
Thus, the speaker of (24):
(24)	 Hewenttothebank.
said, according to Grice, that John Smith went to the financial institution (see
Katz 1972: 444, Sperber and Wilson 1986: 183, Carston 1988: 155, Neale
1992: 520). Hence, if what is said is part of what is explicitly communicated,
then explicit communication involves pragmatic processes too. On the other
hand, Grice analysed linguistically encoded but non-truth-conditional
information, in terms of conventional iinplicatures, i.e. as falling on the
implicit side of communication. In Grice's framework, then, truth-conditional
meaning falls under explicit communication, whereas non-truth-conditional
meaning falls under implicit communication. As I have already established,
though, the distinction is not exhaustive. In particular, basic, central speech-
act information falls into neither the category of what is said nor any of the
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existing categories of what is implicated; and the fact that a speaker who says
that P also communicates that she believes that P, also appears to fall outside
Grice's saying/implicating distinction.
In fact, there is a whole range of non-truth-conditional expressions which
Grice does not explicitly deal with, and which need to be fitted into his
framework. These include a variety of sentence adverbials and
parentheticals, and various sorts of discourse and illocutionary particle. Since
this class of expressions includes most of the evidentials that I am concerned
with in this thesis, I will consider them briefly here.
Let us start by considering a type of non-truth-conditional expression that
Grice does deal with, - the mood indicators. Grice links mood indicators to a
range of central, basic (ground-floor or lower-order) speech acts such as
asserting, teffing, asking. Thus, (25a-c) would be seen as performing the
central, basic speech acts in (26a-c):
(25)	 a. Biliruns.
b. Does Bill run?
c. Run, Bill.
(26)	 a. The speaker is asserting that Bill runs.
b. The speaker is asking whether Bifi runs.
c. The speaker is telling Bill to run.
In this framework, the speaker of (25a-c) communicates the speech-act
information in (26a-c). But is this information explicitly or implicitly
communicated? Clearly, the speech-act information in (26a-c) cannot be
conventionally implicated. As we have seen, Grice links conventional
implicatures to a range of non-basic, non-central speech-acts such as adding,
contrasting, explaining.
In Grice's framework, mood indicators seem to be part of what is said (1989:
118-122). According to Grice:
'...in uttering X, U will have said that*p is a mood-indicator, to be specified as,
e.g. 1-" for indicative, or 9W for imperative] , if both (i) U has Y-ed that *p, where Y-
ing is a central speech-act, and (ii) X embodies some conventional device the meaning
of which is such that its presence in X indicates that its utterer is Y-ing that *p (Grice
1989: 121)
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Thus, someone who utters 'Go home' says '!You go home', i.e. what is said
includes a mood indicator. Neale (1992) summarizes the point as following:
'In 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning' (Essay 6) Grice takes t'
additional [in addition to the "indicative mood"1 sentence types to be associated with
"central" types of speech act those in the "interrogative mood" and those in the
"imperative mood". And it is clear from what Grice says in that essay, together with
remarks in 'Further Notes on Logic and Conversation' (Essay 3), that when U uses a
sentence of any of these three forms, Usays something,...' (Neale 1992: 521)
The best way of reconcffing these remarks with Grice's suggestion that
indicating falls on the implicit side appears to be as follows. First, Grice
claims that there are three basic types of proposition, distinguished by the
presence of 'I-', '!' and '7', with three different modes of satisfaction: say, truth
conditions for 'I-P', compliance conditions for '!P' and answerhood conditions
for '?P'. Thus, what is said (i.e. explicitly communicated) by (25a-c) differs
because of the difference in satisfaction conditions. Second, Gnce claims that
the mood indicators, in addition to altering the satisfaction conditions of
their associated proposition, carry speech-act information that is not part of
what is said. For (25a-c), this is the information given in (26a-c). As is shown
by the quotation immediately following these examples, Grice does not regard
(26a-c) themselves as part of what is said. Thus, according to him, the
speaker of (25a) asserts (or says) that I-P, but merely indicates (or implicates)
that he is asserting that I-P. And as we have seen, although this 'implicature'
is encoded by the mood indicator, it cannot be a conventional implicature
according to Grice's definition, and there appears to be no place for it in the
framework.
Similar remarks apply to various types of propositional-attitude information
conveyed by utterances. Thus, (27a-b) might communicate the information in
(28a-b):
(27) a. Mary (sincerely): Bill is coming.
b. Mary (happily): Bill is coming.
(28) a. Mary believes that Bill is coming.
b. Mary is happy that Bill is coming.
As noted above, it follows from the maxim of truthfulness that the speaker of
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(27a) will communicate (28a); but Grice specifically states that (28a) is not a
conversational implicature of (27a) because it in some sense follows too
directly from the maxims. (28b) is not dealt with by Grice at all. Clearly,
neither (28a) nor (28b) is part of what is said; so these types of
communicated information fail to fit into Grice's framework.
It follows from what has just been said that evidentials do not fit
straightforwardly into Grice's account either. Pragmatically inferred
evidential information fails into the category of pragmatically inferred
propositional-attitude information dealt with above. Consider the following
examples:
(29) a. Mary (firmly): Bill will be here.
b. Mary (hesitantly): Bill will be here.
(30) a. Mary firmly believes that Bill will be here.
b. Mary has some evidence that Bill will be here.
(30a-b) appear to follow as directly from the maxims of quality (perhaps with
help from the manner maxims), as does (28a). Hence they can not be
regarded as conversational implicatures. But the evidential information in
(30a-b) cannot be part of what is said eithec the speaker of (29a) says (or
confirms) that Bill will be here, she does not say that she firmly believes that
Bill will be here. The speaker of (30b) says that Bill will be here, she does not
say that she has some evidence that Bill will be here. Thus, pragmatically
inferred evidentials fall outside Gnce's framework. Similar remarks apply to
the speech-act information carried by a combination of mood indicators and
contextual information (e.g. speculate, confirm, guess, etc.). These are
central, or lower-order, speech acts, like ask and say, and present the same
problems of categorization for Grice.
As for linguistically encoded evidentials, it is not really any dearer where
they would fit in Grice's framework. Consider the examples below
(31) a. John is, I guarantee, a bright student.
b. John is, I guess, a bright student.
(32) a. Evidently, John is a bright student.
b. Obviously, John is a bright student.
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As we saw, Grice's distinction between saying and conventionally implicating
roughly parallels the speech-act distinction between describing and
indicating. The question is whether Grice saw the parentheticals as
contributing to truth conditions or not. If he did, then they would, of course,
contribute to what was said. If not, then it appears that the parentheticals
might be anaiysable in his framework along the same lines as mood indicators
- as indicating what type of central, lower-order speech act is being
performed. However, this would leave the parentheticals as unclassifiable as
the mood indicators, which, as we have already seen, have no obvious place
within Grice's saying/implicating distinction.
In the next chapter, I will show how Sperber and Wilson have introduced a
category of explicit communication, or explicature, parallel to Gnce's notion
of implicit communication, or implicature, to deal with the types of
communicated information that Grice's saying/implicating distinction
ignores.
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CHAPTER 4
RELEVANCE THEORY
4.1	 Introduction
Relevance theory developed out of Grice's pragmatic theory, but differs from
it in many respects. Although still at an early stage of development, it has
provided a useful framework for a considerable variety of research
(Blakemore 1987, 1992, Blass 1990, Carston 1988, 1993, Clark 1991, Gutt
1991, Itani 1993, Matsui 1993, Smith 1989, Zegarac 1991, see also
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 1987, Lingua 1992, 1993). In this chapter, I
will present a brief sketch of relevance theory, with emphasis on those of its
features which bear on the study of evidentials, and in particular on the three
central issues raised in the Introduction.
As pointed out in previous chapters, evidential information is partly
linguistically encoded and partly pragmatically inferred, and I will be
considering what light relevance theory might shed on the role of pragmatic
inference in evidentials. Moreover, relevance theorists have thrown new light
on the distinction between explicit and implicit communication, and I will be
considering on which side of the distinction evidentials might fall. Relevance
theorists have also analysed certain non-truth-conditional expressions such
as but, so, moreover, in a way that differs from Grice's, and I will be
investigating what light the relevance-theoretic approach might shed on the
semantics of evidentials. Finally, relevance theory draws a distinction
between conceptual and procedural meaning, and I will be examining
whether evidentials are better analysed in conceptual or procedural terms.
l'his discussion will lay the groundwork for a detailed consideration of the
truth-conditional status of evidentials, to be offered in later chapters.
4.1.1	 Relevance and communication
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986) builds on Grice's fundamental
assumptions that (a) the primary domain of pragmatic theory is overt
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intentional communication and (b) utterance interpretation is a non-
demonstrative inference process, where hearers infer the intended
interpretation using contextual assumptions and general principles of
communication. A few words of explanation about each of these points.
Overt, intentional communication differs from accidental information
transmission or covert communication in that the speaker wants to convey a
certain message, is actively helping the hearer to recover it, and would
acknowledge it if asked. If Peter points at one of my shelves and asks me to
lend him the red book, surely he wants his intention to pick out a particular
red book recognized; if it is not, communication will fail. While relevance
theory has much to say about accidental information transmission and covert
forms of communication, it follows Grice in claiming that overt, intentional
communication forms a natural theoretical domain, with its own theoretical
principles and generalizations. In what follows, I shall use 'communication' to
mean 'overt, intentional communication', and 'understanding an utterance' to
mean recovering the overtly intended interpretation.
Like most pragmatists, Sperber and Wilson emphasize that understanding an
utterance is not a simple matter of linguistic decoding. It involves identifying
(a) what the speaker intended to say, (b) what the speaker intended to imply,
(c) the speaker's intended attitude to what was said and implied, and (d) the
intended context (Wilson, 'Relevance and Understanding' forthcoming). In
other words, the intended interpretation of an utterance is, for relevance
theory, the intended combination of explicit content, contextual assumptions
and implications, and the speaker's intended attitude to these (ibid.). To
illustrate, consider the following examples:
(1) Sarah's book sold very little.
(2) A: Would you like an ice-cream?
B: lamonadiet.
(3) A: What will happen to the economy?
B: Bill will be the new President.
For the possessive phrase in (1) there are several linguistically possible
interpretations: it could mean the book Sarah owns, the book Sarah wrote, the
book Sarah is holding, etc. In order to decide what the speaker intended to
86
say, i.e. what proposition she intended to express, the hearer needs to
resolve this semantic vagueness: he may also have to disambiguate
ambiguous expressions, assign reference to referentially ambivalent
expressions, or recover ellipsed material. Thus, identifying what the speaker
intended to say is not simply a matter of linguistic decoding.
As Grice has shown, often what a speaker intends to communicate goes
beyond what was said. Thus, it is dear that in (2) B does not simply intend to
communicate that he is on a diet. On the assumption that ice-cream is
excluded from the menu of those who are dieting, B implies, and A will infer,
that she does not want any ice-cream. The recovery of this intended
implication, or implicature, is essential to the understanding of (2B), and
cannot be identified by linguistic decoding alone.
As we have seen in previous chapters, often it is important to know the
speaker's attitude towards the propositions expressed and implied. The same
proposition can be entertained in the mind as a belief or a desire, as a
certainty, a speculation, a suggestion, a fantasy, and so on. Thus, in (3) B may
be expressing a belief, and in doing so he may communicate a prediction, a
promise, a warning, a confirmation, and so on. As Wilson observes:
'In deciding on the speaker's intended attitude to the proposition expressed and
implied, the audience has to answer the following sorts of question. Is she endorsing
these propositions or dissociating herself from them; is she asserting that they are true,
vvndering whether they are true, perhaps wishing or hoping that someone will make
them true? To a certain extent, these attitudes can be linguistically encoded (e.g.
declarative, interrogative or imperative syntax), but - what is communicated generally
goes well beyond what is linguistically encoded.' (Wilson, 'Relevance and
Understanding' forthcoming).
It is obvious that in recovering what the speaker intended to say and imply,
and her intended attitude to the proposations expressed and implied, context
plays an important role. Context, in relevance theory, is not just the
preceding linguistic text, or the spatioteinporal setting in which the utterance
takes place. It includes any assumptions used to arrive at the intended
interpretation, which may be drawn from the immediate linguistic and
physical environment, but also from scientific, cultural, or common-sense
knowledge, or any type of public or individual information that the hearer
has access to at the time. Accessing the appropriate contextual assumptions
is crucial for the understanding of (1-3) above.
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'I he role of con text in communication and understanding has not been a
central focus of most work on utterance interpretation. Relevance theory
makes it a central concern, it raises fundamental questions such as: How is
the appropriate context selected? How is it that from the huge range of
assumptions available at the time of utterance, hearers restrict themselves to
the intended ones? To illustrate, consider the following example:
(4)	 He will be the Chomsky of the next generation.
For linguists at least, the intended interpretation of this utterance will be
immediately obvious. The audience is intended to use the contextual
assumption that Chomsky revolutionised work in Linguistics, and draw the
conclusion that the male linguist in question is a potentially outstanding
figure in linguistics. The question is why this is so. Surely, most linguists will
have much more information than this retrievable for 'Chomsky'. For
example, they might know that Chomsky is a Professor at M.I.T., that he is
actively involved in politics as well as linguistics, that he has a bad back, and
so on. Why don't hearers consider these assumptions, either instead of, or as
well as, the obvious one?
Sperber and Wilson in Relevance (1986) developed a unitary answer to all
these questions, based on the simple idea that communication, like cognition,
is relevance-oriented. The central principle of relevance theory is the
Principle of Relevance, and to this 1 turn next.
4.1.2	 The PrinciDle of Relevance
Sperber and Wilson summarize their approach as follows:
'Relevance Theory ... is based on a few very simple ideas. First, that every utterance has
a variety of possible interpretations (that is, combinations of explicit content, context
and implicatures), all compatible with the information that is linguistically encoded.
Second, that not all these interpretations are equally accessible to the hearer on any
given occasion. Third, that hearers are equipped with a single, very general criterion for
evaluating interpretations as they occur to them. And fourth, that this criterion is
powerful enough to exclude all but at most a single possible interpretation, so that the
hearer is entitled to assume that the first interpretation that meets the criterion is the
only one.' (Smith and Wilson 1992:4)
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The criterion itself is based on a fundamental assumption about cognition.
According to Wilson and Sperber (1987: 27) humans pay attention to some
phenomena rather than others; they represent these phenomena to
themselves in one way rather than another; they process these
representations in one context rather than another. Wilson and Sperber
suggest that a single cognitive principle governs these choices. The
suggestion is that humans tend to pay attention to the most relevant
phenomena available; that they tend to construct the most relevant possible
representations of these phenomena, and to process them in a context that
maximizes their relevance. In other words, human cognition is relevance-
oriented: we pay attention to information that seems relevant to us.
This assumption has an immediate consequence for the theory of
communication. The very act of claiming an audience's attention encourages
the audience to believe that the information offered by the speaker is
relevant enough to be worth their attention. In other words, every act of
communication creates an expectation of relevance. This fact, Sperber and
Wilson call the Principle of Relevance. It is around this simple idea - that
communicated information creates a presumption of relevance - that Sperber
and Wilson's criterion is built.
The principle of relevance differs from other principles, maxims or
conventions proposed in modem pragmatics in that it is not something that
people have to know, let alone learn, in order to communicate successfully. It
is not a norm interlocutors can obey or disobey: it is a generalization about
human communicative behaviour. All that people do have to know is that any
utterance addressed to them conveys a presumption of its own relevance, i.e.
that the speaker intends that particular utterance to seem relevant enough to
them to be worth their attention.
Sperber and Wilson define relevance in terms of contextual effect and
processing effort. Information is relevant to people if it interacts with and
modifies their existing assumptions about the world. Sperber and Wilson
distinguish three ways in which a 'context', i.e. a set of existing assumptions,
may interact with newly presented information, and hence achieve relevance:
(i) combining with the context to yield contextual implications, (ii)
strengthening existing assumptions and (iii) contradicting and eliminating
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existing assumptions. I will illustrate each case in turn:
Case A
You decide to call Mary with the following thought
(5)	 a. If Mary is in, she must be writing her essay.
You call Mary and discover:
(5)	 b.Maryisin.
In this case, from your existing assumption (5a) and the new information
(Sb), you can deduce some further information not deducible from either the
existing assumption or the new information alone:
(5)	 c. Mary must be writing her essay.
The implication in (5c) follows from the new and old information together,
but from neither new or old information on its own. (5a) and (5b) are used as
joint premises in an inference process to yield (Sc). Now, intuitively, the new
information (5b) would be relevant in a context containing assumption (5a).
Sperber and Wilson claim that it is relevant precisely because it enables such
a joint inference process to occur. Here, assumption (Sa) is the context in
which the new information (Sb) is processed, and (Sb) contextually implies
(Sc) in the context (5a). Thus, according to Sperber and Wilson, new
information is relevant in any context in which it has contextual implications.
The more contextual implications it has, the more relevant it will be.
Assumptions about the world vary in their strength depending upon the
evidence for them or the confidence they come with. New information may
affect the strength of your existing assumptions. Consider the following case:
Case B
You see a light in Mary's window, and form the hypothesis that
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(6)	 a. Maryisin.
You call her and discover that:
(6) b.MarylSin.
In this case, the new information (6b) strengthens, or confirms, your existing
assumption (6a). Intuitively, it would be relevant to you in a context
containing (6a). Sperber and Wilson claim that (6b) is relevant precisely
because it strengthens an existing assumption of yours; and the more
assumptions it strengthens, and the more it strengthens them, the greater its
relevance will be.
Finally, let us consider a case where new information achieves relevance by
contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption.
Case C
Similarly to case B, you see a light in Mary's window and form the hypothesis
that:
(7) a.Maryisin.
This time, when you call her, her sister answers the phone and you discover
that:
(7)	 b. Mary is not in.
In this case, the new information (7b) contradicts an existing assumption.
Sperber and Wilson assume that when new and old assumptions contradict
each other, the weaker of the two assumptions is abandoned. Here, the new
information (7b) provides strong evidence against the existing assumption
(7a), which would therefore be abandoned. (7b) would be relevant in these
circumstances. Sperber and Wilson claim that new information is relevant in
any context in which it contradicts, and leads to the elimination of, an
existing assumption. The more assumptions it eliminates, and the stronger
they were, the more relevant it will be.
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The three cases illustrated above show the three ways in which new
information can interact with, and be relevant in, a context of existing
assumptions: (i) by combining with the context to yield contextual
implications, (ii) by strengthening existing assumptions and (iii) by
contradicting and eliminating existing assumptions. Sperber and Wilson call
these types of interaction contextual effects. Thus, new information is
relevant in any context in which it has contextual effects, and the greater its
contextual effects, the more relevant it will be.
However, as Sperber and Wilson point out, this comparative definition of
relevance is inadequate in one respect, as the following example shows:
Case D
You decide to call Mary, thinking:
(8)	 a. If Mary is in, she must be writing her essay.
You call Mary with that single thought in your mind. When Mary answers,
there are a number of facts that could come to your mind: the question is,
which of them will you notice; which of them will be most relevant to you? For
example, in principle, you would be capable of formulating any of the
following thoughts:
(8)	 b. Mary is in.
c. Mary is in and she has a telephone in the house.
cL Mary is in and she has a telephone in the house and she is
capable of hearing it ring
The question is: which of these thoughts would be the best one to formulate
in that situation? Which is the most relevant one - (8b), (8c), or (8d)?
Intuitively, (8b) would be more relevant to you than (8c) or (8d) given that
you had available only the contextual assumption (8a). However, (8b-d) have
exactly the same contextual effects in this contexc they all have the contextual
implication (8e), and no other contextual effect at ath
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(8)	 e. Mary must be writing her essay.
Sperber and Wilson claim that these intuitive differences in relevance are
connected with the fact that (8b) is less linguistically complex than (8c), which
is in turn less complex than (8d). As a result, it takes less effort to recover the
same contextual effects from (8b) than from (8c) or (8d): precisely because
(8d) includes (8b) as a subpart, (8d) will require all the effort needed to
process (8b) and more besides. This extra processing effort detracts from the
relevance of (8d).
Contextual effects, then, cost some mental effort to derive. The effort needed
to compute the contextual effects of an utterance is determined by factors
such as: (a) recency of use; (b) frequency of use; (c) the linguistic complexity
of the utterance; (d) the logical complexity of the utterance; (e) the
accessibffity of the context; (1) the size of the context and (g) the inferential
effort needed to compute the contextual effects of the utterance in the chosen
context.
There are thus two factors that determine the relevance of newly presented
information: (a) contextual effects - the greater the effects, the greater the
relevance; and (b) the processing effort needed to recover those contextual
effects - the smaller the effort, the greater the relevance.
Recall that every utterance creates an expectation of relevance, around which
Sperber and Wilson construct their criterion for evaluating alternative
interpretations of an utterance. In their book Relevance, Sperber and Wilson
define a notion of optimal relevance, which aims to spell out what the hearer
is looking for in terms of effort and effect
Opd.rnal Relevance
An utterance on a given interpretation is optimally relevant ift
(a)it achieves enough effects to be v.vrth the hearer's atten don;
(b) it puts the hearer to no unjustifiable effort in achieving these effects.
According to clause (a), the very fact of requesting the hearer's attention by
means of an utterance entitles the hearer to expect enough effects to make
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the utterance worth his attention. How much that is depends on what else the
hearer could have been attending to at the time. If highly relevant
information is being processed at the time the hearer's attention is requested
- for example, a mother's attention while attending to her badly injured child
- virtually no interruption would be relevant enough to be worth her
attention. When lying leisurely by the beach though, any ordinary remark
would be relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention.
According to clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance, a speaker
aiming at optimal relevance should try to formulate her utterance in such a
way that the first acceptable interpretation to occur to the hearer is the one
she intended to convey. This excludes the possibility that the hearer will be
expected to recover, process and accept the wrong interpretation first, before
arriving at the intended one.
Notice now that the hearer is not automatically entitled to accept any
interpretation that happens to be optimally relevant to him. He is looking for
an interpretation that the speaker might have overtly intended to be
optimally relevant. I would like to end this section by showing that a criterion
based on simply choosing the first interpretation that satisfies the definition
of optimal relevance is slightly too strong. I will consider two types of case.
Both occur because of a mismatch between the context the speaker expected
you to have immediately accessible and the context you do in fact have
immediately accessible. The first is the case of accidental irrelevance.
Suppose I know you are interested in Relevance-theoretic Pragmatics, and I
am not sure you have been in Dillons recently. I say to you:
(9)	 Diane Blakemore's new book is out.
In fact, you have already bought the book, so the proposition I have expressed
is not relevant to you. Thus, there will be no interpretation on which this
utterance will be optimally relevant. Nonetheless, it is easy for you to see how
I might have intended it to be relevant to you, and you will interpret the
utterance accordingly. This confirms that what hearers are looking for is not
simply an optimally relevant interpretation, but an interpretation that the
speaker might have thought would be optimally relevant.
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The second type of example which shows that the criterion hearers use is not
one of optimal relevance alone, is one where the hearer, because of a
mismatch between expected and actual contexts, fmds an interpretation that
is optimally relevant to him, but is not one the speaker could have intended
to convey. The following example is due to Deirdre Wilson: suppose Peter has
found a foolproof way of cheating on exams. He knows the questions in
advance, and has prepared perfect answers. He has also done his best to
convince his tutors that he has been working hard, so that they will not be
surprised by the results. After the results have been announced, Peter meets
his tutor, who says to him:
(10)	 I know why you did so well in your exams.
The first contextual assumption to occur to Peter is likely to be (11), which
yields the highly relevant contextual implication in (12):
(11) The reason why I did so well in my exams is because I cheated.
(12) My tutor knows I did so well because I cheated.
Although this interpretation may well be optimally relevant, however, it is not
one the tutor could have intended, because (a) she's looking cheerful and (b)
Peter knows that his method of cheating was foolproof. He must then retrieve
an alternative interpretation which his tutor could have intended as
optimally relevant. This would, naturally, be an interpretation along the lines
of(13) and(14):
(13) The reason why you did so well in your exams was that you worked
hard.
(14) Your tutor knows that you did so well because you worked hard.
As Sperber and Wilson point out, we do not invariably look for an
interpretation that happens to be optimally relevant; we look for an
interpretation that the speaker could have intended to be optimally relevant.
Hence, the critenon they propose is not one of optimal relevance, but one of
consistency with the prindple of relevance:
Criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance
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An utterance, on a given interpretation, is consistent 'vith the principle of
relevance if the speaker might rationally have expected it to be optimally
relevant to the hearer on that interpretation.
This is then the criterion for utterance interpretation around which Sperber
and Wilson's pragmatic theory is built.
Notice here a crucial consequence of relevance theory for utterance
interpretation: that in every aspect of interpretation - i.e. in deciding (a)
what the speaker intended to say, (b) what the speaker intended to imply and
(c) what is the speaker's attitude to what was said and implied - the criterion
warrants the choice of the first interpretation coinsistent with the Principle of
Relevance - i.e. the most accessible interpretation that yields adequate effects
for no unjustifiable effort, in a way the speaker could manifestly have
foreseen. To ifiustrate, consider again examp'e (15), firstly discussed in
chapter 3 as (8):
(15)	 Bill Clinton is a crook.
When the speaker of (15) is prosecuted for libelling the president of the USA,
his defence lawyer argues that he was not referring to the President but a
local shopkeeper who had cheated him. As Katz argues (1972: 450), such a
defence is bound to fail because the audience were entitled to assume that
the speaker was referring to their President. How does this follow from the
criterion of consistency with the prindple of relevance? Recall that according
to the defmition of optimal relevance, and in particular clause (b), the
speaker should put the hearer to no unjustifiable effort in achieving the
mtended effects. But if the speaker of (15) intended to refer to someone
other than the President of USA, he would have put the hearer to some
unjustifiable effort his audience would have to recover, process and accept
the wrong interpretation first - the interpretatio&i on which he was referring
to the President of USA - then wonder whether this was, indeed, the intended
one, find an alternative one, and engage in further inference to select the
intended one. In other words, if, in the circumstances, an utterance has an
immediately accessible interpretation which is consistent with the principle
of relevance, this is the only interpretation consistent with the principle of
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relevance, and is the only one the hearer is entitled to choose.
What I intend to do in the rest of this chapter is show how a pragmatic theory
based on the ideas presented here might work for the analysis of evidentials.
4.2	 Pragmatic inference and evidentials
My aim in this section is to examine how relevance theory would answer one
of the questions raised in this thesis: how are degrees of speaker
conimitment pragmatically inferred? Notice that these are degrees of
commitment to what is said, the proposition explicitly expressed. As pointed
out in the previous chapter, relevance theory acknowledges the role of
pragmatic principles of interpretation at this level, in a way that Gricean
pragmatists often have not. On the other hand, by specifically rejecting
Grice's maxims of Quality, it may appear that relevance theorists have
deprived themselves of some essential tools for explaining how speaker
commitment is ever communicated at all. I shall look at this fundamental
question of how commitment is communicated in a framework without the
Maxims of Quality, and then turn to the question of how specific degrees of
commitment are inferred.
4.2.1	 Problems with the maxims of Quality
Grice's maxims of Qp.ality are stated as follows:
Qjiality Supermaxim:	 Try to make your contribution one that is
true.
Maxims:	 (1)	 Do riot say what you believe to be
false.
(2)	 Do not say that for which you lack
adequate evidence.
(Grice 1989: 27)
These maxims were central to his theory. Indeed, he saw the first maxim of
Quality (which, following Sperber and Wilson, I shall call the maxim of
truthfulness) as the most important of alL Grice claims:
'...the observance of some ... maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance
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of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be
open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be
false. Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality
is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am c nstructing other
maxims come into operation only on the assumption that the maxim of Quality is
satisfied.' (Grice 1989: 27)
The maxim of Quality is highlighted again later on:
'The maxims do not seem to be coordinate. The maxim of Quality, enjoining the
provision of contributions which are genuine rather than spurious (truthful rather than
mendacious), does not seem to be just one among a number of recipes for producing
contributions; it seems rather to spell out the difference between something's being,
and ... failing to be, any kind of contribution at all. False information is not an inferior
kind of information; it just is not information.' (Grice 1989: 371)
Sperber and Wilson have argued that the maxims of Quality create more
problems than they solve, and are better dispensed with (Sperber and Wilson
1985/6; Wilson 1990).
One problem is that Grice is forced to treat all figurative language as
involving a violation of the maxim of truthfulness, and hence a deviation
from the norm. For example, metaphor, irony, and hyperbole are invariably
treated as violations of the maxim of truthfulness, and are all supposed to
implicate some related true proposition. Consider the following examples:
(16)	 a.Billisafox.
b. Bill is like a fox.
(17) He: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
[They go for a picnic and it rains]
She (sarcastically): It IS a lovely day for a picnic.
(18) a. This walk is a marathon.
b. This walk is very long.
According to Grice, in the case of the metaphor in (16a), the hearer would
infer from the fact that the speaker could not have intended to assert
truthfully and literally that Bill is a fox, that she must have implicated the
related proposition in (16b). In (17), the ironist deliberately flouts the maxim
of truthfulness and implicates the opposite of what was literally said. The
hyperbole in (18a) also involves a deliberate violation of the maxim of
truthfulness with the intention of communicating something weaker than
what was said, i.e. (18b). All three figures of speech implicate some related
98
proposition - in irony the opposite of what is said, in metaphor a related
simile, in hyperbole a related weaker proposition - by deliberately violating
the maxim of truthfulness.
Sperber and Wilson (1985/6, 1986: chapter 4, sections 8, 9) have argued
against both the general daim that figurative language is deviant, and Grice's
attempt to analyse figurative interpretations as implicatures created by
deliberate violation of the maxim of truthfulness. In fact, figurative language
seems to be universal and natural, to arise spontaneously without being
taught or learned (Sperber and Wilson 1985/6: 169-170).
the possibility of expressing oneself metaphorically or ironically and being
understood as doing so follows from very general mechanisms of verbal
communication ... metaphor and irony involve no departure from a norm, no
transgression of a rule, convention or maxim.' (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 242)
Another problem with Grice's account is that not all metaphors express
propositions that are literally false. Consider (19):
(19)	 a. Susan is no angel.
b. No man is an island.
The problem with (19a) and (19b) is that what the speaker has said is not
patently false, but patently true. Thus, the connection Grice wanted to
establish between metaphor and deliberate violation of the maxim of
truthfulness breaks down.
Sperber and Wilson further observe that Grice's framework offers no
explanation for why a speaker who wanted to communicate (16b) or (18b) did
not simply say (16b) or (18b) instead of putting her hearer to the extra effort
of processing the indirect utterances in (16a) and (18a) respectively. In
relevance-theoretic terms, (16a) and (18a) could not be optimally relevant if
they were only intended to communicate (16b) and (18b) (Sperber and
Wilson 1985/6: 166-167, 1986: 236-237).
Sperber and Wilson also point out that hyperbole is more dosely related to
metaphor than it is to irony (Sperber and Wilson: 1985/6: 166, 1986: 235).
In fact, with utterances such as (20a), it is hard to say whether metaphor or
hyperbole is involveth
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This walk is like a marathon (metaphor)
(20) This walk is a marathon
This walk is very long (hyperbole)
For Grice, though, there would be two entirely different analyses depending
on whether (20) is construed as metaphor or hyperbole: communication of a
related simile for metaphor, communication of a weaker proposition for
hyperbole. On the relevance-theoretic account, both figures of speech are
treated along the same lines, and Grice's distinction is seen as artificial.
A problem more dosely connected with issues of evidentiality arises when we
look at loose talk and rough approximations. Consider (21)-(23):
(21) Thessaloniki is north of Athens.
(22) 1 live 10 minutes from Darwin College.
(23) The lake is circular.
There are circumstances where the terms 'north', '10 minutes' and 'circular'
would be strictly and literally intended, but in many cases, they would be
intended and understood as mere approximations to the truth. Here, there is
no question of a deliberate and blatant violation of the maxims of Quality; yet
if strictly and literally interpreted, these utterances would be false. The
problem here is that Grice's framework appears to offer no account at all of
how loose talk should be understood. Are (21)-(23), when understood as
rough approximations, true or false, deviant or not? Whatever the problems
they create for Grice's framework, it is clear that hearers have no problem
understanding them, and we need some explanation of how this is so
(Sperber and Wilson 1985/6: 162-165, 1986: 233-235).
A further problem with both figurative language and loose talk arises from
Gnce's daim that the strictly literal interpetation should be tried first, and
only abandoned if it fails to satisfy the maxims. For him, a figure of speech
necessarily involves a flouting of the maxims, which is essential to their
recognition.
Sperber and Wilson have argued that, on the conlra.iy, with utterances like
(2 1-23), in many circumstances the loose interpretation is the first to be
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tested, and will only be abandoned if it fails to satisfy the criterion of
consistency with the principle of relevance. As they claim:
'...the hearer shouLd take an utterance as fully literal only when nothing less than full
literality will confirm the presumption of relevance. In general, some looseness of
expression is to be expected.' (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 234)
Thus, when I say:
(24)	 I will be there in 10 minutes,
the natural understanding is that I will be there in roughly 10 minute5 the
loose interpretation is preferred even though there is nothing obviously
unsatisfactory with the strictly literal one.
But the main problem that Sperber and Wilson find with the maxims of
Quality is that they have no obvious cognitive basis. As we have seen, the
principle of relevance follows from fundamental assumptions about human
cognition. Grice argues that the maxims of Quality have a basis in rationality:
that if we are interested in communication at all, it will be rational to adopt
the maxim of Quality among others. He also seems to feel that the maxim of
truthfulness has a moral content which his other major categories of maxims
lack (Grice 1989: 27, 371).
Sperber and Wilson challenge these assumptions. They daim that:
'...the hearer is not invariably entitled to expect a literal interpretation of the speaker's
thought, nor is such an interpretation always necessary for successful communication
to take place. A less-than-literal interpretation ... may be good enough: may indeed be
better on some occasions than a strictly literal one.' (Sperber and Wilson 1985/6: 158)
Sperber and Wilson argue that in a framework with a principle of relevance
but without Grice's Quality maxims, a better account of rational
communication will result (Sperber and Wilson 1985/6: 170, 1986: 230-
23 1).
4.2.2	 Disi,ensing with the maxims of Oualitv
The main function of the Qjiality maxims is to explain how a speaker who
utters (25) can communicate the information in (26a) and (26b):
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(25) The sun is shining.
(26) a. The speaker believes the sun is shining.
b. The speaker has adequate evidence that the sun is shining.
In other words, the function of these maxims is to explain how the speaker
presents herself (either honestly or dishonestly) as telling the truth.
The fact that speakers often commit themselves to the truth not only of what
they say, but also of what they imply, is dealt with in Grice's framework by the
supermaxim of Qjality, 'Try to make your contribution one that is true'. Here
contribution is presumably intended to refer both to what was said and to
what was implicated, whereas the Qjiality maxims themselves refer only to
what is said. The question is, how can these commitments be accounted for in
a framework without either maxims or supermadms of Ojiality?
Notice first what follows from the defmition of optimal relevance. A speaker
aiming at optimal relevance must intend to achieve adequate contextual
effects for no unjustifiable effort. Contextual effects, as we have seen, are of
three sorts: (a) strengthening existing assumptions; (b) contradicting and
eliminating existing assumptions; and (c) combining with existing
assumptions to yield contextual implications. The greater the contextual
effects, the greater the relevance. As Sperber and Wilson point out (1986:
chapter 2, sections 3, 7) the contextual effects of an utterance, and hence its
relevance, will increase depending on the number of assumptions affected,
and the degree to which they are strengthened or weakened.
'When all the premises effectively used in the derivation of a particular conclusion are
certain, the conclusion is also certain. When all the premises but one are certain, the
conclusion inherits the strength of the less-than-certain premise. When more than one
premise is less than certain, then the conclusion is weaker than the weakest premise.
Conclusions derived from several weak premises inherit a value that is very weak and
vague. However, inherited degrees of strength are lower limits: generally speaking,
conclusions are more likely to be true than the conjunction of the premises from which
they are deduced.' (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 111)
Sperber and Wilson provide a more formal statement of how these alterations
in contextualization are achieved as following:
'Let {C be a context and Ij a set of new premises. Let {Conciusions of 1111 be the set of
conclusions dedudble from {P alone, lConclusions of	 the set of conclusions
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deducible from C1 alone, and {Conclusions of 1P U ICII the set of conclusions
deducible from the union of {J and { C. Let two assumptions with the same content
but with different strengths count as two different assumptions. Then the
contextualization of f lj in I CI has no contextual effect if and only if the two following
conditions are met
(i) {Conclusions of IC}} is a subset of IConclusions of {P U {CJ;
(ii) the complement of { Conclusions of I Cl with respect to I Conclusions of {i U q is
a subset of {Conclusions of IP}}.
If conditions (i) and (ii) are not both met, then the contextualization of
	 in ICI has
some contextual effect' (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 260, footnote 26)
It is the connection between relevance, strength of assumptions and speaker
commitment that I want to consider here.
The idea that assumptions may vary in their strength is put forward in
Relevance, chapter 2, section 3. For Sperber and Wilson, the strength of an
assumption for an individual is equated, roughly, with his degree of
confidence in it. This will be affected by the source and subsequent
processing history of the assumption: an assumption derived by direct
observation will be very strong; the strength of an assumption derived by
inference will depend on the strength of the premises used to derive it the
strength of an assumption communicated to us by someone else will depend,
first, on how strongly we are intended to take it, and, second, on how much we
trust the communicator (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 77).
Within this framework, an utterance can achieve optimal relevance only by
altering the hearer's existing assumptions, e.g. by stengthning them, or by
contradicting them and being strong enough to overturn them.. For Sperber
and Wilson, a totally groundless speculation, i.e. an assumption which can be
formulated but for which the individual has no evidence, has no intrinsic
relevance. It follows that a speaker aiming at optimal relevance must intend
to communicate a set of assumptions that are strong enough to make her
utterance worth the hearer's attention. In other words, it follows that some
subset of the propositions potentially expressed and implied by the utterance
must be being put forward as true, or probably true.
In this way, relevance theory predicts something quite similar to what is
predicted by Grice's supermaxini of Qjiality, 'Try to make your contribution
one that is true', but with two important differences. In the first place, these
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predictions follow from considerations of relevance alone, without additional
stipulation, and with no appeal to a supermaxim of Quality. In the second
place, it is quite possible within this framework for an utterance to be
consistent with the prindple of relevance even though the proposition
explicitly expressed is false, as long as enough of its potential implications are
put forward as true, or likely to be true.
This is how Sperber and Wilson propose to analyse metaphor and loose talk.
Both are cases in which the proposition expressed is strictly speaking false,
but gives access to a range of contextual implications which the speaker does
want to put forward as true, or probably true. In Sperber and Wilson's
framework, such utterances can achieve optimal relevance as long as there
was no alternative utterance which would have communicated these
implications more economically. In this framework, which contains no
maxims of Qjiality, metaphor and loose talk need not be seen as violations of a
pragmatic principle, or deviations from a norm. They are merely alternative
ways of achieving optimal relevance.
4.2.3	 Inferring degrees of speaker commitment
Relevance theorists (Blakemore 1987, 1992, Carston 1988, Wilson and
Sperber 1981, 1993) have drawn attention to the under-determination of the
proposition expressed by an utterance by its linguistic content. They argue
that this proposition 'is obtained by inferential enrichment of the
linguistically encoded logical form' (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 9). Consider
the following examples:
(27) It will take us some lime to get there.
(28) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped.
(29) Susan's performance isn't good enough.
(30) At home.
(Carston 1988: 164, 167, Blakemore 1992: 60)
For (27), by linguistic decoding alone the hearer will recover the trivially true
proposition that it takes a certain amount of time to get to a certain
destination. Surely this is not what the speaker intended to communicate,
and, in fact, it is not what the hearer will recover. The hearer by using
104
contextual information, will recover a richer, more specffic proposition, along
the lines of (31):
(31) It will take us more time to get there than you might otherwise
assume.
For (28), the hearer will normally understand that the jumping was over the
cliff, although there is no linguistic indication that this is so. For (29) the
hearer must answer the question, not good enough for what? And for (30) the
answers to still further questions must be supplied.
In relevance theory, this inferential process of filling in partially specified
semantic representations is known as enrichment. What guides the hearer in
this inferential process is the criterion of consistency with the principle of
relevance. In interpreting an utterance, the hearer looks for an interpretation
which is consistent with the principle of relevance, i.e. which 'a rational
communicator might have expected to be optimally relevant to the addressee'
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 166). And the first interpretation that the hearer
finds to be consistent with the principle of relevance is the only
interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance, and is the one the
hearer should choose.
As suggested in section 4.1.1, identifying the speaker's attitude to what she
said and implied is as important as identifying what she said, i.e. the
proposition expressed. In fact, the main relevance of an utterance may
depend on correct identification of this attitude. For example, if, after
repeatedly denying allegations that he handled forged currency, the accused
finally says:
(32) Ididit.
the proposition expressed, i.e. 'The speaker handled forged currency' may
not be relevant to the prosecutor, who already believes that this is so. For
him, the main relevance of (32) may lie not In the proposition expressed but
in the higher-level speech-act description in (33):
(33) The speaker is admitting that he handled forged currency.
Recovering the intended attitude of the speaker towards the proposition
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expressed by the utterance is a fundamental task of the hearer. According to
Sperber and Wilson:
'The same sentence, used to express the same thought, may sometimes be used to
present this thought as true, sometimes to suggest that it is not, sometimes to wonder
whether it is true, sometimes to ask the hearer to make it true, and so on. Utterances
are used not only to convey thoughts but to reveal the speaker's attitude to, or
relation to, the thought expressed; in other words they express 'propositional attitudes'
It makes a difference to the interpretation of (4) [You're leaving] whether the speaker
is informing the hearer of a decision that he is to leave, making a guess and asking him
to confirm or deny it, or expressing outrage at the fact that he is leaving. ... Often the
linguistic structure of the utterance suggests a particular attitude, as, for example,
interrogative form most naturally suggests that the utterance is a request for
information. However, as examples (4)-(5) show, the hearer is generally left a certain
latitude, which he must make up on the basis cf non-linguistic information.' (Sperber
and Wilson 1986: 10-11)
As to how propositional attitudes are recovered, they add:
'One of the hearer's sub-tasks, again an inferential one, is to identify this propositional
attitude.' (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 180)
Notice that in relevance theory, the process of enrichment involved in
utterance interpretation goes beyond the recovery of the proposition
expressed; it includes identifying the speaker's attitude towards the
proposition expressed (Blakemore 1992: 61). Thus, the speaker of (34) may
intend to communicate not only the proposition expressed but also the
propositional-attitude information in (35):
	
(34)	 Susan won the elections.
	
(35)	 a. The speaker believes that Susan won the elections.
b. The speaker regrets that Susan won the elections.
c. The speaker feels sad that Susan won the elections.
By the same token, the speaker of (34) may also want to communicate the
speech-act information in (36):
(36)	 a. The speaker is asserting that Susan won the elections.
b. The speaker is adrniuing that Susan won the elections.
c. The speaker is bemoaning that Susan won the elections.
Here it is clear that a given utterance, e.g. (34), may grossly underdetermine
the speech-act and propositional-attitude information that the speaker
intends to communicate. Which of all the possible interpretations is the
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hearer justified in choosing? The answer follows from the criterion of
consistency with the principle of relevance: he is justified in choosing only
the first, i.e. most accessible, interpretation which yields adequate effects for
no unjustifiable effort, in a way the speaker could manifestly have foreseen.
Thus, speech-act and propositional-attitude information is identified by the
same principles that guide the identification of the proposition the speaker
intended to express.
The particular attitude a speaker may intend to convey towards the
proposition expressed may or may be not indicated by the linguistic form of
the utterance. In cases such as the above, para-linguistic features, e.g. tone of
voice, facial expression, may help to make certain interpretations more
accessible. In other cases the speaker provides explicit linguistic clues, in the
form of ilocutionary force indicators. In later sections, I will consider the
principle governing the speaker's choice of when to use such linguistic dues.
In the remainder of this section, I will look at how different degrees of
speaker commitment are pragmatically inferred when no specific linguistic
guidance is given.
Consider an example used in a previous chapter.
(37)	 There are 2,716 beans in the bag.
I noted there that when offered as a guess in a fairground competition, this
would be understood as carrying a lower degree of commitment (or strength)
than when used to announce the results of the competition. In each case, the
circumstances of utterance will provide clues to the intended degree of
commitment: could the speaker know how many beans there are, is she
participating in a guessing game; if she knows, is she willing to reveal her
knowledge, and so on. When the circumstances make highly accessible a
particular hypothesis about the speaker's degree of commitment, and when
that hypothesis leads us to a manifestly satisfactory interpretation, then this
is the only interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance, and all
other interpretations are disallowed.
Suppose, now, that there is no single highly accessible hypothesis in the
circumstances. Then considerations of optimal relevance dictate that
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additional linguistic clues - say, in the form of ifiocutionary force indicators,
should be given. Or suppose that the circumstances make highly accessible a
certain hypothesis that the speaker does not want the hearer to use. Then
again considerations of relevance dictate the use of a linguistic indicator.
Thus, suppose one of the organizers of the fairground competition is
accidentally asked to buy a ticket and make a guess. In these circumstances,
the utterance of (37) would be interpreted as a guess, and in order to
communicate her knowledge, she would have to say 'I know there are 2,716
beans in the bag'.
Notice here the importance of the relevance-theoretic assumption that the
first interpretation tested and found consistent with the principle of
relevance is the only interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance.
In the case of pragmatically inferred degrees of speaker commitment, if there
is a salient, i.e. immediately accessible interpretation which the speaker
could have intended, this is the one she should have intended. This is the
only interpretation the speaker can rationally intend to communicate. Recall
that according to clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance, the speaker
should put the hearer to no unjustifiable effort in achieving the intended
effects. If, in the circumstances, an utterance has a manifestly satisfactory
and immediately accessible interpretation which the speaker does not intend
to communicate, she would put her hearer to the unjustifiable effort of first
recovering, processing and accepting the wrong interpretation, then
wondering whether this was, indeed, 'the intended one, entertaining
alternative ones, and trying by further inference to choose between the
interpretations currently available. In these circumstances, the speaker could
have saved her audience a lot of unnecessary effort by reformulating her
utterance - e.g. by using an explicit evidential construction, to eliminate the
iinin tended interpretation. Hence, the first interpretation consistent with the
principle of relevance is the only interpretation consistent with the principle
of relevance, and is the one the hearer should choose.
4.3	 Relevance and the exrfficit/imDlicit distinction
In Relevance, Sperber and Wilson investigated the explicit aspect of
communication and introduced a notion of explicature which was meant to
parallel Grice's notion of implicature. In this section I will explore the
108
consequences of this for a problem raised in previous chapters: do
illocutionary force indicators (many of which are evidentials) contribute to
the explicit or the implicit aspect of communication? My condusion will be
that they are best treated as falling on the explicit side.
Sperber and Wilson define the notion of explidtness as follows:
An assumption communicated byan utterance Uis explicit if and only ifitis
a development of a logical form encoded by U (Sperber and Wilson 1986:
182)
The logical form of the utterance is the semantic representation assigned to it
by the grammar and recovered by an automatic process of decoding. To
illustrate, the sentence in (38) will encode something like the incomplete
semantic representation in (39):
(38) Hesawit.
(39) _SAWAT.
(39) can be enriched by pragmatic inference procedures to yield the
proposition expressed by (38), i.e. something like (40):
(40) P. SMITH SAW 'TOSCA' AT 7.30 ON MAY 6, 1993.
Generally, the logical form encoded by an utterance is not fully propositional,
and the hearer needs to enrich it on the basis of contextually inferred
features to obtain the fully propositional form the speaker intended to
express. The amount of enrichment needed will vary from utterance to
utterance. To illustrate, consider the following examples:
(41) a. Nell Smith will be in UCL at 9.00 am on October 61993.
b. The carpenter made a bolt for the door.
c. The talk was too long.
d. He saw it.
e. Telephone.
The propositional form of (41a) is almost totally linguistically determined,
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and hence the amount of inference required to derive it from the
linguistically encoded logical form is minimal. Understanding (41b-e)
requires various types and amounts of enrichment, including
disambiguation, e.g. (41b), resolution of semantic vagueness, e.g. (41c),
reference assignment, e.g. (41d), and completion where ellipsed material has
to be supplied, e.g. (41e) (for detailed discussion, see Carston 1988). Sperber
and Wilson say that a proposition communicated by an utterance is explicit if
and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U. The
enrichment process just described, which enriches an incomplete logical form
into a fully propositional form, is an example of what they mean by
'development'. As we have seen, this development yields (a hypothesis about)
the proposition the speaker intended to express. A second type of
development process consists in optionally embedding the proposition
expressed by the utterance under a speech-act or propositional-attitude
description, such as 'X THINKS THAT', 'X ADMITS THAT', etc. This type of
development yields (a hypothesis about) the speaker's intended attitude to
the proposition expressed, or the speech act she intended to perform.. Notice
that in this framework, unlike Grice's, there is only a single basic type of
proposition, corresponding to Grice's '1-', whose satisfaction conditions are
truth conditions, and which is expressed by imperatives and interrogatives
as well as dedaratives.
According to Sperber and Wilson, the set of propositions resulting from these
two types of development process, based on a linguistically encoded logical
form, are the explicatures of the utterance:
'On the analogy of 9mplicature", we will call an explicitly communicated assumption
an explicature. Any assumption communicated, but not explicitly so, is implicitly
communicated: it is an imp!icature.' (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 183)
As we have seen, the recovejy of explicatures may involve a greater or lesser
element of decoding, and a greater or lesser element of inference. Sperber
and Wilson introduce a notion of degrees of explicitness based on the relative
contributions of decoding and inference: the greater the element of decoding
involved in explicit communication, the greater the explicitness (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 182). Notice that this distinction captures our intuition,
discussed in an earlier chapter, that, somehow, linguistic encoding makes an
utterance more explicit. To ifiustrate, compare (42) with (43):
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(42) a. Peter: Is Bill awake?
b. Mary: He is.
(43) a. Peter: Is Bill awake?
b. Mary Bill is awake.
In chapter 2, 2.4, when the example was first examined, the intuition
expressed was that (42b) was somehow less explicit than (43b). Sperber and
Wilson's definition of degrees of explicitness can accommodate this
distinction: both (42b) and (43b) will communicate identical explicatures;
nevertheless the information that Bill is awake will be more explicitly
communicated by (43b) than by (42b) because the relative amount of
linguistic decoding involved is greater in (43b) than in (42b). Similarly,
compare (44) and (45):
(44) Mary: (sadly) Susan lost the election.
(45) Mary: Sadly, Susan lost the election.
Both these utterances will explicitly communicate the information that Mary
is sad that Susan lost the election. However, because of the presence of 'sadly'
in (45), and hence the greater element of linguistic decoding, the information
will be more explicitly communicated by (45) than by (44).
In the relevance-theoretic framework, then, explicatures are obtained by 'a
combination of linguistically encoded and contextually inferred conceptual
features' (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 182). In order to recover the
explicatures communicated by an utterance, the hearer needs not only to
disambiguate, assign reference or resolve various types of semantic
indeterminacies; he also needs to retrieve information about the speaker's
attitude to the proposition expressed - does she speak literally or
metaphorically, seriously or jokingly, or about the speech act she intends to
perform - is the utterance an admission or warning, a promise or a
prediction?
To illustrate, the utterance in (46) might communicate the following
explicatures:
(46) Mary (crossly): You've stained my shirt.
(47) a. Mrs Smith has stained Mary's shirt.
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b. Mary is saying that Mrs Smith has stained her shirt.
c. Mary is saying crossly that Mrs Smith has stained her shirt.
d. Mary is cross that Mrs Smith has stained her shirt.
e. Mary believes that Mrs Smith has stained her shirt.
f. Mary is blaming Mrs Smith for staining her shirt.
Thus, an utterance may communicate a whole range of explicatures, some of
which are more explicit than others depending on the amount of decoding
involved.
In more technical terms, the most deeply embedded explicature of (46) is the
proposition expressed by (46), and (471,-f) are higher-level explicatures of
(46). According to Sperber and Wilson, the truth conditions of (46) will
depend solely on (47a), the proposition expressed, whereas the higher-level
explicatures (47b-f) will be explicitly communicated but make no
contribution to the truth conditions of (44) (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 5-6,
16). These notions will be taken up in the next section, and their implications
for the analysis of evidentials will be discussed in later chapters.
Having distinguished the proposition expressed by an utterance from its
higher-level explicatures, let us see in more detail how the latter are
obtained. Higher-level explicatures, like logical forms and fully propositional
forms, are recovered by a combination of decoding and inference. To obtain
(47a) the hearer must not only decode the semantic representation of the
utterance but make an inference about the intended referent of 'you'; to
obtain the remaining explicatures (47b-f) he must make additional
inferences about Mary's attitude to the proposition she is expressing, and the
type of speech-act she intends to perform. As we have seen, the utterance
may offer the hearer more or less linguistic guidance as to what explicarures
are intended. Within this framework, ifiocutionary force indicators may be
analysed as encoding information about higher-level explicatures. Some such
indicators appear to be obligatory: for example, the declarative, imperative
and interrogative mood indicators in English. Thus, (48a-c) are widely
regarded as expressing the same proposition, (49), but as encoding different
information about speaker's attitude to this proposition, or the ifiocutionary
act she is intending to perfonn:
(48)	 a. You write novels.
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b. Write novels.
c. Do you write novels?
(49) P. SMITH WRiTES NOVELS.
Generally, mood indicators are analysed in speech-act terms: declaratives are
seen as connected with the speech act of saying (or asserting), imperatives
with the speech act of telling, and interrogatives with the speech act of
asking. Thus, the information communicated by (48a-c) would be along the
lines of (50a-c):
(50) a. Mary is saying that Peter writes novels.
b. Mary is telling Peter to write novels.
c. Mary is asking Peter whether Peter writes novels.
As we have seen, in the framework of relevance theory, (50a-c) are higher-
level explicatures of (48a-c), and if this analysis of mood indicators is correct,
then the mood indicators would encode information about a certain type of
higher-level explicature.
In fact, relevance theory rejects the speech-act account of the semantics of
mood indicators. Instead, Wilson and Sperber (1988) propose a
propositional-attitude account, on which mood indicators are seen as
encoding information about the propositional attitude the speaker intends to
express. Here too the mood indicators are seen as encoding information
about higher-level explicatures, and hence as falling on the explicit side of
communication. On this account, declarative mood is connected with the
propositional attitude of believing, and imperative mood is connected with
the propositional attitude of desiring. Hence, the choice of declarative syntax
is seen as guiding the hearer towards a certain hypothesis about the
speaker's propositional attitude, which may be narrowed down on the basis of
further linguistic or inferential dues.
Turning to evidentials, it should be dear that they contribute to the explicit
aspect of communication in a similar way: they convey information about the
speaker's propositional attitude.
On this analysis, pragmatically inferred evidential information contributes to
higher-level explicatures. Thus, (5 la-b) might communicate (52a-b):
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(51) a. Mary (firmly): John is qualified.
b. Mary (hesitantly): John is qualified.
(52) a. Mary strongly believes that John is qualified.
b. Mary thinks that John is qualified.
And evidentials themselves might be analysed along similar lines, with (53a-
b) communicating the higher-level explicatures in (54a-b). These ideas will
be taken up in later sections.
(53) a. Mary Clearly, John is qualified.
b. Mary: John is, I think, qualified.
(54) a. Mary strongly believes that John is qualified.
b. Mary thinks that John is qualified.
Thus, Sperber and Wilson have constructed a notion of explicit
communication which indudes, but goes beyond, Grice's notion of what is
said. Grice's notion of what is said coincides with the relevance-theoretic
notion of the proposition expressed. The notion of higher-level explicature
captures propositional-attitude and speech-act information, as well as
information about mood indicators, all of which are types of communicated
information that apparently fail to fit into Grice's framework.
To conclude, explicitly communicated information is obtained by recovering
the proposition expressed by the utterance and optionally embedding it
under a speech-act or propositional-attitude description. Everything that it is
not explicitly communicated is implicitly communicated. Thus, the
distinction between explicit and implicit communication, unlike Grice's
distinction between saying and implicating, appears to be exhaustive.
Evidentials will be analysed in the framework of relevance theory as encoding
information about the explicatures of the utterance. The question I want to
raise in later chapters is: do they contribute to the proposition expressed or
to higher-level explicatures? To the extent that these constructions are non-
truth-conditional, the information they encode will contribute to higher-level
explicatures rather than to the proposition expressed. The truth-conditional
status of evidentials will be e,mmined in detail in chapters 5 and 6. The next
section contains a brief preliminary survey of some relevant background
materiaL
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4.4	 Relevance and non-truth-conditional meaning
Most linguistic semanticists observe that not all linguistically encoded
meaning is truth-conditional: not every linguistic construction affects the
truth conditions of the utterance in which it occurs. Relevance theory has
proposed new analyses of some of the constructions that are generally seen as
non-truth-conditional, e.g. mood indicators, various types of sentence
adverbials, parentheticals, and so-called 'discourse' or 'pragmatic' particles
and connectives (Blakemore 1987, 1992, Blass 1990, Gutt 1991, Wilson and
Sperber 1988, 1993). These constructions are illustrated in (55-60):
Mood indicators
(55)	 a. Bill writes novels.
b. Does Bill write novels?
c. Bill, write novels!
Sentence adverbials
(56)	 a. Frankly, Bill doesn't lilce fish.
b. Seriously, Bifi went to Moscow.
(57)	 a. Unfortunately, Susan lost the election.
b. Sadly, you have to come back tomorrow.
Parentheticals
(58)	 a. John is, I think, the best candidate.
b. John is, I guess, the best candidate.
c. John is the best candlithte, I suppose.
'Discourse' narticles and interjections
(59)	 a. Susan lost the election, alas.
b. ru beat him, huh!
c. Oh, you are the late one.
d. You're making too much noise, eh?
'Discourse' or 'oragmatic' connectives
(60)	 a. It's Sunday but the shops are open.
b. Susan lives in Hampstead. After all, she's got a rich father.
c. Susan's got a rich father, so she lives in Hampstead.
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d. I talked to John. However, he didn't change his mind.
The fundamental question raised by relevance theorists is whether all non-
truth-conditional meaning is of the same type, so that it should all be
analysed in the same way. This seems to be the assumption behind the two
main approaches that have dealt with the above constructions, i.e. speech-act
theory and Grice's theory of conversation. As suggested in chapter 2, the
linguistic constructions in (55-60) have been analysed by speech-act theorists
as non-truth-conditional indicators of the illocutionary force of the utterance
in which they occur, which is regarded as distinct from the truth-conditional
content of the utterance. As suggested in chapter 3, the same assumption lies
behind the Gricean approach, which treats the constructions in (60), in terms
of the notion of conventional implicature, i.e. as non-truth-conditional
linguistically encoded meaning that is implicitly communicated.
Relevance theory rejects the hypothesis that all non-truth-conditional
meaning is cut to the same pattern. In the framework of relevance theory,
linguistically encoded meaning can fall into four distinct categories,
'defined by an interaction between two independently necessary distinctions: between
explicit and implicit communication, and between conceptual and procedural
meaning. When faced with a particular non-truth-conditional construction, we thus
need to ask ourselves two questions: first, does it contribute to the explicit content of
an utterance or to its implicatures; and second, is its meaning conceptual or procedural,
i.e. does it encode an element of a conceptual representation or a constraint on
processing?' (Wilson 1991)
Within this framework, the distinction between conceptual and procedural
meaning was first drawn by Blakemore (1987) and has been developed by
Wilson and Sperber (1993). In the following sections, I shall outline the
distinction; its application to evidentials will be discussed in later chapters.
4.4.1	 Conceptual meaning
The distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning is based on a
fundamental distinction drawn by modern theories of mind between
representation and computation (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 71, 89). For
example, utterance interpretation is seen as involving a variety of
representations: phonetic, phonological, syntactic and semantic. These are
linked by a variety of phonetic, phonological, syntactic or semantic rules or
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computations. Representations are distinguished by their formal properties:
for example, a phonetic representation is a siring of segments in the form of
feature matrixes. Computations are also distinguished by their formal
properties: for example, a phonological rule (e.g. the vowel length rule) may
take as input a phonological representation and yield as output its
corresponding phonetic representation. Thus, for cab, applications of the
aspiration and vowel length rules to the phonological representation /kb/,
yield the phonetic representation [k:b].
On Fodor's modular approach to cognition (Fodor 1983), the mind is seen as
operating on the basis of various specialized representational/computational
systems. These are input systems, which process perceptual information
(visual, auditory, linguistic etc.), converting sensory representations into
conceptual representations, and central systems, which process these
conceptual representations (see Sperber and Wilson 1986, chapter 2, sections
1, 2). Conceptual representations have logical properties: they can describe
states of affairs in the world, they are capable of being true or false, they can
imply or contradict other conceptual representations, they act as the input to
inference rules (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 72, Wilson and Sperber 1993:
10).
Within this framework, most of the words in a language, induding the vast
majority of truth-conditional ones, are seen as encoding concepts,
constituents of conceptual representations. The word 'boy', for example,
encodes the concept BOY, the word 'play' encodes the concept PLAY and so on.
In more formal terms, concepts are labels which (a) serve as headings for the
storage and ren-ieval of various types of information and (b) are constituents
of conceptual representations to which deductive rules may apply (Sperber
and Wilson 1986: 86). A concept is seen as storing three main types of
information, in encyclopaedic, logical and lexical entries. According to
Sperber and Wilson, the encyclopaedic entry for a concept
'contains information about the extension and/or denotation of the concept that is,
about the objects, events and/or properties that instantiate it.' (Sperber and Wilson
1986: 86)
For example, the encydopaedic entry for BOY contains information about
boys, the encyclopaedic entry for PLAY contains information about playing,
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and so on. The logical entry for a concept
'consists of a set of deductive rules which apply to logical forms of which that concept
is a constituent' (ibid.)
For example, the logical entry for BOY might contain a rule enabling the
hearer to deduce, from the premise that X is a boy, the conclusion that X is
male, and so on. Finally, the lexical entry for a concept contains information
about the word whose meaning is the concept: for example, that BOY is
realized in English as the noun 'boy', and so on. On this approach, the
encyclopaedic entries for concepts make accessible contextual assumptions
(conceptual representations) that can be used in processing propositions
containing the associated concept. Logical entries supply inference rules
(computations) that apply to these propositions to yield various conclusions.
In this respect, the information in encyclopaedic entries is representational,
whereas the information in logical entries is computational (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 89).
Conceptual representations may be either complete or incomplete. When
incomplete, they are unable to be true or false. Thus, the sentence in (61) will
encode an incomplete conceptual representation along the lines of (62):
(61) He performed at the Royal Opera House.
(62) - PERFORMED AT THE ROH AT -.
(62) is the semantic representation of (61). It is an incomplete conceptual
representation (logical form) which:
'may be syntactically well formed without being fully propositional. A psychological
example of a non-propositional form is the sense of a sentence.' (Sperber and Wilson
1986: 72)
Thus, granted that 'He' in (61) does not encode a determinate concept, but
simply marks the place such a concept is to occupy, sentence (61) is neither
true or false. However, despite the fact that it is not fully propositional, (61)
has logical properties: it implies (63), which is also non-propositional, and
contradicts (64), which (perhaps) is fully propositional
(63) HewasintheROH.
(64) No one ever performed at the ROH.
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On this approach, both explicatures and implicatures are conceptual
representations, and can be recovered by decoding, by inference or, as with
explicatures, a mixture of both decoding and inference. Thus, (62) can be
enriched by pragmatic inference procedures to yield the proposition
expressed by (61), which could be:
(65) T. HAMPSON PERFORMED AT THE ROH AT 7.30 ON MARCH 2,
1993.
As suggested in section 4.3, the proposition expressed by an utterance can
be optionally embedded under a speech-act or propositional-attitude
description to yield a higher-level explicature such as (66) or (67):
(66) A. STEWART SAYS T. HAMPSON PERFORMED AT THE ROH AT 7.30
(67) A. STEWART BELIEVES T. HAMPSON PERFORMED AT THE ROH AT
7.30
In this respect, both the proposition expressed by an utterance and its
higher-level explicatures are conceptual representations which are recovered
partly by decoding and partly by inference. Thus, (65), as well as (66) and
(67), contain the concepts ROH and PERFORMED, which, as we have seen, are
encoded by the words 'Royal Opera House' and 'performed'. However, they
also contain the concepts THOMAS HAMPSON and 7.30 ON MARCH 2, 1992,
which are certainly not encoded, but must be pragmatically inferred.
Similarly, eveiy utterance communicates various implicatures, which, like
explicatures, are conceptual representations, but which are recovered
entirely by pragmatic inference rather than decoding.
4.4.2	 Procedural meaning
Within relevance theory, not all word meaning is analysed in conceptual
terms. Brockway 1983 (see also Blakemore 1987) suggested that in this
framework, certain discourse connectives might be treated as encoding
information about computations rather than representations: that is about
how utterances containing these expressions should be processed. On this
approach, the meaning of a word or other linguistic construction is
procedural if it constrains the inferential phase of comprehension by
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indicating the type of inference process that the hearer is expected to go
through (Wilson and Sperber 1993).
Blakemore (1987) convincingly analysed a variety of discourse connectives in
procedural terms. She saw expressions such as after all, so, but, however, not
as encoding concepts, or as contributing to the truth conditions of utterances,
but as indicating to the hearer what type of inference process he is in.
Blakemore proposed
'a non-unitary theory of linguistic semantics. On the one hand, there is the essentially
conceptual theory that deals with the way in which elements of linguistic structure map
onto concepts ... On the other, there is the essentially procedural theory that deals with
the way in which elements of linguistic structure map directly onto computations...'
(Blakemore 1987: 144)
To illustrate, consider the procedural analysis for so and after all in (68) and
(69) respectively:
(68) Susan's got a rich father, so she lives in Haxnpstead.
(69) Susan lives in Harnpstead; after all, she's got a rich father.
According to Blakemore, so in (68) 'instructs' the hearer to identify the
proposition it introduces as a contextual implication of the preceding
segment; after all in (69) 'instructs' the hearer to identify the proposition it
introduces as justification for the proposition expressed in the previous
segment (Blakemore 1987: 85-90, 1992: 139-140). For Blakemore, discourse
connectives are constraints on irnplicatures, i.e. intended context and
contextual effects, because they encourage the hearer to supply the
appropriate contextual assumptions and conclusions in interpreting an
utterance.
Blakemore provides an alternative to Grice's notion of conventional
implicature by suggesting a procedural rather than a conceptual approach.
Although Grice does not use a conceptual/procedural distinction, he appears
to be treating conventional iinplicatures as linguistically encoded conceptual
representations which do not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterances that carry them. As Wilson and Sperber observe:
he [Grice] seems to have thought of the conventional implicatures carried by
discourse connectives such as thut", moreover", "so" and "on the other hand in
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conceptual rather than procedural terms. For one thing, his choice of the term
"implicature" suggests that he thought of conventional implicatures, like
conversational implicatures, as distinct propositions with their own truth conditions
and truth values. Moreover, he talks in almost identical terms of what was
conventionally implicated and what was said, noting, for instance, that items or
situations are "picked out by", or "fall under", both what was conventionally
implicated and what was said.' (Wilson and Sperber 1993:12)
One might be able to choose between the two approaches on the basis of the
following arguments. First, conceptual expressions should be able to
contribute to truth conditions in at least some utterances, whereas procedural
expressions never do. Thus, no one would deny that the word 'boy'
contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance in (70):
(70)	 A boy cried.
This can be explained on the assumption that it encodes a concept. By
contrast, it is difficult to think of any utterance in which 'but' contributes to
truth conditions; hence, there is no reason to think of it as encoding a
concept. Second, the meanings of discourse connectives, e.g. 'but', 'so', 'well',
areteas to bring to consciousness in the way that conceptual meanings are,
e.g. 'cat', 'walk', 'clever'. This is explained on the assumption that their
meanings are procedural, because computations in general (grammatical
rules, inference rules) are not easily accessible to consciousness (Wilson and
Sperber 1993: 16).
If these arguments are correct, then we might be tempted to conclude that all
truth-conditional meaning is conceptual and all non-truth-conditional
meaning is procedural. In fact, I shall argue that the situation is more
complicated. These issues will be pursued in chapters 5 and 6.
Sperber and Wilson (1986) argue that apart from the discourse connectives
discussed by Blakemore, the mood indicators might also be best approached
in procedural terms. In Relevance, they claim that
'ilocutionary force indicators such as declarative or imperative mood or interrogative
word order make manifest a rather abstract property of the speaker's informative
intention; the direction in which relevance is to be sought' (Sperber and Wilson 1986:
254)
Their view (developed in Wilson and Sperber 1988, 1993), is that mood
indicators, like discourse connectives, act as constraints on the inferential
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phase of comprehension. Unlike the discourse connectives, which are
constraints on implicatures, Sperber and Wilson argue that the mood
indicators are constraints on explicatures, guiding the hearer towards the
intended propositional attitude, which is recovered in the form of a higher-
level explicature.
In this framework, the declarative mood indicator is associated with the
attitude of belief (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 180, 248-249). To illustrate,
consider the sentence in (71):
(71)	 The sun is shining.
As we have seen, the declarative mood indicator suggests to the hearer that
the appropriate attitude to adopt towards the proposition expressed by (71)
is one of belief. Hence, one of the higher-level explicatures communicated by
(71) might be (72):
(72) Mary believes that the sun is shining.
As we have also seen, this is not part of the truth conditions of the utterance
in (71), but in appropriate circumstances it would be communicated, and
would therefore fit Sperber and Wilson's definition of higher-level
explicature.
To the extent that 'discourse' or 'pragmatic' particles are fully
grammaticalized, it might be possible to develop a similar procedural
approach. Thus, consider (73 a-b):
(73) a. Susan lost the election, alas.
b. Susan lost the election, eh?
'Alas' is used to communicate disappointment and sorrow, and it might be
argued that it encourages the construction of a higher-level explicature along
the lines of (74):
(74) The speaker is sad that Susan lost the election.
Similarly, 'eh', together with rising intonation, is one way of asking a
question, and it might be argued that it encourages the construction of a
higher-level explicature along the lines of (75):
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(75)	 The speaker is requesting confirmation of (or wondering about the
truth of) the statement that Susan lost the election.
4.5	 Relevance and the descriptive/interpretive distinction
A further distinction that will be central to the arguments of this thesis is
Sperber and Wilson's distinction between descriptive and interpretive use of
language and thought. This rests on the idea that utterances are
interpretations of thoughts, and that interpretations may be more or less
faithful to the original. A fully faithful interpretation is one which reproduces
the thought it represents. According to Sperber and Wilson, however, a
speaker aiming at optimal relevance often has good reasons to produce a less
than fully faithful interpretation, that is, an utterance expressing a
proposition which merely resembles one of her thoughts. Metaphor,
hyperbole and loose talk (see above, section 4.2.1) are cases in point.
4.5.1	 Interoretive resemblance
In introducing the idea that utterances may be more or less faithful
interpretations of the thoughts they represent, Sperber and Wilson point out
that communication often involves the exploitation of resemblances. Natural
or artificial phenomena can be used to represent other phenomena which
they resemble. Welcoming you at the door I can indicate that a common
friend is inside by mimicking one of her most typical grimaces. TI you ask me
what is the shape of Italy, I can point to a boot, or if I want to indicate how
bored I feel during a lecture I can yawn to you meaningfully.
Sperber and Wilson argue that verbal communication too involves the
exploitation of resemblances. Sometimes - as in direct quotation - an
utterance is used not to describe a state of affairs in the world, but to
represent another utterance or thought which it resembles. Thus, Sperber
and Wilson distinguish between two modes of representation -
representation in virtue of truth-conditions and representation in virtue of
resemblance. They call the former description and the latter interpretation.
Sperber and Wilson claim that a proposition can be descriptively used to
represent a state of affairs which makes it true, and interpretively used to
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represent some representation - for example a thought - which it resembles
in content (Sperber and Wilson 1985/6: 157).
Descriptive representation is a relation between a proposition and a state of
affairs. It has already been discussed in detail in truth-conditional semantics.
Interpretive representation is a relation between utterances and thoughts,
and, being a central relevance-theoretic notion, needs further introduction.
Notice first that when I point to a boot in order to give you an idea of what
Italy looks like on the map, you are meant to assume that it reproduces some
but not all of Italy's actual or imaginary properties; you are meant to assume
that this is how the outline of Italy more or less goes; you are not meant to
assume, and indeed you will not assume, that this is the actual scale of Italy,
for example. When you ask me how I spend my Tuesday evenings I might act
out a few ballet steps. If you already know that I attend ballet classes and if
my 'performance' has been good enough, you will notice its resemblance to
the act of ballet dancing, assume that this resemblance was intentional, and
come to the reasonable conclusion that on Tuesday evenings I have a ballet
dass. You are not meant to condude that I normally perform a ballet piece
with no music and in jeans.
These examples should illustrate the fact that when representation by
resemblance, or interpretive use, is involved, the relation between
representation and original is not normally one of full identity. Clearly, the
observer is not meant to assume that every property of the representation
carries over to the original. Reasonable assumptions have to be made about
which assumptions carry over to the original and which do not Sperber and
Wilson argue that the exploitation of resemblances between utterances, or
between utterances and the thoughts they represent, is subject to the same
constraint. In particular, when an utterance is used to represent a thought, all
the hearer is entitled to assume is that the content of the utterance resembles
the content of the represented thought to some degree - Le. that some degree
of faithfulness has been attempted. Seen from this perspective, a
requirement of total truthfulness - which is what Grice's maxim of
truthfulness demands - is too strong.
What does it mean to say that the content of an utterance must resemble the
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content of the thought it represents? According to Sperber and Wilson
(1985/6: 157-158, 1986: 233-234), the two contents resemble each other if
and only if they share logical and contextual implications, and the more
implications they share, the more they resemble each other. For example, on
the assumption that foxes are cunning, then the thought that Bill is a fox and
the thought that Bill is very cunning will resemble each other in content,
because they both share the implication that Bill is cunning. Hence, on the
assumption that utterances may be used to represent thoughts that they
merely resemble in content, the utterance in (76)
(76) Bill isafox.
might be used as a 'less than fully faithful' representation of the thought in
(77)
(77)	 Bill is cunning.
Interpretive resemblance, on this account, is a comparative notion with two
extremes: no resemblance at all, i.e. no shared implications, at one end, and
full propositional identity at the other. If an utterance and the thought it
represents have the same propositional content, they will share all their
logical and contextual implications in every context. When this happens,
Sperber and Wilson say that the utterance is a literal (i.e. fully faithful)
interpretation of the thought it represents. On this account, literalness is just
a liiniling case of interpretive resemblance.
Against this background, Sperber and Wilson question the fundamental
assumption made by any framework with a maxim of truthfulness: that every
utterance must be a fully literal interpretation of the speaker's thought.
Where representation by resemblance, or interpretive use, is involved, all the
audience is entitled to expect is that some degree of faithfulness - some
degree of resemblance - has been attempted. There is no more reason to
expect an utterance to be a fully literal interpretation of the speaker's thought
thpn there is to expect a map of Italy to be life-size.
4.5.2	 Attributive interDretive use
So far, I have been tacitly assuming, with Grice, that the proposition
expressed by an utterance is invariably an interpretation of a thought of the
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speaker's own. But, as Sperber and Wilson point out, this assumption is
mistaken. Often, an utterance is put forward as an interpretation of a thought
that the speaker attributes to someone other than herself. In this case,
Sperber and Wilson talk of attributive interpretive use.
In introducing this notion, it might be helpful to consider the fact that an
utterance is often used to represent an utterance of someone other than the
speaker, and here too the notion of degrees of faithfulness applies.
Direct quotation is an obvious example where an utterance is used, in the
first instance, to represent another utterance which it resembles. Consider
the possible answers (78b-d) to the question in (78a):
(78)	 a. He: What did Mary say?
b. She: I don't care.
c. She: 'I don't care'.
d. She: She didn't care.
The speaker of (78b) says that she doesn't care what Mary said; the speaker of
(78c) directly quotes Mary's claim that she doesn't care. A misunderstanding
would occur if the hearer failed to make the correct assumption about what
these utterances were intended to represent. (78d) has two possible
interpretations: the speaker is either indirectly reporting Mary's claim that
she doesn't care or she is drawing the conclusion, on her own initiative, that
Mary doesn't care: Mary herself might have said nothing at all. Again, when
processing this utterance, the hearer must make some assumption about
whose beliefs or claims the speaker intends it to represent. Sperber and
Wilson argue that the correct interpretation is the one that is consistent with
the principle of relevance, i.e. the first interpretation to yield adequate
effects for no unjustifiable effort in a way the speaker could manifestly have
foreseen. A speaker who thought there would be any difficulty about
choosing the correct interpretation should make her intentions more explicit,
for example by adding 'she said' to (78c) or (78d).
Direct quotation, as in (78c), involves resemblance in linguistic properties.
Indirect quotation, as in (78d), by contrast involves interpretive resemblance,
i.e. resemblance in content. Consider (79):
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(79)	 a. She said 'Make sure you come home before 11 o'dock'.
b. She told me to make sure that I come home before 11 o'clock.
c. She told me that I should be home early tonight.
d. She said I shouldn't be late tonight.
Direct quotation, (79a) in the example, must be identical to the original in
syntactic, lexical and logical (though not necessarily phonological) structure.
In the case of indirect quotation, as shown in (79b-d), the demands are much
weaker. What is reported is merely the content of the original. As Sperber
and Wilson show, indirect quotation differs from direct quotation in that the
required resemblances are purely logical. A speech in one language can be as
adequately reported in the same or a different language: it is only the logical
properties of the original that need to be preserved. Moreover, as (79b-d)
indicate, indirect reports may be more or less detailed, more or less of a
summary. In other words, an indirect report can be less than fully faithful,
i.e. a less than fully literal interpretation of the original. Full identity of
content between report and original is not required.
Having shown that an utterance may interpretively represent either a
thought of the speaker's or a thought attributed by the speaker to someone
else, Sperber and Wilson defme a proposition as descriptively used when the
thought it interprets is a current thought of the speaker's, and as
interpretively used when the thought it interprets is attributed to someone
other than the speaker (or to the speaker herself at another time).
Reporting actual speech, as illustrated in (78c) or (79b), is the commonest
type of interpretive use of utterances. Another case of interpretive use is the
attribution to someone else not of utterances but of thoughts (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 229). Consider (80):
(80)	 Susan John is very lucky to have got a fellowship in Oxford, Peter
thinks, and I agree with him.
Here, the first part of Susan's utterance reports a thought which she explicitly
attributes to Peter.
Sometimes, the speaker may communicate not only what someone else said or
thought but her attitude or reaction to what was said or thought. In these
cases, the interpretations are called echoic (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 238,
127
Wilson and Sperber 1992: 59). Echoic utterances are used to express a wide
variety of attitudes, as the following examples show.
(81) Mary (to Peter): I won the race.
Peter (to Mary): (happily) You won the race!
(82) Mary: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
(They go for a picnic and it rains)
Peter: It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.
In (81), Peter reproduces Mary's utterance and indicates his own attitude
towards its propositional content: he is delighted that she won the race. In
(82), Peter reproduces Mary's utterance and indicates, again, his own attitude
towards it: this time, however, he is dissociating himself from it. Both
utterances are echoic. Notice that (82) is a case of irony, which is analysed in
the framework of relevance theory in terms of the notion of interpretive
resemblance, and in particular, of the notion of echoic use: in ironical
utterances, the speaker echoes an opinion which she rejects with mockery and
scorn (for detailed discussion, see Sperber and Wilson 1986: 237-243,
Wilson and Sperber 1992: 53-76).
In this section, 1 have introduced a distinction between descriptive and
interpretive use, which will be exploited in later chapters when I come to
analyse a variety of evidential constructions and contrast them with other
constructions. A crucial point to notice is that descriptive use of a proposition
carries some degree of speaker commitment, whereas attributive interpretive
use suspends the speaker's conlmilment by indicating that the views being
represented are not the speaker's own. We would thus expect descriptively
and interpretively used propositions to differ in truth-conditional status, and
this is what we will find.
4.6	 Conclusion to chapter 4
We now have three distinctions: between truth-conditional and non-truth-
conditional meaning, between conceptual and procedural meaning, and
between explicit and implicit communication. Having shown how
pragmatically inferred evidential information would be dealt with in the
framework of relevance theory, I will now turn to linguistically encoded
evidential information, and try to show on which side of these three related
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distinctions a variety of evidential items fall. I will focus in particular on the
claim made by many speech-act theorists that evidentiials are illocutionary
force indicators, and are therefore non-truth-conditional. I will argue that, on
closer investigation, this claim turns out to be false. In chapter 5, 1 will
therefore compare the behaviour of a variety of adverbials that have been
treated by speech-act theorists as illocutionary force indicators. The
arguments will be developed and applied to a variety of parenthetical
expressions in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
SENTENCE ADVERBIALS
5.1	 Introduction
In this chapter, I will be concerned with four types of sentence adverbial:
illocutionary, attitudinal, evidential and hearsay adverbials. All are
standardly treated in non-truth-conditional terms, as contributing not to the
proposition expressed by the utterance, its truth-conditional content, but to
indicating the type of speech-act performed. I shall survey some standard
speech-act analyses, and then raise an obvious question: are these adverbials
really non-truth-conditional, as speech-act theorists have claimed? I shall
show that by the standard tests for truth-conditionality, these classes of
adverbial behave quite differently from each other: some are clearly truth-
conditional, whereas others are not. This raises two further questions: how
can these facts be described, and how can they be explained? Using the
framework of relevance theory outlined in previous chapters, I shall sketch
the lines on which answers to these questions might be found.
5.2	 Types of sentence adverbial
ifiocutionary adverbials are those, like frankly, confidentially, honestly,
seriously, that are understood as modifying an implicit illocutionary verb
(Sadock 1974: 36, Bach and Harnish 1979: 219-228, Vanderveken 1990: 16,
119). Examples are given in (la-c), which would be understood as
communicating (2a-c):
(1)	 a. Frankly, I'm bored.
b. Mary has, confidentially, failed the exam.
c. Seriously, your argument is fallacious.
(2)	 a. I tell you frankly that I'm bored.
b. I inform you confidentially that Mary has failed the exam.
c. I tell you seriously that your argument is fallacious.
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Attitudinal adverbials are those, like unfortunately, happily, sadly, luckily,
which do not name a speech act but indicate the speaker's attitude to the
statement she makes (Urmson 1963: 228, Strawson 1973: 57-58, Récanati
1987: 50, Vanderveken 1990: 116-117). Examples are given in (3a-c), which
are understood as communicating (4a-c), not (Sa-c):
(3)	 a. Unfortunately, Mary has missed the deadline.
b. Sadly, Paul's car was stolen.
c. Happily, Bill was in time for the interview.
(4)	 a. It is unfortunate that Mary has missed the deadline.
b. It is sad that Paul's car was stolen.
c. It is happily true that Bill was in time for the interview.
(5)	 a. I tell you unfortunately that Mary has missed the deadline.
b. I tell you sadly that Paul's car was stolen.
c. I tell you happily that Bill was in time for the interview.
Evidential adverbials are those that indicate the source or the strength of the
speaker's evidence (Urmson 1963: 228, Palmer 1986: 45-46, 64, Chafe 1986:
26 1-272). This class indudes adverbials such as evidently, obviously, dearly.
Examples are given in (6a-c), which are understood as communicating (7a-c):
(6)	 a. Evidently, Bill has cheated in the exam.
b. Obviously, the bailwasover the line.
c. clearly, you are responsible for the damage.
(7)	 a. It is evident (evidently true) that Bill has cheated in the exam.
b. It is obvious (obviously true) that the ball was over the line.
c. It is dear (clearly true) that you are responsible for the damage.
Hearsay adverbials, such as allegedly and reportedly, are generally treated as
a type of evidential (Palmer 1986: 73, Chafe 1986: 268), because they
indicate that the source of knowledge is not the speaker herself but someone
else. They are typically used to report actual speech. Examples are given in
(8a-c), which are understood as communicating (9a-b):
(8)	 a. Allegedly, the cook has poisoned the soup.
b. Reportedly, the ball was over the line.
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(9)	 a. It is alleged that the cook has poisoned the soup.
b. It is reported that the ball was over the line.
These four dasses of adverbial are interesting because they have traditionally
been treated as providing evidence for a speech-act semantics and against a
truth-conditional account of at least some lexical items. In the next section, I
shall consider some speech-act accounts.
5.3	 Speech-act accounts of sentence adverbials
As noted in chapter 2, speech-act theorists assign particular importance to
linguistic devices that enable the speaker to make the force of her utterance
explicit. Austin claims that an illocutionary act can be performed only if there
is a conventional means of performing it - a 'formula' or 'indicator' whose
only function is to indicate the performance of the act. Performative verbs are
the illocutionary force markers par excellence simply because they explicitly
name the act to be performed (Austin 1962). Parenthetical constructions
have also been treated as indicators, signalling the force of the utterance to
which they are attached (Austin 1962, Urmson 1963, Strawson 1971a).
All such indicators have been traditionally treated as non-truth-conditional,
i.e. as not contributing to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they
occur, or to the proposition expressed by the utterance. Speech-act theorists
repeatedly assert that their function is not to describe but to indicate the
illocutionary force of the utterance a request for information, an order, a
promise, a warning, an assertion, a guess.
Certain types of sentence adverbials seem to fit naturally into this framework.
Although speech-act theorists have not dealt extensively with adverbials, the
following should give an idea of how the speech-act approach would go.
The salient features of the speech-act approach to adverbials are:
(a) illocutionary, attitudinal, evidential and hearsay adverbials are standardly
treated as non-truth-conditional and
(b) non-truth-conditional expressions are treated as indicating a speech act
or propositional attitude rather than describing a state of affairs.
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These claims are linked because, as we have seen, the crucial feature of an
indicator, in this framework, is that it does not contribute to the proposition
expressd, i.e. to the truth conditions of the utterance.
ifiocutionary adverbials will be the first to be discussed, being the most
promising candidates for speech-act analysis. According to the speech-act
view the adverbials frankly, confIdentially, seriously in (la-c)
(1)	 a. Frankly, I'm bored.
b. Mary has, confidentially, failed the exam.
c. Seriously, your argument is fallacious.
do not modify anything in the proposition that follows them, they make no
contribution to the truth conditions of these utterances; they do not describe
anything, but merely indicate what type of speech-act is being performed
(Sadock 1974: 36, 66-71, Bach and Harnish 1979: 220). Here is how Sadock
presents this view:
'(68)	 For the last time, I don't like liver.
It is obvious ... that the adverbial phrase for the last time is not understood as
modifying the sentence in the same way that it does in one interpretation of (69).
(69) For the last time, Ussorssuaq beheld his native lancL
In fact, for the last time cannot modify the propositional content of sentence (68), as
is shown by (70):
(70) *J don't like liver for the last time.
(72)	 1 tell you for the last time that I don't like liver.
Sentence (72) is a fairly close paraphrase of sentence (68), ... thus ... the distribution of
the adverbial is explained by the abstract-performative hypothesis.' (Sadock 1974: 36)1
Sadock claims that a large class of adverbials such as frankly, finally, in
1 Sadock, like many generative semanticists, defended the 'abstract (higher)
performative hypothesis', which attempted to account for the distribution of sentence
adverbials, etc., by syntactic means, i.e. by positing an abstract performative verb in
syntactic deep structure. This hypothesis has long since been abandoned, and I am here
considering a purely semantic/pragmatic version, on which an utterance like Sadock's
(68) would be analysed as communicating the information in (72), without necessarily
encoding all this information by syntactic means. See Levinson (1983) for arguments
against the abstract performanve analysis.
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conclusion, have the same function, i.e. 'modify the abstract performative.'
(ibid.) Similarly, Bach and Harnish observe that
the prefatory adverbial is not used to modify the main clause of the sentence (it
may not even contribute to the locutionary act). Rather it is used to characterize, in
one way or another, the utterance of the main clause. In (30) [Frankly, you bore me]
"frankly" describes S's act of stating that H bores S.' (Bach and Hamish 1979: 220)
This analysis treats frankly in (la) as indicating that the speech act
performed is one of saying frankly/telling the hearer frankly/admitting
frankly/informing the hearer franidy that the speaker is bored.
One advantage of this proposal is that it provides an explanation for the
ambiguity of utterances like (10):
(10)	 Seriously, is she coming?
Here, seriously can have two possible interpretations: (a) the speaker is
asking a serious question or (b) the speaker is asking for a serious answer.
(lOa)	 I ask you seriously to tell me whether she is coming.
(lOb')	 I ask you to tell me seriously whether she is coming. (Bach and
Harnish 1979: 221)
This is perhaps the strongest confirmation of the speech-act analysis of
illocutionary adverbials (Wilson 1991).
Similarly, the speech-act account treats attitudinal adverbials as indicating
the propositional attitude the speaker intends to convey. It is Urmson who
provides us with the most extensive speech-act account of these adverbials
(1963: 227-229), in the course of a discussion of parenthetical verbs (ibid.
220-240) which will be considered in more detail in chapter 6. He refers to
adverbs such as luckily, happily, unfortunately, as being 'loosely attached to
sentences as are parenthetical verbs' (ibid. 228), and notes that their
position in the sentence can vary 'as in the case of parenthetical verbs'. These
adverbs, he claims, modify the whole statement to which they are attached 'by
giving a warning how they are to be understooct (emphasis added). Thus,
attitudinal adverbials are considered as non-truth-conditional indicators,
semantically external to the proposition expressed by the utterances that
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carry them.
Strawson (1973: 57-58) and Récanati (1987) express the same view. l'his is
how Récanati summarizes the point in relation to the attitudinal adverb
'happily':
'Deleting the adverb would not change the proposition expressed by the sentence when
interpreted in this manner, because the modification introduced by the adverb is
external to the proposition and concerns the speaker's emotional attitude toward the
latter. This attitude is not "stated" nor "described", but only "indicated".' (Récanati
1987: 50)
Evidential adverbials are treated by speech-act theorists as indicators of the
kind or amount of evidence the speaker has for what she is saying. Urmson
(1963: 228) and Chafe (1986: 264) consider evidential adverbials such as
certainly, probably, possibly, defmitely, undoubtedly as indicators of the
extent to which the speaker's statement is reliable. For Urmson,
'...cei-tainly, probably and possibly, among others, show how much reliability is to be
ascribed to the statement' (Urmson 1963: 228)
and for Chafe,
'...one way in which knowledge may be qualified is with an expression indicating the
speaker's assessment of its degree of reliability, the likelihood of its being a fact.
(9s)	 But I'm probably not going to & it any more.
(lOs)	 He's quite nice, and certainl y very cheery.
(13w)	 The positive and negative decisions in the Johnson -Laird eta!. (1978)
study may have allowed equal elaboration, but possibly not.
(14w)	 The answer undoubtedly varies from one situation to another.
(15w)	 Then this limitation will surely play a part in determining the nature of the
"rules" for reference in any language.' (Chafe 1986: 264-265)
Evidential adverbials are also considered as indicators of the speaker's degree
of commitment (Palmer 1986: 64) or as an alternative device to the explicit
performative for making dear the force of utterances (Austin 1962: 74-77).
According to Austin:
'...when we say "I shall" we can make it clear that we are forecasting by adding the
adverbs uundoubtedly or "probably", that we are expressing an intention by adding
the adverbs "certainly" or "definitely"._' (Austin 1962: 77)
Similar analyses have been proposed for the hearsay adverbials apparently,
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allegedly, reportedly. These are usually treated as a type of evidential (Palmer
1986: 7, 9, 51, 56-57, 71, 73, Chafe 1986: 268-269), and hence speech-act
theorists analyse them as indicating a diminished speaker commitment.
The main point to be emphasized in these accounts is that speech-act
theorists have indiscriminately treated the different types of sentence
adverbials as being consistently non-truth-conditional. In the next section, I
will try to show that this treatment is inadequate. By applying some standard
tests for truth-conditionality, I will try to show that different classes of
sentence adverbial behave in very different ways. In later sections, I will ask
why this is so.
5.4	 Testing for truth-conditionality
There is a standard test for distinguishing truth-conditional from non-truth-
conditional meaning, which I am going to apply to the four classes of
adverbial illustrated above. Its core mechanism consists in embedding the
item to be tested into the antecedent of a conditional and seeing if it falls
within the scope of the 'if. If it does, the item is truth-conditional, if it does
not, it is non-truth-conditionaL
The way the test works and the results it yields are best ifiustrated by using it
to show that but is non-truth-conditional (Wilson 1992). Consider but in
(11):
(11) Mary is here but Sue isn't.
The question is whether the suggestion of contrast carried by but is truth-
conditional or not. In other words, are the truth conditions of (11) correctly
given in (12a-b) or (13a-c)?
(12) a. Mary is here.
b. Sue isn't here.
(13) a.Maryishere.
b. Sue isn't here.
c. There is a contrast between the fact that Mary is here and the
fact that Sue isn't.
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It is easier to answer this question when we embed (11) into a conditional, as
in (14):
(14)	 If Mary is here but Sue isn't, we can't vote.
The question now is: under what circumstances is the speaker of (14)
claiming that we can't vote? Is she saying that we can't vote if (12a-b) are
true, or is she saying that we can't vote if (13a-c) are true? In other words,
does (13c) contribute to the truth conditions of (14), or does it remain
outside the scope of the 'if ... then' connective?
It should be dear that (13c) does not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterance in (11). Thus, but is non-truth-conditional, as most analysts who
deal with but have assumed.
Let us examine how the test applies to each group of adverbials in turn. The
attitudinal adverbials unfortunately and sadly will be the first to be tested,
since they are, along with hearsay adverbials, the clearest cases. Consider
(3a-b):
(3)	 a. Unfortunately, Mary has missed the deadline.
b. Sadly, Paul's car was stolen.
Intuitively, as speech-act theorists have claimed, the adverbials in (3) do not
make any contribution to the proposition expressed, hence to the truth
conditions of the utterances in question. (3a) would be true if and only if
Mary missed the deadline, (3b) would be true if and only if Paul's car was
stolen. However, it will be interesting to see if our intuitions are confirmed by
the test illustrated above.
Regarding (3a), the issue is whether its truth conditions are (15) or (16):
(15) Mary has missed the deadline.
(16) It is unfortunate that Mary has missed the deadline.
To apply the test, we embed (3a) into a conditional. Note that since (3a)
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sounds odd when embedded as it stands, the synonymous (17) will be used.2
(17) Maiy has unfortunately missed the deadline.
(18) If Mary has unfortunately missed the deadline, she can reapply in
May.
The question is: under what circumstances is the speaker of (18) claiming
that Mary should reapply in May? Is she saying that Mary should reapply in
May if (15) is true, or is she saying that Mary should reapply in May if (16) is
true? Clearly, she is saying the former, not the latter. Hence, (16) does not
contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance, and the attitudinal
adverbial unfortunately is non-truth-conditional.
Exactly parallel arguments apply to sadly in (3b). Regarding (3b), the issue is
whether its truth conditions are (19) or (20):
(19) Paul's car was stolen.
(20) It is sad that Paul's car was stolen.
Since (3b) again sounds odd when embedded as it stands, the synonymous
(21)will be used.
(21) Paul's car was, sadly, stolen.
(22) If Paul's car was, sadly, stolen, he will start using the underground.
The question is: under what circumstances is the speaker of (22) daiming
that Paul will start using the underground? Is she saying that Paul will start
using the underground if (19) is true, or is she saying that Paul will start
using the underground if (20) is true? Again, it is clear that (20) does not
contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance, and hence the non-truth-
conditional status of attitudinal adverbials is confirmed. Notice that these
results are exactly as the speech-act theorists predict
I will next examine the hearsay adverbials allegedly and reportedly. These
also yield uncontroversial results, but results which go in quite the opposite
2 For arguments that these constructions are synonymous, see Greenbaum (1969: 94-
95) and Jackendoff (1972: 56-57, 72). In later sections, I will look at some cases where
movement of the adverb is not required.
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direction from those obtained with attitudinal adverbials. Consider again
(8a-b):
(8)	 a. Allegedly, the cook has poisoned the soup.
b. Reportedly, the ball was over the line.
In the case of (8a),, the question is whether its truth conditions are (23) or
(24):
(23) The cook has poisoned the soup.
(24) It is alleged that the cook has poisoned the soup.
To test (8a) we embed the synonymous (25)
(25) The cook has allegedly poisoned the soup.
into a conditional, as in (26):
(26) If the cook has allegedly poisoned the soup, the police should make
an inquiry.
The question is: under what circumstances is the speaker of (26) claiming
that the police should make an inquiry into the case? Is she saying that the
police ought to make an inquiry ii (23) is true, or is she saying that the police
ought to make an inquiry 11(24) is true?
Interestingly, in this case the results obtained are quite different. (24) does
contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. Hence, the hearsay
adverbial allegedly is truth-conditional, contrary to what is claimed on the
speech-act account.
Similarly, in the case of (8b), we want to know whether its truth conditions are
those in (27) or (28):
(27) The ball was over the line.
(28) It is reported that the ball was over the line.
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Assuming that (8b) is synonymous with (29),
(29) The bail was reportedly over the line
we embed (29) into a conditional as in (30):
(30) If the ball was reportedly over the line, the matter should be
investigated further.
Under what circumstances is the speaker of (30) claiming that the matter
should be investigated further? Is she saying that the matter should be
investigated further if (27) is true, or is she saying that the matter should be
investigated further if (28) is true? It is clear again that (28) contributes to
the truth conditions of the utterance. Hence, the truth-conditional status of
hearsay adverbials is confirmed.
Note that the testing of hearsay adverbials yields results that go exactly
against the speech-act predictions. Thus, we have one clear argument against
the speech-act approach, and one clear problem: why do these two types of
adverbial behave differently?
Turning to illocutionary and evidential adverbials, a number of problems
arise in applying the tests.
(a) First, when we embed illocutionary adverbials under 'if, they often seem
to take not the embedded clause but the whole utterance in their scope. For
example, (31) would often be understood as communicating (32a) rather than
(32b):
(31) If Mary, frankly, is unqualified, we should not give her the post.
(32) a. I tell you frankly that if Mary is unqualified, we should not give
her the post.
b. If I tell you frankly that Mary is unqualified, we should not give
her the post.
These adverbials cannot easily be interpreted as taking merely the embedded
antecedent in their scope. A similar point applies to disjunctions. Just as
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(31) would often be understood as communicating (32a), so (33) would often
be understood as communicating (34a) rather than (34b):
(33) Either Mary, frankly, isn't as qualified as you say she is, or she is
inefficient.
(34) a. I tell you frankly that either Mary isn't as qualified as you say
she is, or she is inefficient.
b. Either I tell you frankly that Mary isn't as qualified as you say
she is, or she is inefficient.
(b) Second, when we embed at least some illocutionary adverbials, they often
seem to take only the embedded VP in their scope. For example, (35) can be
understood as communicating (36):
(35) If John is frankly annoyed, we should drop the subject.
(36) If John is honestly/openly showing his annoyance, we should drop
the subject.
Notice, moreover, that this interpretation is possible even without
embedding. (37) can be understood as communicating (38):
(37) John is frankly annoyed.
(38) John is honestly/openly showing his annoyance.
However, this is not the interpretation we are interested in. We are looking
for an interpretation on which 'frankly' modifies an implicit illocutionary
verb, i.e. an interpretation of (35) which would be equivalent not to (36) but
to (39):
(39) If I tell you frankly that John is annoyed...
The question is whether both these possibilities of interpretation can be
eliminated in order to show whether these adverbials are truth-conditional in
the sense we are interested in.
The second problem seems to arise with evidentials too. Here, the possible
confusion is over cases where the evidential can be understood as a manner
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adverbial modifying the embedded VP. For example, (40) can be understood
as communicating (41a) or (41b):
(40) The cook obviously poisoned the soup.
(41) a. The cook poisoned the soup in an obvious way.
b. It is obvious that the cook poisoned the soup.
There are also cases parallel to (35) and (36) above, i.e. where (42) is
understood as communicating (43):
(42) If John is evidently annoyed, we should drop the subject.
(43) If John is showing his annoyance in an evident way, we should
drop the subject.
The issue is whether there is a way of dealing with points (a) and (b) for both
ifiocutionary and evidential adverbials.
On point (a), notice that 'if...then' and 'either...or' are, as it were, non-factive
connectives: they do not commit the speaker to the truth of the propositions
embedded under them. With factive connectives such as although, since and
because, which commit the speaker to the truth of the propositions
embedded under them, the scope facts are quite different. Thus (44a) is
equivalent to (44b) and (45a) is equivalent to (45b):
(44) a. Mary shouldn't get the post, because she franidy isn't qualified
enough.
b. Mary shouldn't get the post, because (I tell you frankly that) she
isn't qualified enough.
(45) a. Mary might get the post, although she frankly isn't qualified
enough.
b. Mary might get the post, although (I tell you frankly that) she
isn't qualified enough.
In these examples, we have an interpretation of the sort we are interested in
testing for truth-conditional status. I have put the embedded illocutionary
clause in parentheses, to indicate that we have not yet decided whether, in
this position, it is fully truth-conditional or not. These examples suggest that
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we should be able to avoid problem (a) by constructing test sentences based
on factive rather than non-factive connectives. I will return to this point
below.
On point (b), the manner-adverbial interpretation can be eliminated in the
case of evidentials on the basis of the following syntactic/semantic
arguments. (i) Manner adverbs must be semantically compatible with the
verbal construction they modify (Hartvigson 1969: 172). The manner adverb
dearly, for example, requires a verb that denotes 'actions' which can be
performed in a more or less dear way or manner. Thus the manner adverbial
dearly co-occurs with verbs like see, explain, write but not a verb like die.
The evidential dearly, however, can modify any verbal construction. (II) In
American English, manner adverbs do not occur before aspect or modals
(Jackendoff 1972: 75). Hence the unacceptability of manner-adverbial
interpretations of (A):
(A) *The driver clearly has seen the pedestrian.
*The cook obviously has poisoned the soup.
*The cook dearly is poisoning the soup.
*The cook clearly will poison the soup.
Compare with the same utterances interpreted as evidentials, which are
perfectly acceptable in American English:
(B) The driver, clearly, has seen the pedestrian.
The cook, obviously, has poisoned the soup.
The cook, dearly, is poisoning the soup.
The cook, evidently, will poison the soup.
Some of these examples sound strange in British English, which prefers to put
the adverbial after the auxiliary, but the same point can be made with the
negative counterparts of (A). Thus, in British English 'The driver clearly
hasn't seen the pedestrian' etc. can only have an evidential interpretation.
Let us, then, use the following examples, which by the arguments given above
have only an evidential interpretation, to test for truth-conditionality of
evidentials:
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(46) a. The driver clearly hasn't died.
b. The cook obviously won't poison the soup.
The issue is whether the truth conditions of (46a) are (47) or (48).
(47) The driver hasn't died.
(48) It is clear that the driver hasn't died.
To sharpen our intuitions, we embed (46a) into a conditional, as in (49):
(49) If the driver dearly hasn't died, you must hurry for an ambulance.
The question is: under what circumstances is the speaker of (49) claiming
that they must hurry for an ambulance? Is she saying that they must hurry for
an ambulance if (47) is true, or is she saying that they must hurry for an
ambulance if (48) is true? In other words, is (48) contributing to the truth
conditions of the utterance as a whole or does it remain outside the scope of
the conditional? Here, (48) does seem to contribute to the truth conditions of
the utterance. This suggests that the evidential adverbial dearly is truth-
conditional.
The results are even sharper for (46b). We need, again, to decide whether its
truth conditions are (50) or (51):
(50) The cook won't poison the soup.
(51) It is obvious that the cook won't poison the soup.
To sharpen our intuitions we embed (46b) into a conditional, as in (52):
(52) If the cook obviously won't poison the soup, we can eat the meal
without worrying.
The question is: under what drcumstances is the speaker of (52) claiming
that they can eat the meal without worrying? Is she saying that they needn't
worry if (50) is true, or is she saying that they needn't worry if (51) is true?
Clearly, (51) does contribute to the truth conditions of (46b). Hence the truth
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conditional status of evidential adverbials is confirmed.
With illocutionary adverbials, the maimer-adverbial interpretation can be
eliminated by choosing VPs that do not take human subjects, as in (53):
(53) John's book has frankly sold very little.
or by using confidentially or some other adverbial instead, 3 as in (54):
(54) Mary has, confidentially, failed the exam.
Let us examine how the test applies to frankly first. We want to know whether
the truth conditions of (53) are (55) or (56):
(55) John's book has sold very little.
(56) I tell you frankly that John's book has sold very little.
To sharpen our intuitions, we embed (53) into a conditional, as in (57):
(57) If John's book has franidy sold very little, you shouldn't be
surprised.
The question is: under what circumstances is the speaker of (57) claiming
that the hearer shouldn't be surprised? Is she saying that he shouldn't be
surprised ii (55) is true, i.e. if the book has sold very little, or is she saying
that he shouldn't be surprised if (56) is true, i.e. if the speaker tells him
frankly that the book has sold very little? Clearly, the former interpretation is
correct. Hence, (56) does not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterance as a whole, and the illocutionary adverbial frankly is non-truth-
conditional.
Similar arguments apply to (54). When testing (54), the question is whether
its truth conditions are (58) or (59):
(58) Mary has failed the exam.
(59) I inform you confidentially that Mary has failed the exam.
3 Both ways of eliminating the 'frankly' examples in (b) have been suggested to me by
Deirdre Wilson.
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To sharpen our intuitions, we embed (54) into a conditional, as in (60):
(60)	 If Mary has, confidentially, failed the exam, you mustn't be upset.
The question is: under what circumstances is the speaker of (60) claiming
that the hearer mustn't be upset? Is she saying that he mustn't be upset if
(58) is true, or is she saying that he mustn't be upset if (59) is true? Clearly,
the former interpretation is correct. Hence, (59) does not contribute to the
truth conditions of the utterance as a whole, and the non-truth-conditional
status of ifiocutionary adverbials is confirmed.
This last example returns us to an important issue raised above, about the
scope of sentence adverbials embedded in subordinate clauses. Although, as
we have just seen, confidentially does not appear to contribute to the truth
conditions of (60), it still has two natural scope possibffities, brought out by
the paraphrases in (61) and (62):
(61) I tell you this confidentially: if Mary has failed the exam, you
mustn't be upset.
(62) If Mary has failed the exam - and I am telling you in confidence
that she has - you mustn't be upset.
In (61), the speaker is not conceding that Mary has failed her exam; in (62) it
seems that she is. Notice that in (62), the parenthetical clause 'and I am
telling you that she has' does not fall semantically within the scope of the
connective 'if', despite its syntactic position: it is not part of the conditions
under which the speaker is telling the hearer that he mustn't be upset. This,
on the one hand, confirms the non-truth-conditional status of the
illocutionary adverbial 'confidentially' in (60), and, on the other hand,
suggests that a closer study of parentheticals might shed more light on
sentence adverbials too. This topic will be pursued in the next chapter.
Meanwhile, let us pursue this matter one stage further by looking at the
behaviour of ifiocutionary and evidential adverbials embedded under factive
connectives, which eliminate the possibility of an interpretation along the
lines of (61) above. Notice first that the use of factive connectives such as
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because and although eliminates a syntactic problem encountered above. In
order to embed the sentence adverbials felicitously under 'if" and 'or', we had
to move them from sentence-initial position to mid-sentence, relying on the
synonymy between 'Fortunately, he has left' arid 'He has fortunately left':
utterances such as 'If, fortunately, John left, we can celebrate' are either
ungrammatical or infelicitous. With factive connectives, i.e. connectives
which entail the truth of their constituent clauses, this problem does not
arise. Thus, consider (63) and (64):
(63) a. John's here, although unfortunately his train was late.
b. Susan's lucky, because frankly she should have lost the election.
(64) a. John's here, although allegedly his train was late.
b. Susan's lucky, because obviously she should have lost the
election.
Here, there is no need to move the adverbial from sentence-initial position to
obtain a fully acceptable result. In these examples, the speaker is clearly
committed to the following:
(65) a. Unfortunately, his train was late.
b. Frankly, she should have lost the election.
c. Allegedly, his train was late.
d. Obviously, she should have lost the election.
The question is, though, whether these adverbials fall within the scope of
because and although, as they would if they were genuinely truth-conditional.
In the case of (63a) and (63b), it seems clear that the results are as before.
These adverbials remain outside the scope of the connectives. The facts being
contrasted in (63a) are (a) that John is here and (b) that his train was late.
What makes the speaker conclude that Susan is lucky in (63b) is the fact that
Susan ought to have lost the election rather than the fact that this information
is being given frankly. This confirms the non-truth-conditional status of
attitudinal and ifiocutionary adverbials.
With (64), by contrast, things seem less clear cut. There appears to be both a
truth-conditional and a non-truth-conditional reading: obviously and
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allegedly can fall both inside and outside the scope of although and because.
That is, (64a) might be equivalent to 'although it is alleged that his train was
late', or to 'although his train was late', and similarly for (64b). This suggests
that the truth-conditional status of evidential and hearsay adverbials is even
more complicated than either pure truth-conditional theorists or pure
speech-act theorists have thought. These points will be taken up in the next
chapter.
In this section, I have tried to show that ifiocutionaty, attitudinal, evidential
and hearsay adverbials behave very differently from each other, both
semantically and pragmatically, and present a variety of descriptive problems
that are entirely unexpected on the standard speech-act account. Hence, we
need a new descriptive and explanatory framework in which to analyse them.
In the next section, I shall start to analyse them in the framework of relevance
theory.
5.5	 Relevance theory and sentence adverbials: possibilities for
description
Relevance theory provides a rich enough framework for describing the facts
about sentence adverbials that have been presented above. The basic
assumptions I shall develop are the following:
(1) Sentence adverbials encode elements of conceptual
representations, which may be true or false in their own right,
even if they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterances in which they occur.
(2) Sentence adverbials contribute to the explicatures of an utterance,
rather than its implicatures.
(3) Where they do not contribute to the proposition expressed, they
contribute to what Wilson and Sperber (1993) call higher-level
explicatures of the utterance, where higher-level explicatures by
definition do not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterances, though they may be true or false in their own right.
5.5.1	 Conceptual versus procedural
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The distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning was introduced
in chapter 4. The assumption is that most ordinary nouns, verbs, adjectives
and adverbs which contribute to truth conditions do so by encoding concepts.
Hence, since we have seen that evidential, including hearsay, adverbials
appear to be truth-conditional, they should be treated as encoding concepts.
Blakemore (1987) argues that non-truth-conditional discourse connectives
such as after all, so, but, etc., encode procedural rather than conceptual
meaning, indicating to the hearer what type of inference process he is in. The
question is, are all non-truth-conditional expressions to be analysed in
procedural terms? In particular, do the non-truth-conditional adverbials, i.e.
the illocutionary and the attitudinal adverbials, also encode procedural rather
than conceptual meaning? I shall argue, following Wilson and Sperber (1993),
that they do not.
Note first that a speaker who uses the ifiocutionary adverbials in (66-68) and
the attitudinal adverbials in (69-70) can lay herself open to charges of
untruthfulness in their use:
(66) a. Peter: Frankly, this party is boring.
b. Mary That's not true. You're not being frank. I've just seen you
dancing with the blonde beauty in blue.
(67) a. Bill: Contidentiafly, Peter broke up with Jane.
b. Ann: Liar. You're not being confidential, you've told everybody
in the College.
(68) a. Peter: Honestly, I don't care.
b. Mary: That's not true. You're not being honest! I know you have
sent her another Valentine card this year.
(69) a. Peter: Unfortunately, John lost his job.
b. Maiy That's not true. It's not unfortunate! He got a fellowship
in Oxford instead!
(70) a. Peter. Sadly, she missed the deadline.
b. Mary: That's not true, no-one's sad about it!
This can be explained on the assumption that the adverbials in (66-70)
encode elements of conceptual representations which can be true or false in
their own right, though not contributing to the truth conditions of the
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utterance in which they occur.
More importantly, ifiocutionary and attitudinal adverbials have synonymous
manner-adverbial counterparts which are clearly truth conditional, and
should therefore, on standard assumptions, be treated as encoding concepts
(Wilson and Sperber 1993). Thus, consider (71) and (72):
(71) Peter spoke fiankly.
(72) It's unfortunately true that John lost his job.
The manner adverbials frankly and unfortunately make a contribution to the
truth conditions of the utterances in (71) and in (72): (71) is true if and only
if Peter spoke frankly and (72) is true if and only if it is unfortunately true
that John lost his job. By the above arguments, the two adverbials must be
treated as encoding concepts.
But the only difference between these truth-conditional manner adverbials
and their non-truth-conditional illocutionary and attitudinal counterparts is
that the truth-conditional adverbials modify explicit ilocutionary and
attitudinal predicates, whereas the non-truth-conditional ones must be seen
as modifying implicit illocutionary and attitudinal predicates. Thus, compare
(73) and (74):
(73) Frankly, this party is boring.
(74) I'm telling you frankly that this party is boring.
and (75) and (76):
(75) Unfortunately, John lost his job.
(76) It is unfortunately true that John lost his job.
The sense of frankly in (73) and (74) and of unfortunately in (75) and (76)
seems to be the same, the only difference being that in (74) and (76) the
adverbs contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances whereas in (73)
and (75) they do not. The simplest way to account for these facts is to assume
that the two adverbs encode the same concepts in both cases, but that in (74)
and (76) these concepts contribute to the proposition expressed by the
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utterance, and hence to its truth conditions, whereas in (73) and (75) they do
not.
A further argument for the view that illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials
encode concepts is based on compositionality (Wilson and Sperber 1993).
These adverbials can have a quite complex syntactic and semantic structure.
Consider (77a-d):
(77)	 a. Quite frankly, he is a fool.
b. In strictest confidence, he is a fool.
c. Very sadly and regrettably, your fête will be rained off.
d. Not surprisingly, he didn't win.
These more complex adverbials are easily analysable on the assumption that
they encode concepts in the same way as regular, truth-conditional
expressions, with the sole exception that the concepts they encode do not
contribute to the truth conditions of utterances in which they occur.
Notice that, as Wilson and Sperber (1993) point out, none of these arguments
carries over to discourse connectives such as 'but', 'however', etc., which we
have seen are analysed within the relevance-theoretic framework as encoding
procedural rather than conceptual meaning. Thus, 'but and 'however' appear
to have no synonymous truth-conditional counterparts, which was one of the
strongest reasons for assigning conceptual status to sentence adverbs such as
'frankly', 'unfortunately', etc. Nor do they appear to occur in complex
connectives corresponding to the complex adverbials in (77) above.
Moreover, as Wilson and Sperber (1993) also point out, the meanings of
discourse connectives such as but, so, well, etc., are hard to bring to
consdousness and to analyse in conceptual ternis:
'Conceptual representations can be brought to consciousness: procedures cannot. We
have direct access neither to grammatical computations nor to inferential
computations used in comprehension. A procedural analysis of discourse connectives
would explain our lack of direct access to the information they encode.' (Wilson and
Sperber 1993: 16)
Clearly, the meaning of all the adverbials dealt with here are easy to bring to
consdousness and to analyse in conceptual terms. Notice, too, that in the last
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section I showed that evidential and hearsay adverbials seemed to vacillate
between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional status. Surely they do
not also vacillate between conceptual and procedural status: they are
conceptual throughout.
5.5.2	 ExDlicatures versus imDlicptures
I shall now argue (following Wilson and Sperber 1993) that there is a second
important difference between Blakemore's pragmatic connectives and the
non-truth-conditional adverbials we are dealing with here. Blakemore
analyses her connectives as encoding constraints on implicatures, i.e. as
contributing to the implicit aspect of communication. illocutionary and
attitudinal adverbials, by contrast, appear to contribute to what Sperber and
Wilson call the explicatures of an utterance: i.e. to the explicit aspect of
communication.
As we have seen, Sperber and Wilson define explicatures as explicitly
communicated assumptions. The explicatures of an utterance will typically
include:
(a) the proposition expressed by the utterance
(b) higher-level descriptions obtained by optionally embedding this
proposition under a speech-act verb or a propositional-attitude
verb.
Thus, the explicatures of the utterance in (78) might indude the propositions
in (79):
(78) Mary (frankly): I lied.
(79) a. Marylied.
b. Mary is saying that she lied.
c. Mary is saying frankly that she lied.
d. Mary is telling Peter that she lied.
e. Mary believes that she lied.
f. Mary is admitting that she lied.
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As we have seen, Mary's utterance in (78) is true if and only if Mary lied, i.e.
if and only if the explicature in (79a) is true. The remaining explicatures
(79b-f) may be true or false in their own right but make no contribution to
the truth conditions of Mary's utterance. In more technical terms, the most
deeply embedded explicature of (78) is the proposition expressed by (78)
and (79b-f) are higher-level explicatures of (78). The truth conditions of (78)
will depend solely on (79a), the proposition expressed, whereas the higher-
level explicatures (79b-f) will be explicitly communicated, but make no
contribution to the truth conditions of (78).
As noted in chapter 4, higher-level explicatures, like logical forms and fully
propositional forms, are recovered by a combination of decoding and
inference (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 11). To obtain (79a) the hearer must
not only decode the semantic representation of the utterance but make an
inference about the intended referent of 'I'; to obtain the remaining
explicatures (79b-f) he must make additional inferences about Mary's
attitude to the proposition she is expressing, and the type of speech act she is
intending to perform. On this approach, higher-level explicatures are
conceptual representations, which can entail and contradict each other and
represent determinate states of affairs. Although they are true or false in
their own right, they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterances in which they occur (ibid.: 16). Within this framework, then, both
the fact that ifiocutionary and attitudinal adverbials encode concepts, and the
fact that they are nonetheless non-truth-conditional, can be described.
Evidential and hearsay adverbials, as we have seen, encode concepts too, and
in many cases these concepts appear to contribute to the truth conditions of
utterances in the regular way. Thus, consider (80a-b):
(80)	 a. Evidently, Bill has cheated in the exams.
b. Allegedly, Bill has cheated in the exams.
According to the tests described above, (SOa) and (80b) communicate the
explicatures in (81) and (82) respectively, but these constitute the truth
conditions of (80a) and (80b):
(81)	 Iris evident that Bill has cheated in the exams.
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(82)	 It is alleged that BALI has cheated in the exams.
Within this framework, these facts can be described by saying that the
evidential (evidently) and hearsay (allegedly) adverbials in (80a) and (80b)
contribute to the proposition expressed; in other words, (81) and (82)
constitute the truth-conditional content of the utterance rather than its
higher-level explicatures. A description, of course, is not an explanation. The
four classes of adverbial we have been considering are syntactically very
similar: why is it that two appear to contribute to the truth conditions of
utterances, and two do not? In this chapter, I shall not attempt a full
explanation, but merely indicate the lines along which I think an explanation
might be sought. The matter will be taken up in later chapters.
5.6	 Relevance theory and sentence adverbials: possibilities for
explanation
The questions that have been raised in this chapter are:
(a)	 are all the adverbials we have been discussing really non-truth-
conditional?
(b) if so, how do we establish this? If not, what tests for truth-
conditionality can we use?
(c) for non-truth-conditional adverbials, why are they non-truth-
conditional?
(d) do they encode conceptual or procedural information?
(e) do they contribute to the implicit or the explicit aspect of
communication?
(f) if there is a difference between truth-conditional and non-truth-
conditional adverbials, how can this difference be explained?
It has been shown by the standard test for truth-conditionality that evidential
and hearsay adverbials are (generally) truth-conditional, whereas attitudinal
and illocutionary adverbials are non-truth-conditional. The distinction
between proposition expressed and higher-level explicatures makes it
possible to describe the facts in a natural way: truth-conditional adverbials
contribute to the proposition expressed whereas the non-truth-conditional
ones contribute to higher-level explicatures. It has also been shown that all
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these adverbials, whether truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional, encode
conceptual information and contribute to the explicit aspect of
communication.
However, it still remains to provide an explanation for these facts, i.e. to
answer questions (c) and (1) above. I suggest that an answer to question (c)
might be sought along the following lines. The comma intonation separating
off sentence adverbials and their position in the sentence (initial, mid or
final) seems to suggest that they should be treated along with parentheticals.
In the literature, parenthetical constructions have been classed with
appositive clauses (e.g. 'Mary's car, and it is an expensive one, is blue')
(Emonds 1979), nonrestrictive relative clauses (NRR) (e.g. 'I talked to Mary,
who is nice') (Fabb 1990) or disjunct constituents (Espinal 1991, for
discussion within a traditional framework see Meyer 1992).
The general claim is that all these constructions are phonologically,
syntactically and semantically independent of their host clauses (Emonds
1979, McCawley 1982, Fabb 1990, Haegeman 1991, Espinal 1991). This
might be taken to suggest that there is not one single utterance involved, with
a single set of truth conditions. Instead, there might be two separate syntactic
and discourse units or two separate utterances involved, each with their own
truth conditions, which might make different contributions to overall
relevance. This would connect up with suggestions traditionally made by
speech-act theorists along similar lines (Récanati 1987: 36-40). If such
speculations prove to be correct, one might further speculate that intuitions
about the Iruth conditions of the utterance as a whole will be intuitions about
the sub-part of it which makes the major contribution to overall relevance.
In order to pursue these ideas further I must first investigate the nature of
parentheticals, and examine their truth-conditional status. As we will see, an
important subclass of parentheticals perform an evidential function, and are
generally treated by speech-act theorists as non-truth-conditional. The next
chapter will therefore look at the truth-conditional status of parentheticals in
general, and of evidential parentheticals in particular, and discuss how they
function in pragmatic terms.
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CHAPTER 6
PARENTHETICALS
6.1	 Introduction
At the start of this thesis, I raised three main questions about the nature of
evidentials:
(a) what is the role of pragmatic inference in the interpretation of
evidential utterances?
(b) do overt evidential expressions contribute to the explicit or the
implicit aspect of communication? and
(c) do these expressions contribute to the truth conditions of
utterances in which they occur?
I have now offered partial answers to all three questions, Within the
framework of relevance theory, outlined in chapter 4.
These answers might be summarised as follows. Utterance comprehension
involves the formation and evaluation of hypotheses about the speaker's
intended interpretation, i.e. the intended combination of contextual
assumptions, propositions expressed and implied, and attitudinal or speech-
act information. Evidential utterances typically communicate attitudinal or
speech-act information - about degree of speaker commitment or source of
information - which may be either linguistically encoded or pragmatically
inferred. In chapter 4, I showed how inferences about degree of speaker
commitment were constrained by considerations of optimal relevance: the
first hypothesis which leads to an overall interpretation consistent with the
prindple of relevance is the one the hearer should choose. I have not yet
considered how relevance theory can account for the effect on pragmatic
interpretation of overt evidential expressions such as 'I think', or 'I know' - an
effect described in speech-act terms as that of weakened speaker
commitment. Such an account will be provided towards the end of this
chapter.
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As regards the interpretation of overt evidential expressions, we have seen
that they typically encode attitudinal or speech-act information, and as such
contribute to the expilcatures of an utterance rather than its implicatures.
Evidential adverbials do this by encoding conceptual rather than procedural
information. In a later section of this chapter, I will show briefly that
parenthetical expressions such as 'I think' and 'I know' also encode conceptual
rather than procedural information, and contribute to the explicit rather than
the implicit aspect of communication. This opens the way for a unified
treatment of evidential adverbials and parentheticals.
By the standard tests for truth-conditional status, evidential and hearsay
adverbials seem to contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances
on at least some occasions, whereas illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials
seem always to contribute to non-truth-conditional content. I have shown that
these facts can be described within the framework of relevance theory by
saying that evidentials and hearsay adverbials can contribute to the
proposition expressed, whereas illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials
invariably contribute to higher-level explicatures. I have as yet offered no
explanation for why this should be so. Such an explanation will be sketched in
a later section of this chapter.
In testing for truth-conditional status, I also caine across a variety of puzzling
scope facts that I felt would be illuminated by a study of parentheticals.
Parenthetical utterances have often been analysed as performing two
separate speech acts, one commenting on the other, and I suggested that this
might provide a key to explaining the differences in truth-conditional status
between evidential and hearsay adverbials, on the one hand, and
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, on the other. It is to the study of
parentheticals that I now turn.
6.2	 Speech-act accounts of parentheticals
The philosopher Urmson, in a famous paper (1963), treated rhinlç know,
believe, suppose, as parenthetical verbs. Such verbs can appear in main-
clause or syntactically parenthetical position, as illustrated in (1):
(1)	 a. I suppose that your house is very old.
b. Your house is, I suppose, very old.
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c. Your house is very old, I suppose.
(Urmson 1963: 221)
Regardless of their syntactic position, Urmson saw parenthetical verbs as
contributing not to the proposition expressed by the utterance but to
indicating the type of speech act performed - often indicating, in particular,
the speaker's degree of commitment to the proposition expressed. On this
account, (la-c) would be mere stylistic variants. Further examples are given
in (2):
(2)	 a. I believe that he is at home.
b. He is, Ihear, ill in bed.
c. He is, I fear, too old.
d. You intend to refuse, I gather.
e. Jones was the murderer, I conclude.
The parenthetical expressions in (la-c), (2a-e), are interesting because they
have been treated as providing evidence for a speech-act semantics and
against a truth-conditional account of at least some lexical items. In this
respect, they resemble a more famous class of lexical items, the so-called
performative verbs. In this section, I will compare and contrast the speech-act
approaches to these two dasses of items.
As we have seen, speech-act theorists attached particular importance to
linguistic devices which enable the speaker to make the illocutionary force of
her utterance explicit. Austin's theory of ifiocutionary acts relies heavily on
the idea that an illocutionary act can be performed only if there is a
conventional means of performing it - a 'formula' or 'indicator' whose only
function is to indicate the performance of the act. Performative verbs are the
illocutionary force markers par excellence simply because they explicitly
name the act to be performed (Austin 1962). However, 'parenthetical'
constructions, such as those in (1) and (2), have also been treated as
illocutionary force indicators even though, unlike performatives, they do not
name any speech act (Austin 1946, Urmson 1963, Strawson 1971a).
Speech-act theorists tend to treat all ifiocutionary force indicators as non-
truth-conditional, i.e. as not contributing to the proposition expressed by the
utterance in which they occur. Thus, according to traditional speech-act
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accounts (Austin 1946, Urmson 1963, Strawson 1971a) both performatives
and parentheticals lack any descriptive meaning and do not contribute to the
proposition expressed by the utterance. And there are further similarities in
the behaviour of these two classes, as illustrated by the parentheticals in (1)
above and the performatives in (3):
(3)	 a. Iwarn you that Jifi is there.
b. Jill, I am you, is there.
c. Jill is there, I vvarn yOU.
(Holdcroft 1978: 64)
In both cases, the claim of many speech-act theorists has been that the
examples in (a)-(c) are stylistic variants of each other, which reinforces my
point about the close connections between performative and parenthetical
verbs 1 . And a careful examination of the speech-act literature indicates that
these two classes have never really been treated independently of each other.
Speech-act theorists rarely miss the opportunity of drawing parallels between
them (see, for example, Austin 1946, 1962, Strawson 1971a, Urmson 1963,
1977).
Performative verbs are verbs that name illocutionary acts. Austin, in his
paper 'Other Minds' (1946: 103), discusses uses of expressions such as I
warn, I asic I define, other than the familiar performattve ones. When they
are used performatively, the speaker is not describing an action, but
performing it. In their non-performative uses, he thought, these expressions
functioned as signals or indicators of how the utterance is to be understood:
as a warning, a promise, an assertion, a guess. As he puts it, they function
like tone and expression, or like punctuation and mood, signalling the force of
the utterance. One question I want to consider in this chapter is whether it is
really right to classify parenthetical constructions along with mood, intonation
or punctuation: are they non-truth-conditional in the way mood, tone or
punctuation are?
Urmson, in his papers 'Parenthetical Verbs' (1963) and 'Performative
Utterances' (1977), developed Austin's observation concerning the non-
performative use of expressions such as 'I warn', 'I ask', 'I define', into a
1 Note that, as Blakemore points out (1990/1), Urmson, at least, does not treat (3a) as
synonymous with (3b) and (3c). The verb is a true performative only in (3a); in (3b)
and (3c) it is more like a parenthetical - i.e. a two-utterance construction.
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technical notion of parenthetical use. Like Austin, he considers parenthetical
verbs as non-descriptive and hence as non-truth-conditional. He too sees
them as functioning in a similar way to intonation, choice of words, maimer of
expression, etc.: they signal how the associated statements are to be taken;
they show, rather than state, the speaker's attitude to the proposition
expressed, the logical relevance and the reliability of the associated
statements.
According to Urmson, 'parenthetical' expressions can function as evidentials
indicating the type of evidence ('good', 'moderate', 'poor') the speaker has for
the assertion being made. On the standard speech-act account, the pragmatic
effect of employing an expression such as I think is to weaken the strength of
the assertion. When it is used:
'The claim to truth need not be very strong, ... the whole point of some parenthetical
verbs is to modify or to weaken the claim to truth which would be implied by a simple
assertion p.' (Urmson 1963: 224-225)
Thus, our assertions may come with varying degrees of strength, as illustrated
below:
(4)	 a. John is in Berlin. 	 stronger
b. I think John is in Berlin. 	 weaker
c. John is, I think, in Berlin.	 weaker
d. John is in Berlin, I think.	 weaker
In an earlier chapter, we have considered some Gricean accounts of how these
degrees of commitment are conveyed by the use of overt parenthetical
expressions. In a later section of this chapter, I will sketch a relevance-
theoretic account.
Regarding the relation between performative and parenthetical verbs,
Urmson claims that 'parenthetical and performatory verbs have much in
common as against ordinary descriptive verbs' (Urmson 1963: 233). As we
have seen, he also distinguishes between performative and parenthetical
verbs on the basis of their function, or force: 'doing' (e.g. I guarantee, I bet)
is one thing, and 'orientating the hearer' (e.g. He'll come to a bad end, I
guarantee! He'll forget to come, I bet) is another (Urmson 1963: 238, 1977:
263). Blakemore (1990/1) points out that
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'As Urmson has observed, it is possible to use many so-called performative verbs
parenthetically. Consider, for example, the utterances in (15) and (16):
(15) It is, I admit, difficult.
(16) He'll forget to come, I bet.
However, Urmson also points out that in these uses the performative verbs have a
rather different force:
"To ask for odds or cry "Taken" when someone says "He'll forget to come,
I bet", has, as Aristotle would say, the mark of an uneducated man (1966:
210).'" (Blakemore 1990/1: 202-203)
There is a further, more important, difference between performative and
parenthetical verbs that Urmson seems to be drawing. Parenthetical verbs are
seen as comments loosely attached to the sentences they accompany. They
give rise to complex speech acts, one part of which comments on the other
(Urmson 1963: 227, 233). As Urmson notes:
'They are not part of the statement made, nor additional statements, but function with
regard to a statement made rather as "READ WITH CARE" functions in relation to a
subjoined notice, ... They help the understanding and assessment of what is said rather
than being a part of what is said.' (Urmson 1963: 239-240)
With genuine performatives, by contrast, only a single speech act is
performed. For, Urmson, then, the two types of construction are parallel, but
distinct.
Strawson (1971a: 159-161) also linked performative verbs to expressions
attached to the utterance to make the 'character' or 'intention' of the latter
clear (ibid.: 160). Adopting the standard speech-act view, he treats the
explicit performative as the primary linguistic means for indicating the
illocutionary force of the utterance. Parenthetical comments are also a means
of signalling ifiocutionary force. Examples are phrases such as This is only a
suggestion, rm only making a suggestion, or That was a warning, I'm warning
you (ibid.). Strawson goes on to note that from such parenthetical comments
to the explicitly performative formula the step is only a short one. In other
words, the function of both parenthetical comment and explicit performative
formula is very much the same. Like Urmson, however, he draws a
fundamental distinction between the two types of construction in terms of a
two-utterance effect. For Strawson, the use of a performative verb 'subtracts'
the effect of having two utterances, one a comment on the other, which is
created by the use of parenthetical comments. Instead, we have a 'single
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utterance in which the first-person performative verb manifestly (ibid.)
indicates the ilocutionary force of the utterance. Thus, the speech-act
analysis of performatives is, or ought to be, quite different from the analysis
of parentheticals. In particular, if parenthetical constructions involve two
utterances, or a complex utterance, presumably each one, or part of one, could
have its own truth conditions. After all, a comment ought to have truth
conditions too. This is rather different from claiming that parentheticals are
devoid of any descriptive content (see also Blakemore 1990/1: 206-207).
There are a few points to be emphasized in these accounts. Firstly, the claim
that performative verbs are non-truth-conditional has been seriously
challenged (Lemmon 1962, Hedenius 1963, Lewis 1970, Warnock 1971,
Wiggins 1971, Bach 1975, Ginet 1979, Cresswell 1979, Bach and Harnish
1979, Récanati 1987). If this claim is false, might not the treatment of
parenthetical expressions as non-truth-conditional be invalid too? Secondly,
speech-act theorists do not generally distinguish between genuine (i.e.
syntactic) parentheticals, and their main-clause counterparts. Thirdly, they
do not operate with a distinction between conceptual and procedural
meaning. In a framework which makes use of such a distinction - the
framework of relevance theory, for example - it would be instructive to
consider on which side of this distinction genuine parentheticals fall. In the
next section, I will consider the truth-conditional question, arguing that there
are clear differences in the truth-conditional status of genuine parentheticals
and their main-clause counterparts.
6.3	 Testing for truth-conditionality
Before applying the standard test for truth-conditional status, I would like to
emphasize an important syntactic difference between main-clause
constructions like (la) and genuine parentheticals like (lb-c). This difference
is best brought out by looking not at dedaratives such as (la-c), but at non-
declaratives. On many speech-act accounts, (5a-c):
(5)	 a. I beg you to come with me to Pans.
b. Come with me, I beg you, to Paris.
c.Come with me to Paris, I beg you.
and (6a-c):
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(6)	 a. Iwonder whether he's coming.
b. Is he, I wonder, coming?
c. Is he coming, I wonder?
are stylistic variants. Yet in (5a) 'I beg you' is the main clause and 'come with
me' is a subordinate dause, whereas in (Sb) and (Sc), 'come with me' is not an
embedded clause at all.
This is shown in (5) by the fact that imperative morphology in English is
found only in main clauses. The infinitival 'come' in (5a) indicates the
presence of a subordinate clause, embedded under a main verb 'I be '.By
contrast, 'come with me' is a main clause in (Sb) and (5c). Similarly, English
yes-no interrogatives exhibit subject-aux inversion only in main clauses. The
non-inverted 'whether he's coming' in (6a) indicates a subordinate
interrogative clause embedded under a main verb 'I wonder', whereas 'is he
coming?' in (6b) and (6c) is a main clause.
In fact, there is a genuine parenthetical counterpart of (5b-c) and (6b-c) with
the parenthetical comment in fronted position, but it is not (S-6a) but (7a-b):
(7)	 a. I beg you, come with me.
b. I wonder, is he coming?
Thus, if we are looking for stylistic variants, we should really be considering
(8a-c) and (9a-c):
(8)	 a. I beg you, come with me to Paris.
b. Come with me, I beg you, to Paris.
c. Come with me to Paris, I beg you.
(9)	 a. I wonder, is he coming?
b. Is he, I wonder, coming?
c. Is he coming, I wonder?
These facts reinforce the claim sometimes made in the recent philosophical
literature that in a main-clause utterance like (5a) or (6a) it is the matrix,
speech-act clause that is the bearer of illocutionary force, whereas in genuine
(syntactic) parentheticals, the propositional-content clause has its own
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illocutionary force (see for example Hand 1993). I will return to this issue
later. Meanwhile, given these facts, the results of our tests for truth-
conditionality, which show a marked difference between genuine
parentheticals and their main-clause counterparts, should not be too
surprising.
As shown in chapter 5, the core mechanism of the test consists in embedding
into a conditional the sentence which includes the expression to be tested,
and seeing if this expression falls within the scope of the 'if. If it does, it is
truth-conditional; if it does not, it is non-truth-conditional. Let us examine
how the test applies to main-clause 'parentheticals' first:
(10) If I think that John is abroad, he will not come to the meeting.
The question is, under what circumstances is the speaker claiming that John
will not come to the meeting? If I think makes no contribution to truth
conditions, then (10) should be synonymous with (11):
(11) If John is abroad, he will not come to the meeting.
Clearly, the two utterances are not synonymous; I think does fall within the
scope of 'if in (10) and is therefore truth-conditional. The results generalize
quite straightforwardly to other main clause 'parenthetical' verbs, such as
'believe' and 'suppose'.
The results of applying the embedding test to genuine parentheticals are
quite different. These can indeed be embedded into a conditional:
(12) If John is, I thin!ç abroad he will not come to the meeting.
(13) If John is abroad, I think, he will not come to the meeting.
However, there is an important difference between (10), the embedded main-
clause construction, and (12) - (13), the embedded genuine parentheticals.
The preferred interpretations of (12) and (13) are not synonymous with (10).
Semantically, the embedded parentheticals in (12) and (13) take the whole
utterance in their scope. The preferred interpretations of these utterances
are thus equivalent to (14):
(14)	 I think that if John is abroad he will not come to the meeting.
164
The same point applies to disjunctions. Just as (12) is synonymous with (14),
so (15):
(15)	 Either John is, I think, abroad, or he will be there soon.
is normally synonymous with (16):
(16)	 I think that either John is abroad or he will be there soon.
This scope effect becomes even clearer if we substitute I think with a third
person parenthetical, as in (17):
(17)	 a. This is, the catalogue says, a Tintoretto.
b. If this is, the catalogue says, a Tintoretto, it is the most valuable
painting in the museum.
c. The catalogue says that if this is a Tintoretto, it is the most
valuable painting in the museum.
In other words, genuine parentheticals take wide scope even when embedded
into the antecedent of conditionals. Their main-clause counterparts do not.
These main-clause counterparts are clearly truth-conditional. In the case of
genuine parentheticals, the issue is not so clear-cut. One might argue that
(17c) correctly states the truth conditions of (17b), or one might agree with
the speech-act theorist that what is being asserted is merely the embedded
conditional, with 'the catalogue says' functioning merely as a comment on this
assertion. Things may become clearer if we consider some further examples.
'If ... then' and 'either ... or ...' are 'non-factive' connectives, which do not
commit the speaker to the truth of the propositions embedded under them.
With factive connectives such as because, since and although, which
automatically commit the speaker to the truth of the propositions embedded
under them, we have seen that the scope facts are quite different. Thus
consider (iSa) and (18b):
(18)	 a. John's here, although his train, I think, was late.
b. Susan's lucky, because she should, I think, have lost the election.
Here, the speaker is clearly committed to the following:
(19)	 a.Ithinkhistrainwaslate.
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b. I think she should have lost the election.
In other words, the parenthetical has a narrower scope than it did in (14) and
(15). The question is, though, whether the parenthetical expressions fall
within the scope of, and therefore interact with, 'because' and 'although', as
they would if they were genuinely truth-conditional. For (18a) and (18b) the
results are relatively clear: the parentheticals seem to remain outside the
scope of the connectives. The facts being contrasted in (18a) are (a) that John
is here and (b) that his train was late, rather than the fact that the speaker
thinks his train was late. What makes the speaker conclude that Susan is
lucky in (18b) is the fact that Susan ought to have lost the election, rather
than the fact that the speaker thinks she should have lost. Hence the
parenthetical I think seems to have non-truth-conditional status even when it
takes narrow scope.
Actually, the scope facts are even more complicated than these examples
suggest. From the discussion so far, we would expect a 'main-clause' 'I think'
to fall within the scope of connectives such as 'because' and 'although', as it
does when embedded under 'if. But consider the following examples:
(20)	 a. John's here, although I think his train was late.
b. Susan's lucky, because I think she should have lost the election.
Here, as we saw with evidential adverbials in chapter 5, there seem to be two
possibilities of interpretation, one in which 'I think' does contribute to truth
conditions by falling within the scope of the connectives, and one in which it
behaves like a parenthetical, and remains outside the scope of the
connectives. In other words, when embedded under factive connectives
(though not under 'if), it behaves pragmatically very much as it does in main
dauses: sometimes confirming the belief that it functions purely truth-
conditionally, and sometimes confirming the speech-act view that its
occurrence is not essential to the truth conditions of utterances in which it
occurs. This vacillation has yet to be explained. I will return to this point in a
later section.
In this section, I have tried to show that main-clause 'parentheticals', as in
(la), and genuine parentheticals, as in (lb-c), behave very differently from
each other, both syntactically and semantically: only the main-clause
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construction is truth-conditional, and moreover, under embedding, main-
clause constructions and genuine parentheticals exhibit important
differences in scope. At the same time, genuine parentheticals present a
variety of descriptive problems that are entirely unexpected on the standard
speech-act account. Hence, we need a new descriptive and explanatory
framework in which to analyse them. In the next section I shall start to
analyse them in the framework of relevance theory.
6.4	 Relevance theory and parentheticals: Possibilities for descriotion
As we have seen with sentence adverbials, relevance theory provides a rich
enough framework for describing the facts about parentheticals that have
been presented above. Here I will show very briefly that parentheticals
pattern like sentence adverbials in two important respects:
(1) Parenthetical constructions encode elements of conceptual
representations, which may be true or false in their own right,
even if they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterances in which they occur.
(2) Parenthetical constructions contribute to explicit, rather than
implicit, communication. To the extent that they are non-truth-
conditional, they contribute not to the proposition expressed, but
to higher-level explicatures. As we have seen, higher-level
explicatures do not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterances which communicate them, though they may be true or
false in their own right.
I shall argue, first, that genuine parentheticals encode concepts in just the
same way as their main-dause counterparts. If this is so, they are clearly
quite different from tone, expression and mood, which are all non-conceptual
in nature.
Notice first that main-dause 'parentheticals' should be treated as encoding
concepts because, as we have seen, they are truth-conditional. The
assumption is that most ordinary nouns, verbs, adverbs and adjectives which
contribute to truth conditions do so by encoding concepts (Wilson 1992). The
simplest semantics would then treat the genuine parentheticals as encoding
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exactly the same concepts, and there are several further arguments for this.
First, the speaker who uses such a parenthetical can lay herself open to
charges of untruthfulness in their use:
(21) Peter: John is waiting at the airport, I think.
Mary: That's not true; you don't think anything of the sort.
This can be explained on the assumption that parenthetical comments encode
conceptual representations, which, though not contributing to the truth
conditions of the utterance which incorporates them, can be true or false in
their own right.
Second, parenthetical constructions exhibit a high degree of compositionality
(Wilson 1992). Parentheticals often have a complex syntactic and semantic
structure. Consider (22) - (23):
(22) John is, Iincreasmgly tend to think, a fool.
(23) This is, I strongly suspect, despite all indications to the contrary, a
Tintoretto.
These complex parentheticals can be easily understood on the assumption
that they encode concepts, which are capable of undergoing the regular
compositional semantic rules. It is not dear how they could be analysed in
procedural terms.
Having shown that parentheticals, like adverbials, encode conceptual rather
than procedural information, I shall now show briefly that, like adverbials,
they contribute to the explicit rather than the implicit aspect of
communication.
Recall that, according to Sperber and Wilson 'an assumption communicated
by an utterance Uis explicit if and only if it is a development of a logical form
encoded by U' (1986 182), where 'development' is a process of enriching a
linguistically encoded logical form. As we have seen, the explicatures of an
utterance will typically indude:
(a) the proposition expressed by the utterance
(b) higher-level explicatures obtained by optionally embedding this
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proposition under a speech-act verb or a propositional-attitude
verb.
The truth conditions of the utterance depend only on the proposition
expressed, whereas the higher-level explicatures of an utterance make no
contribution to its truth conditions, though they may be true or false in their
own right. Thus, the explicatures of the utterance in (24) might include the
propositions in (25):
	
(24)	 Mary: John is at the airport.
	
(25)	 a. John is at the airport.
b. Mary is saying that John is at the airport.
c. Mary is asserting that John is at the airport.
d. Mary thinks that John is at the airport.
Mary's utterance in (24) is true if and only if John is at the airport, i.e. if and
only if the explicature in (25a) is true. The remaining explicatures (25b-d)
may be true or false in their own right but make no contribution to the truth
conditions of Mary's utterance.
Higher-level explicatures, like logical forms and fully propositional forms, are
conceptual representations recovered by a combination of decoding and
inference (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 11). To obtain (25a) the hearer must
not only decode the semantic representation of the utterance but make an
inference about the intended referent of 'I'; to obtain the higher-level
explicatures (25b-d) he must make additional inferences about Mary's
attitude to the proposition she is expressing, and the type of speech act she is
intending to perform. According to Sperber and Wilson, the greater the
degree of decoding involved, the more explicit the communication. Thus,
explicitness is a matter of degree. Within this framework both the fact that
genuine parentheticals encode concepts, and the fact that they are
nonetheless non-truth-conditional, can be described. Consider (26):
(26)	 John is, I think, at the airport.
If the parenthetical I think is genuinely non-truth-conditional, it can be
analysed as providing the hearer with explicit guidance as to the intended
higher-level explicature, namely (27):
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(27) Mary thinks John is at the airport.
This higher-level explicature is identical to the one in (25d) above: the
difference lies merely in the greater degree of decoding involved in obtaining
it from (26) as opposed to the less explicit (24).
Main-clause 'parentheticals', as we have seen, encode concepts too, and these
appear to conthbute to the truth conditions of utterances in the regular way.
Thus, consider (28a-b):
(28) a. I think that Bill has cheated in the exams.
b. I believe that Bill has cheated in the exams.
These would communicate the information in (29) and (30), respectively:
(29) Mary thinks that Bill has cheated in the exams.
(30) Mary believes that Bill has cheated in the exams.
In this case, though, the information in (29) and (30) would constitute the
proposition expressed by (28a) and (28b), thus accounting for their
contribution to truth conditions.
A description, of course, is not an explanation. Why is it that some genuine
parenthetical constructions appear not to contribute to the truth conditions of
utterances, whereas their main-clause counterparts do? Moreover, why do we
feel that the addition of a parenthetical verb, pre-fixed, inserted or
utterance-final, weakens (I think) or strengthens (Iknow) our assertions? It is
to these questions that I shall now turn.
6.5	 Relevance theory and parentheticals: Possibilities for exolanation
The questions that have been raised in this chapter are:
(a)	 are the utterances in (la-c) really stylistic variants of each other,
i.e. syntactically, semantically and pragmatically equivalent?
(b) are genuine parentheticals and their main-clause counterparts
really non-truth-conditional, as speech-act theorists claim?
(c) do these expressions encode conceptual or procedural
information?
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(d) do they contribute to the implidt or the explicit aspect of
communication?
(e) if parentheticals weaken the assodated assertions, why should this
be so?
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that utterances such as (la-c), (3a-c), (5a-c)
and (6a-c) are not stylistic variants of each other, as many speech-act
theorists have claimed. In the first place, in the main clause (a) versions, the
speech-act or propositional-attitude clause contributes to the truth conditions
of the utterance in the regular way, whereas in the genuine parenthetical (b)
and (c) versions, it does not. In the second place, if Urmson is right, explicit
performative uses can occur only in matrix position, as in (3a); the (b) and (c)
versions would have a double speech-act structure, with one speech act being
used to comment on another. This is an idea I would like to pursue.
6.5.1	 Parentheticals and the double-sr)eech-act analysis
Several recent syntactic/semantic analyses seem to confirm the double-
speech-act approach. Thus a variety of writers (Mittwoch 1977, 1979, 1985,
Fabb 1990, Haegeman 1984, 1991, Espinal 1991, Burton-Roberts
forthcoming) have argued that genuine parenthetical constructions are
phonologically, syntactically and semantically independent of their host
clauses. Here I shall take the work of Espinal (1991: 726-762) as illusiration.
Espinal analyses parentheticals as a type of Disjunct Constituent. Disjunct
constituents include:
(a) Sentences: Peter will get married next Sunday, I guess.
(b) Appositive relatives: John, who is living on a small income, is still a
bachelor.
(c) Adjectival phrases: The secretaxy, well mannered as anybody, will present
an apology.
(d) Adverbial dauses: I've just received the expected letter, if that makes you
feel any better.
(e) Adverbial phrases: Frankly, my dear, I don't know how to handle that.
(f)Noun phrases: Frankly, my dear, I don't know how to handle that.
(g) Prepositional phrases: Your brother, behaved, of course, like a gentleman.
Notice that genuine parentheticals and sentence adverbials both appear on
171
the list.
Espinal groups these disjunct constituents into three main categories:
(i) those that contain a pronominal expression linked to the main verb
(appositive relatives)
(ii)those that contain a syntactic gap filled conceptually by the main clause
(e.g. I think)
(ill) those that are syntactically self-contained (e.g. frankly, my dear)
According to Espinal, all these constituents are syntactically and semantically
independent of their host clauses. They thus escape a variety of otherwise
well established syntactic and semantic generalizations. For example, they can
be inserted into Wh-islands, which are immune to extraction:
(31)	 a. John buys books which deal with art.
b. *Wch topic does John buy books which deal with?
c. John buys books which, I think, deal with art.
In VP anaphora, where the antecedent VP contains a parenthetical, this does
not function as part of the antecedent for the empty VP:
(32)	 John came, I think, to the meeting, and Peter did too.
(= Peter came to the meeting too;
not = Peter came, I think, to the meeting too.)
Espinal also cites a variety of binding arguments which distinguish appositive
(parenthetical) relative clauses from restrictive (non-parenthetical) relative
clauses. If these arguments extended to the adverbial and parenthetical
constructions we are interested in, this would confirm their
syntactic/semantic independence.
Fabb (1990) also argues for the independence of non-restrictive relative
(parenthetical) clauses, but at discourse level. For example, if the wh-
antecedent of an NRR is moved, the NRR remains behind (Fabb 1990 70):
(33)	 a. We taught the boys, some of whom were deaf, French.
b. Who did we teach [e], some of whom were deaf, French?
c. *Who, some of whom were deaf, did teach [e] French?
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NRR (parenthetical) clauses cannot have null operators, i.e. non-overt
antecedents, whereas restrictive (non-parenthetical) clauses can (ibid.: 72).
(34) a.	 I saw standing in the corner, is likely to leave early.
b. The woman I saw standing in the corner is likely to leave early.
Haegeman (1991) puts forward similar arguments. For example, true
parentheticals cannot contain parasitic gaps, i.e. non-overt elements, - e.g.
ei, which depend on the presence of another null element, - e.g. e2:
(35) a. *This is a subject which John studied el in Cambridge while his
son will be studying e2 in Oxford.
b. This is the document which John managed to memorize el while
he was copying e2.
In fact, the various analyses of parenthetical constructions differ as to the
level of linguistic representation at which they should be dealt with.
Parenthetical discontinuity is treated as an S-Structure phenomenon (Emonds
1979, McCawley 1982), an LF phenomenon (Safir 1986), a discourse
phenomenon (Fabb 1990), a PP phenomenon (Haegeman 1991), and a D-
structure phenomenon (Espinal 1991). Among these proposals, a distinction
can be drawn between those that place parentheticals within the syntactic
representation of the sentences with which they coappear (Emonds 1979,
McCawley 1982), and those that treat parentheticals as syntactically
unattached to the host dause (Fabb 1990, Haegeman 1991, Espinal 1991). In
the latter cases, integration occurs at the level of utterance interpretation.
Safir's (1986) proposal can be seen as an intermediate case. He, too, thinks
that parentheticals are best treated as falling outside the syntactic
representation which they modify. Nonetheless, he daiins that they need to
be attached to some level of structure in accordance with Chomsky's (1986)
principle of Full Interpretation 2. This happens at LF , a syntactic level of
representation later than LF, where 'extra' constituents are attached to
independently grammatical sentences (Safir 1986: 672).
Espinal's conclusion is that parenthetical adverbials, which are syntactically
2 The principle of Full Interpretation is a syntactic principle which requires that
sentences are fully interpreted, i.e. all syntactic constituents of a sentence must receive
some interpretation, for example, arguments must have theta-roles.
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self contained, are not syntactically linked to the host clause in any way; the
only syntactic property shared by the two constructions is a surface linear
order. By contrast, parenthetical constructions like I think, I know, are
syntactically incomplete: they have an empty category in verb complement
position. According to Espinal, although the host clause and the parenthetical
are still syntactically independent, it follows that there must be some level
where the semantic argument corresponding to the complement position of
the verb is filled by a conceptual entity. She regards this as a postsyntactic
process, i.e. one that takes place at the level of utterance interpretation. To
illustrate, for (36):
(36)	 The manager has gone, I think, to another company
the conceptual entity which fills the semantic argument of think is that
corresponding to The manager has gone to another company. As Espinal
claims:
'The linguistic meaning of the host ... is projected into the empty argument position of
the verb of the parenthetical - following lexical specifications - in the final process of
utterance interpretation. It is also in this process that the referential expression that will
point out an event accessible from the most immediate context - the propositional
content corresponding to the host clause.' (Espinal 1991: 748)
Thus, for Espinal, a set of syntactic conditions allow the insertion of disjuncts
in certain positions only (ibid.: 751-754), and a set of conceptual conditions
control the mapping of syntactic constituents onto conceptual constituents
(ibid.: 754 - 757). Finally, pragmatic principles enable conceptual structures
to be fully interpreted by enabling the hearer to infer the conceptual entities
for empty argument positions on the basis of the most accessible information
(ibid.: 756).
As for the truth-conditional status of parentheticals, Espinal makes the
following suggestion:
'...disjuncts are fully conceptualized if and only if they contribute to some sort of
inferential effect, for example if they contribute somehow to the proposition
expressed' (Espinal 1991: 748)
This last remark might be taken to suggest that disjuncts are 'somehow' truth-
conditional. In fact, what Espinal seems to mean is a pragmatic, inferential
type of contribution to the proposition expressed, whereby parentheticals
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point to, or indicate, the conceptual entity that fills the argument position of
the verb, or the direction where any other relevant information is to be
sought. As she claims:
'...pragmatically, disjunct constituents may connect with the speaker or the addressee
they may provide information about the attitude attributed to the communicator of
the actual or a future speech act ..., they may introduce an additional assumption of the
speaker into the discourse ..., and they may also provide information about the context
of interpretation ... Disjuncts are units of information linguistically dissociated from the
proposition with which they have to be interpreted at the moment of utterance
processing, yet they contribute to the final interpretation of the whole utterance.'
(Espinal 1991: 735)
She must, then, be treating disjuncts as non-truth-conditional. As she points
out later on:
the disjunct ... is saturated at a conceptual level of representation .... as a comment
on some other conceptual entity which is not linguistically encoded ... ' (ibid.: 756)
and we have seen that, in the speech-act literature at least, 'comments' are
standardly treated as non-truth-conditional indicators, giving rise to a
double-utterance effect. In conclusion, Espinal notes that fon
complex syntactic structures containing disjunct constituents ... a set of association
principles and conditions ... will select the sort of metalinguistic COMMENT licensed by
particular kinds of disjuncts.' (Espinal 1991: 760)
A double speech-act analysis of parentheticals has also been adopted by
Mittwoch (1977, 1979, 1985) and Haegeman (1991). Mittwoch views
parentheticals as giving rise to two separate sentences, and two separate
speech acts. The speech act performed by the parenthetical somehow
'corrects', or 'reinforces', or 'modifies' the speech act performed by the main
dause (1979: 405-409). As regards their syntactic status, Mittwoch claims:
'...an example with a parenthetical, like John is coming, I think, is not a syntactic unit,
as in Emonds' analysis, but a sequence of two sentences fused into one discourse unit,
such that the proposition expressed by its first sentence is interpreted as the object of
the second.' (Mittwoch 1985: 138, Footnote 2)
As to their truth-conditional status, in analysing sentence adverbials such as
'frankly', 'frankly speaking', 'in all frankness', she claims that they
'...modify not the propositional content of the sentence to which they are attached
but what I shall provisionally call the pragmatics of the speech situation;' (Mittwoch
1977: 177)
and that
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'...this relationship is not one of super-ordination versus subordination, with the rest
of the sentence embedded under the performative clause, but one of juxtaposition or
parenthesis.' (ibid.: 180)
Mittwoch cites parentheticals such as 'I think', 'he claims', as 'the most
obvious analogue' to parenthetical adverbials. Her examples are in (20):
i think )
'(20)	 Kangaroos are	
'the claims	 herbivorous.' (ibid.: 181)
Thus, for her, both types of parenthetical clause appear to be non-truth-
conditional.
Haegeman's (1991) views on the double-speech-act analysis of parentheticals
are as follows:
'In (17b) [He is a real bully, if you don't mind the expression] too, the if-clause if you
don't mind the expression does not modify the propositional content of the adjacent
clause (i.e. "he's a bully"). Rather the sentence is a "metalinguistic" condition on the act
of saying "he's a bully". The speaker qualifies the speech act.
The hearer of(17b) will integrate the conditional in the following schema:
(20) The hearer doesn't mind the expression
-> The speaker says 17b.' (Haegeman 1991)
The parenthetical is seen in terms of a speech act which qualifies, or
comments upon, the speech act of saying.
Let us then accept the view that genuine parenthetical utterances perform two
separate speech acts, one commenting on the other. On this account, (37)
would make two assertions, given in (38a) and (38b), and (39) would make
two assertions, given in (40a) and (40b):
(37) That painting is, I think, the best in the museum.
(38) a. That painting is the best in the museum.
b. The speaker thinks that painting is the best in the museum.
(39) That is John's book, I think.
(40) a. l'hat is John's book.
b. The speaker thinks that is John's book.
Each assertion communicates a separate explicature; each explicature makes
manifest a range of higher-level explicatures. As noticed by Blakemore
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(1990/1), building on the speech-act approach, the function of the assertions
in (38b) and (40b) is precisely to guide the interpretation of the assertions in
(38a) and (40a) by encoding information about the intended higher-level
explicatures of these 'ground floor' assertions. As Hand (1993) puts it, the
parenthetical comment has a 'fine-tuning' function, narrowing down the
interpretation of the speech act to which it is appended.
Similar remarks apply to the analysis of ilocutionary and attitudinal
adverbials. Thus, (41) makes two assertions, given in (42a) and (42b), and
(43) makes two assertions, given in (44a) and (44b):
(41) Frankly, I'm not happy in London.
(42) a. The speaker is not happy in London.
b. The speaker is saying frankly that she's not happy in London.
(43) Unfortunately, the party is over.
(44) a. The party's over.
b. It is unfortunate that the party's over.
Each assertion communicates a separate explicature, the one in (b) 'fme
tuning' the interpretation of (a) by encoding information about its intended
higher-level explicature. Without the parenthetical comment, the content of
this higher-level explicature would have had to be pragmatically inferred.
6.5.2 Scope possibilities3
In the last section, I accepted a double-speech-act analysis of parenthetical
utterances, on which a parenthetical comment attached to a main clause
assertion 'fine-tunes' the higher-level explicature of the assertion to which it
is attached. However, the positioning of the parenthetical comment in the
utterance may vary: it may, for example, occur within an embedded dause,
or, in complex utterances, between the two conjuncts, or at the end of either.
Its scope possibilities may vary accordingly. In this section, I intend to
investigate the scope possibifities for parentheticals, and how these scope
possibifities determine the speech act whose higher-level explicatures are
'fine-tuned'.
3 Being a non-native speaker, I have relied quite heavily on Deirdre Wilson's intuitions
on the scope possibilities for parenthetical comments.
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As regards the scope facts, I shall not attempt a full analysis, but merely
suggest the lines on which I think such an analysis might be found. Before
doing so, however, it is important to distinguish two quite different scope
questions which I have raised in discussing adverbials and parentheticals.
The first is to be dealt with in this section: what is the scope of the
parenthetical comment - i.e. what is the phrase or clause whose
interpretation it modifies? The second will be dealt with in the next section:
can the parenthetical comment itself fall within the scope of truth-conditional
connectives, and thus contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance as a
whole?
As we have seen in the last section, parenthetical comments are sometimes
attached to embedded clauses, and when they are, they sometimes take only
the embedded clauses in their scope. Thus, consider (45a-d):
(45)	 a. John wrote a book which was published, I think, by Faber.
b. John wrote a book which has not, frankly, sold very well.
c. John wrote a book which was published, unfortunately, in
January.
d. John wrote a book which has not, allegedly, sold very well.
Here, the parenthetical comment occurs within a relative clause, and in each
case it is most naturally interpreted as modifying this relative clause, rather
than the utterance as a whole. Thus, the preferred interpretation is as in
(46), rather than (47):
(46)	 a. I think the book was published by Faber.
b. Frankly, the book has not sold very well.
c. Unfortunately, the book was published in January.
d. Allegedly, the book has not sold very well.
(47)	 a. I think John wrote a book which was
b. Frankly, John wrote a book which was
c. Unfortunately, John wrote a book which was
d. Allegedly, John wrote a book which was
Notice here that when I daim that a parenthetical comment takes an
embedded clause in its scope, I am not making any commitment as to the
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truth-conditional status of the resulting interpretation. Indeed, on the
double-speech-act account outlined in the last section, the parenthetical
comment is seen as constituting a separate speech act, with its own truth-
conditional content. The truth-conditional status of adverbials and
parentheticals will be taken up in the next section.
Regarding the scope of parenthetical comments in complex utterances,
differences in syntactic position do affect interpretation in a way that speech-
act theorists did not foresee. For example, when a parenthetical comment
appears at the end of a conjoined utterance such as (48a-c), it can take either
the whole utterance, or only the second conjunct, in its scope:
(48)	 a. John left, but not with Susan, I think.
b. John failed, and so did Bifi, I fear.
c. Susan is happy, though Mary is not, I suspect.
That is, (48a) can be interpreted as meaning either '[John left, but not with
Susan], I think', or 'John left, but [not with Susan], I think'. Similarly, when
the parenthetical appears at the end of the first conjunct, it can take either
the whole utterance, or only the first conjunct, in its scope:
(49)	 a. John left, I think, but not with Susan.
b. John failed, I fear, and so did Bill.
c. Susan is happy, I suspect, though Mary is not.
In (49a-c), the preferred scope is probably the narrower one, i.e. '[John left],
I think', but in certain circumstances the broader scope '[John left but not
with Susan], I think' might be possible too.
By contrast, when the parenthetical is inside one or other of the conjuncts,
narrow scope is strongly preferred:
(50)	 a. John left, but not, I think, with Susan.
b. John, I fear, failed, and so did Bill.
c. Susan is happy, though Mary, I suspect, is not.
If such intuitions are right, then we have an argument against the speech-act
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view that true parentheticals are mere stylistic variants of each other.
Differences in syntactic position lead to different possibilities of
interpretation. These can presumably be explained by an interaction
between a 'least effort' parsing principle and the criterion of consistency with
the principle of relevance. For example, the parsing principles might, in
certain circumstances, allow for the narrow-scope interpretation. As long as
the resulting interpretation is consistent with the principle of relevance, all
other interpretations would be disallowed. In other circumstances, the broad
and narrow scope interpretations might be roughly equally accessible. In this
case, an interpretation would be selected on semantic and pragmatic
grounds.
Conjoined utterances have co-ordinate structure, and co-ordinating
conjunctions are, of course, factive. Thus, conjoined utterances can be seen as
performing two speech-acts of roughly equal status, to either of which a
parenthetical comment can be attached. Turning now to subordinating
conjunctions, let us consider the factive subordinating conjuction 'because'.
Two possibilities have to be examined here. In the first, the 'because' clause
is separated off by comma intonation; in the second it is not. These
differences in intonation affect the scope of a main-clause negation, as shown
in (51a-b):
(51) a. John didn't fail because he worked too hard.
b. John didn't fail, because he worked too hard.
in (Sla), the scope of the negation includes the 'because' clause; in (Sib) it
does not. Their interpretation will be, then, as in (52a-b):
(52) a. It is not the case that [John failed because he worked too hard].
b. [John didn't fail], and the reason is that he worked too hard.
Bearing these scope possibilities in mind, let us now examine the
interpretation of parentheticals in various positions in 'because' clauses.
First, the parenthetical may appear at the end of the whole utterance, as in
(53):
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(53)	 a. John will fail because he won't work hard enough, I fear.
b. John will fail, because he won't work hard enough, I fear.
The parenthetical in (53a) is most naturally interpreted as taking the whole
utterance in its scope, whereas in (53b) it can be interpreted as having either
wide or narrow scope. In (54), where the parenthetical occurs at the end of
the main clause, it can take either the main clause 'John will fail' (without the
adverbial clause), or the whole utterance in its scope.
(54) John will fail, I fear, because he won't work hard enough.
Consider now (55a-b), where the parenthetical is inside the main clause.
Here, the presence or absence of comma intonation again affects the scope
possibilities.
(55) a. John will, I fear, fail because he won't work hard enough.
b. John will, I fear, fail, because he won't work hard enough.
(55a), without comma intonation, is interpreted as making a single (complex)
assertion, with the parenthetical comment taking the whole assertion in its
scope. (55b), with comma intonation, is interpreted as making two distinct
assertions, only the first being modified by the parenthetical comment.
Finally, where the parenthetical comment is inside the embedded clause, as
in (56), it seems to be interpretable only as having narrow scope, regardless
of whether there is comma intonation or not
(56) a. John will fail because he won't, I fear, work hard enough.
b. John will fail, because he won't, I fear, work hard enough.
Thus, for a full analysis of the scope of parentheticals one must consider not
only syntactic facts, including the position of the parenthetical and the
difference between main clause and subordinate dause, but also intonational
facts. It appears that, generally, factivity favours narrow scope.
Finally, let us turn to 'non-factive' connectives such as 'or' and 'if ... then'. 'Or'
is a co-ordinating conjunction, which should yield results similar to 'and'; 'if
then' is a subordinating conjunction, which should yield results similar to
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'because'. Any differences in patterning between 'and' and 'or', or between
'if and 'because' are presumably due to the presence or absence of factivity.
As we have already seen, factivity does seem to affect the scope possibilities
of parentheticals such as 'I think' or 'Bill says'. Consider (57) and (58):
(57) a. If the book is good, I think, I'll give it to Susan for Christmas.
b. If the book is good, I'll give it to Susan for Christmas, I think.
(58) a. If I go to the cinema, Bill says, I won't get my homework done.
b. If I go to the cinema, I won't get my homework done, Bill says.
In (57a), where the parenthetical appears at the end of the 'if dause, the
wide-scope interpretation is clearly the preferred one, with 'I think'
modifying the interpretation of the utterance as a whole. In (57b), it has been
argued that the wide scope interpretation is the only possible one (see
Sperber, forthcoming, who argues that so-called 'conditional assertions'
should be reanalysed as assertions of conditionals). This is certainly true for
'Bill says' in the same position in (58b).
With disjunctions, there is always the possibility of a wide-scope
interpretation. However, depending on the syntactic position, the semantic
content of the parenthetical comment and the clause to which it is attached, a
narrow-scope interpretation is possible too. Thus, compare (59) and (60):
(59) a. Either you didn't work hard enough, I think, or you need some
extra tuition.
b. Either you didn't, I think, work hard enough, or you need some
extra tuition.
(60) a. Either you didn't work hard enough, Bill says, or you need some
extra tuition.
b. Either you didn't, Bill says, work hard enough, or you need some
extra tuition.
All four utterances have the wide-scope interpretations in (61):
(61) a. I think that [either you didn't work hard enough or you need
some extra tuition].
b. Bill says that [either you didn't work hard enough or you need
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some extra tuition].
The question is whether they can also have the narrow-scope interpretations
in (62):
(62) a. Either [you didn't work hard enough, I think], or you need some
extra tuition.
b. Either [you didn't work hard enough, Bifi says], or you need
some extra tuition.
Here, the intuitions are that, while this is possible for (5 ), it is quite
impossible for (GO ). As will be shown below, the behaviour of sentence
adverbials in 'if' clauses reinforces this intuition: depending on the content
and position of the adverbial and the host clause, narrow-scope
interpretations are sometimes possible and sometimes ruled out. If this is so,
we should allow both wide and narrow-scope interpretations to be constructed
in all cases, and then ifiter out the unwanted ones on semantic and pragmatic
gmunds.
Let us turn, then, to the scope possibilities for the four types of sentence
adverbials discussed in chapter 5. In the case of co-ordinating conjunctions,
all these adverbials show exactly the same scope possibilities, which are just
the same as those outlined above for parentheticals.To ifiustrate, consider the
fflocutionary adverbial 'franldy':
(63) a. It's been a dull day, and, franidy, I'm bored.
b. hf s been a dull day, frankly, and I'm bored.
c. It's been a dull day and rm bored, frankly.
d. It has, frankly, been a dull day, and I'm bored.
e. It's been a dull day and I am, frankly, bored.
f. Franidy, it's been a dull day, and rm bored.
The possibilities of interpretation are as follows. In (63a), with 'frankly'
positioned before the second conjunct, it can take only this second conjunct in
its scope. In (63b), with 'frankly' positioned at the end of the first conjunct, it
can take either this conjuct or the whole utterance in its scope. In (63c), with
'frankly' positioned at the end of the second conjunct, it can take either this
conjunct or the whole utterance in its scope. In (63d), where 'frankly' is
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positioned within the first conjunct, it can take only this conjunct in its scope.
In (63e), where 'frankly' is positioned within the second conjunct, it can take
only this conjunct in its scope. Finally, in (631), with 'frankly' in utterance-
initial position, it can take either the whole utterance or the first conjunct in
its scope.
In 'because' clauses, all four types of adverbials exhibit identical behaviour,
with just the possibilities of interpretation we would predict from our
analysis of parentheticals above. I will therefore examine the behaviour of
adverbials in 'or' and 'if' clauses next. As we have seen, these adverbials
appear to behave very differently from each other when it comes to tests of
truth-conditional status. However, I will argue that the scope possibilities for
adverbials in 'or' and 'if dauses again run parallel to the scope possibilities
for parentheticals, opening the way for a unified analysis.
In 'or' clauses, it seems that any sentence adverbial, regardless of its syntactic
position, can take the whole utterance in its scope. This is, in fact, the only
possibility when it appears in utterance-initial position before the 'either'.
Consider (64):
(64)	 a. Franidy, either this is a bad book, or I didn't read it carefully
enough.
b. Evidently, either this is a bad book, or I didn't read it carefully
enough.
c. Allegedly, either this is a bad book, or
d. Unfortunately, either this is
When it appears in other positions, wide-scope interpretations are always
possible, and often preferred. Nevertheless, given suitable semantic content,
narrow-scope interpretations may be possible too. To illustrate, consider
(65):
(65)	 a. Either you didn't work hard enough, frankly/unfortunately, or
you need some extra tuition.
b. Either you didn't, frankly/unfortunately, work hard enough, or
you need some extra tuition.
c. Either you need some extra tuition or you didn't,
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franldy/unfortunately, work hard enough.
in (65a), for example, the adverbial can take either the whole utterance or
only the first disjunct in its scope. As we have seen, the same example with
parenthetical 'I think' yields exactly the same possibilities of interpretation;
with 'Bill says', however, only the wide-scope interpretation is possible. This
confirms my earlier suggestion that, for both adverbials and parentheticals
occurring in disjunctions, both wide and narrow scope interpretations should
be allowed, and then filtered out on semantic and pragmatic grounds.
Finally, let us examine 'if clauses, which are central to the standard tests for
truth-conditional status. As before, an adverbial in utterance-initial position
before the 'if can take only the whole utterance in its scope. This is shown in
(66):
(66)	 a. Franidy, if the Prime Minister has resigned, we must call an
election.
b. Evidently, if the Prime Minister has resigned, we must call an
election.
c. Unfortunately, if the Prime Minister has resigned, we must call
an election.
d. Allegedly, if the Prime Minister has resigned, we must call an
election.
As noted earlier, if Sperber's arguments are right, an adverbial in utterance-
final position, or within the main clause, must obligatorily take wide scope.
This is illustrated in (67):
(67)	 a. If you haven't worked hard enough, you will fail,
frankly/evidently/unfortunately/allegedly.
b. If you haven't worked hard enough, you will,
frankly/evidently/unfortunately/allegedly, fail.
A wide-scope interpretation is also possible when the adverbial appears
within the 'if clause. Consider (68):
(68)	 a. If you haven't, frankly, worked hard enough, you can't expect to
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pass.
b. If you haven't, unfortunately, worked hard enough, you can't
expect to pass.
c. If you haven't, obviously, worked hard enough, you can't expect
to pass.
d. If you haven't, admittedly, worked hard enough, you can't
expect to pass.
In all these cases, the parenthetical comment can be interpreted as modifying
the utterance as a whole. However, a narrow-scope interpretation, where the
parenthetical modifies the 'if' clause alone, seems to be possible too. Thus,
the narrow-scope interpretation of (68b) would be as in (69):
(69)	 If you haven't worked hard enough - and it is unfortunate that you
have not - you can't expect to pass.
Notice that a narrow-scope interpretation of a parenthetical does not
necessarily affect its truth-conditional status. In (69), it functions as a
separate assertion, rather than contributing to the truth conditions of the
utterance as a whole. Similar possibilities of interpretation appear to be
available for all four adverbs illustrated in (68).
In this section, I have investigated the various scope possibilities for
parentheticals and adverbials, and reached the following condusions. First,
adverbials and parentheticals seem to behave in identical ways, as would be
expected if adverbials are a sub-type of parentheticals. Second, the syntactic
position of the adverbial or parenthetical affects its possibilities of
interpretation. In some cases, only wide-scope interpretation is possible; in
other cases, both wide-scope and narrow-scope interpretations are possible.
Third, there is often a preferred interpretation, which is affected by at least
the following factors: syntactic structure (main-clause vs subordinate dause),
semantic structure (factive vs non-factive) and semantic content (of the
parenthetical comment and the clause to which it is attached). Fourth, factive
and non-factive structures affect the behaviour of parentheticals and
adverbials: when they appear inside factive clauses, narrow-scope
interpretation is either preferred or mandatory; when they appear inside
non-factive clauses, narrow-scope interpretation becomes much harder. Fifth,
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I have suggested that the preferred interpretation of factive clauses results
from an interaction between 'least effort' parsing principles and the criterion
of consistency with the principle of relevance. By contrast, the crucial factor
in the interpretation of non-factive clauses seems to be the semantic content
of the parenthetical and the clause to which it is attached. Finally, I have
suggested that even a narrow-scope interpretation is not necessarily truth-
conditional, i.e. it need not fall within the scope of truth-conditional
connectives to yield a unitary set of truth conditions for the utterance as a
whole.
Having shown the essential similarity between adverbials and parentheticals,
I shall turn in the next section to their differences in truth-conditional status,
and examine how these might be explained.
6.5.3	 Parentheticals and truth-conditions
In the last section, I proposed a unified analysis of parentheticals and
adverbials, where both wide and narrow-scope interpretations were freely
generated, but often filtered out by semantic and pragmatic means. On a
'wide-scope interpretation', the parenthetical fine-tunes the interpretation of
the utterance as a whole; on a 'narrow-scope-interpretation', the parenthetical
comment fme-tunes the interpretation of some embedded clause. Precisely
because of its unified nature, this analysis as yet sheds no light on the
differences in truth-conditional status which the various types of sentence
adverbial and parenthetical construction seem to exhibit. Why is it that some
narrow-scope interpretations seem to fall within the scope of logical
connectives and thus contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance as a
whole, while others do not? In this section, I shall attempt an explanation of
this fact.
The facts about truth-conditional status to be discussed in this section are the
following:
1. Evidential and hearsay adverbials (e.g. clearly, obviously, evidently,
apparently, allegedly, admittedly) seem to be truth-conditional. In particular,
they seem to fall within the scope of both factive and non-factive connectives.
2. ifiocutionary and attitudinal adverbials (e.g. frankly, confidentially,
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seriously, unfortunately, regrettably, happily) seem to be non-truth-
conditional. In particular, they seem to remain outside the scope of both
factive and non-factive connectives.
3. Parentheticals (e.g. I think, Bill says, We all agree) are hard to test for
truth-conditional status, since, although they can take narrow scope in factive
environments, in the non-factive environments where I have conducted my
tests, they find it difficult or impossible to take narrow scope.
On the double-speech-act analysis, the assumption is that an utterance
containing any of these constructions performs two speech acts, one
commenting on the other. Thus, the utterances in (70) would make the
assertions in (71a-d), with the second of the two speech acts fine-tuning the
interpretation of the first:
(70)	 a. John left, clearly.
b. He's a fool, frankly.
c. He's going to win, I think.
d. He's going to win, Bill says.
(71)	 a. John left. ills is clear.
b. He's a fool. I tell you this franidy.
c. He's going to win. I think this.
d. He's going to win. Bill says this.
In speech-act terms, the question is why, for evidential and hearsay
adverbials, both speech acts seem to fall within the scope of embedding
connectives, and why, with illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, only the
ground-floor speech act seems to fall Within the scope of embedding
connectives. For parentheticals such as 'I think', 'Bill says', we still need to
establish what their truth-conditional status is.
My main claim is going to be as follows. Sometimes, a parenthetical comment
alters the iruth-conditional status of the ground-floor assertion to which it is
attached. It can do this in either of iwo ways: first, by marking the ground-
floor assertion as a case of interpretive rather than descriptive use; and
second, by affecting the strength of the assumption communicated (and
hence the recommended degree of commitment to the proposition it
expresses). A parenthetical comment which functions in either of these two
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ways will be perceived as making an essential contribution to truth
conditions, and, hence, as falling within the scope of embedding connectives.
A parenthetical comment which functions in neither of these ways - that is,
which does not affect the truth-conditional status of the ground-floor
proposition but merely expresses the speaker's attitude to the fact that it is
true - will be perceived as non-truth-conditional, and as faffing outside the
scope of embedding connectives.
The hearsay adverbials allegedly, reportedly, admittedly, etc. will be
considered first. In relevance-theoretic terms, the key to their behaviour is
that they alter the truth-conditional status of the ground-floor proposition by
marking it as interpretively rather than descriptively used. As shown in
chapter 4, an utterance or clause is descriptively used when the thought it
interprets is one of the speaker's own; it is interpretively used when the
thought it interprets is attributed to someone other than the speaker (or the
speaker herself at another time). Descriptive use implies speaker-
cominitment interpretive use does not. Clearly, the function of a hearsay
adverbial is to mark the ground-floor assertion as communicating the views of
someone other than the speaker. It is, in other words, a marker of interpetive
rather than descriptive use. This, however, alters the truth-conditional status
of the ground-floor proposition by removing the speaker's commitment to its
truth. To illustrate, consider (72):
(72) John is, allegedly, a spy.
The question is whether the speaker of (72) is committed to the truth of both
the ground-floor proposition in (73a) and the parenthetical comment in
(73 b):
(73) a. John isaspy.
b. Someone alleges this.
Clearly, the speaker is not necessarily committed to the truth of (73a): this is
interpretively, not descriptively, used, to reflect views attributed to someone
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else4.
Thus, we would expect that when (72) is embedded into either factive or non-
factive structures, it wifi be perceived as making an essential contribution to
truth conditions: it marks the ground-floor proposition as interpretively
rather than descriptively used. And this is, indeed, what we find. Consider
(74a) and (74b):
(74)	 a. Although John is, allegedly, a spy, he is a very charming man.
b. Because John is, allegedly, a spy, we must be careful what we say
to him.
The speaker of (74) is comrrntted to the truth of (75) and (76):
(75) It is alleged that John is a spy.
(76) a. Although it is alleged that John is a spy, he is a very charming
man.
b. Because it is alleged that John is a spy, we must be careful what
we say to him.
But she is not committed to the truth of either (77) or (78):
(77) John isaspy.
(78) a. Although John is a spy, he is a very charming man.
b. Because John is a spy, we should be careful what we say to him.
The reason for this is that hearsay adverbials 'fine tune' the interpretation of
the proposition that falls within their scope by marking it as interpretively
rather than descriptively used. Taking into consideration the semantics of
'allegedly', we can conclude that the speaker is not necessarily committed to
the truth of this proposition.
Notice, moreover, that the parentheticals we have been considering above,
e.g. 'I think', 'We all agree', 'Bill says', have the same function as hearsay
' Such a commitment may be indirectly conveyed: for example, if it is assumed that
the speaker of (72) uld not report an allegation unless she thought there were some
truth in it. In this case, (72) wuld be equivalent to a desci-iptive use. The issue will be
discussed further below in connection with the parenthetical 'I think'.
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adverbials: they mark the proposition that falls within their scope as being
interpretively rather than descriptively used. In particular, parentheticals
such as 'Bill says', 'The newspaper reported yesterday', which we might call
'hearsay parentheticals', are exactly like hearsay adverbials in that they
specifically indicate that the views being interpreted are not the speaker's
own. Thus, (79) runs parallel to (72) above:
(79) John is, you say, a spy.
Here, the speaker is not conunitted to the truth of the ground-floor
proposition in (80a), as she would be if the parenthetical comment were
missing:
(80) a. John is a spy.
b. You say this.
Similarly, the speaker of (81) is committed to the truth of (82) and (83):
(81) a. Although John is, you say, a spy, he's a very charming one.
b. Because John is, Bill says, a spy, we should be careful what we
say to him.
(82) You say that John is a spy.
(83) a. Although you say that John is a spy, he's a very charming one.
b. Because Bill says that John is a spy, we should be careful what
we say to him.
However, she is not committed to the truth of either (84) or (85):
(84) John is a spy.
(85) a. Although John is a spy, he's a very charming man.
b. Because John is a spy, we should be careful what we say to him.
Because hearsay parentheticals, like hearsay adverbials, are markers of
interpretive use, they are perceived as making an essential contribution to
truth conditions.
By contrast, parentheticals such as 'I think', 'I fear', indicate that the views
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being interpreted are in fact the speaker's own. In certain cases, e.g. 'I think',
the resulting interpretation may be roughly equivalent to a straightforward
descriptive use. Consider (86):
(86) a. John is, I think, a spy.
b. John is a spy.
Notice that the presence of the parenthetical comment here is not essential.
The speaker of (86a), like the speaker of (86b), commits herself to the truth of
both the ground-floor proposition in (87a) and the parenthetical comment in
(87b):
(87) a. John is a spy.
b. I think this.
And the speaker of (88) is committed to the truth not only of (89) and (90),
but of (91) and (92) too:
(88) a. Although John is, I think, a spy, he is a very charming one.
b. Because John is, I think, a spy, we should be careful what we say
to him.
(89) I think that John is a spy.
(90) a. Although I think that John is a spy, he is a very charming one.
b. Because I think that John is a spy, we should be careful what we
say to him.
(91) John is a spy.
(92) a. Although John is a spy, he is a very charming one.
b. Because John is a spy, we should be careful what we say to him.
In this respect, the truth-conditional status of parenthetical comments will be
clearer for some parentheticals than others. When the views being
interpreted are not the speaker's own, as in (79), the parenthetical phrase
will be perceived as making an essential contribution to truth conditions.
When the views being interpreted are the speaker's own, as in (86), the
parenthetical phrase may be perceived as inessential: the speaker will
remain committed to the truth of the proposition that falls within its scope,
and a non-truth-conditional reading may be the preferred one. As shown
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earlier, tests for truth-conditional status are difficult with parentheticals,
since they rarely take narrow scope in non-factive environments. Despite the
difficulty of conducting tests, the above discussion should shed some light on
their behaviour. The case of parentheticals lIke 'I hope', 'I fear' will be
discussed in a later section.
Let us turn next to illocutionary adverbials such as 'franidy', 'seriously',
'confidentially'. These too seem not to affect the truth-conditional status of
the propositions that fall within their scope. Consider (93):
(93)	 a. Frankly, I'm bored.
b. Seriously, I don't like him.
c. Confidentially, I intend to resign.
As we have seen, these utterances communicate the information in (94):
(94)	 a. I'm bored. I tell you this frankly.
b. I don't like him. I tell you this seriously.
c. I intend to resign. I tell you this confidentially.
Notice, however, that the same information can be communicated by uttering
(95) with the appropriate tone of voice or facial expression:
(95)	 a. I'm bored.
b. I don't like him.
c. I intend to resign.
The ifiocutionary adverbial may give information about the manner in which
the speaker intends to make her assertion, but it does not alter the truth-
conditional status of the assertion itself, either by marking it as a case of
interpretive use, or by altering the strength with which it is put forward. The
presence of the adverbial phrase is inessenhial to the truth conditions of the
proposition that falls within its scope. This is, indeed, confirmed by our tests.
In particular, an illocutionary adverbial such as 'frankly' appears to be non-
truth-conditional even when it takes narrow scope. Consider (96):
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(96) a. I realize that the play is good, although, frankly, Fm bored.
b. I'm going out this evening, because, franldy, I'm bored.
The speaker of (96) is committed to the truth of both (97) and (98):
(97) a. I'm bored.
b. I'm telling you this frankly.
(98) a. I realize that the play is good, although I'm bored.
b. I'm going out this evening, because I'm bored.
(98) suggests that the presence of 'frankly' is inessential to the truth
conditions of the utterance in which it occurs. The same holds for non-factive
environments in which 'frankly' takes narrow scope. This is so because
'frankly' and other illocutionary adverbials do not alter the truth conditions of
the assertion that falls within their scope, but merely indicate the manner in
which this assertion is being made.
Consider now the evidential adverbials 'apparently' and 'seemingly'. Recall
that, on conducting the tests, these were classed as truth-conditional.
Although I have not investigated whether they mark interpretive or
descriptive use, they clearly suspend the speaker's commitment to the
proposition that falls within their scope. Consider (99):
(99) a. John is, apparently, a spy.
b. John is, seemingly, a spy.
In this case, the occurrence of the adverbial does make a difference to the
truth-conditional status of the ground-floor proposition: the speaker of (99 a)
and (99b) is not committed to the truth of (100), but she is certainly
committed to the truth of (101):
(100) John is a spy.
(101) It seems/appears that John is a spy.
This should mean that these adverbials are truth-conditional, and that they
are able to fall within the scope of both factive and non-factive connectives.
And this is what we find, indeed. The speaker of (102) is committed to the
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truth of (103) but not to the truth of (104):
(102) a. Although John is, apparently, a spy, he is very charming.
b. Because John is, seemingly, a spy, we should avoid him.
(103) a. Although it appears that John is a spy, he is very charming.
b. Because it seems that John is a spy, we should avoid him.
(104) a. Although John is a spy, he is very charming.
b. Because John is a spy, we should avoid him.
As our tests have shown, similar results are obtained when these adverbials
appear in non-factive environments.
One way of analysing the situation is as follows. The evidential adverbial
makes clear that the speaker is putting forward the proposition that John is a
spy with a very reduced degree of strength - a degree determined by the
semantic content of the adverbial. As a result, evidence that would have
falsified a stronger assertion no longer counts as falsifying evidence. Hence,
the truth-conditional status of the utterance is altered, and the speaker's
degree of commitment to the proposition expressed - as well as the degree of
commitment recommended to the hearer - is affected too. In this way, speech-
act accounts of weakened degree of speaker commitment can be reconciled
with the fact that the truth conditions of the proposition embedded under the
adverbials appear to be altered too.
The evidential adverbials 'obviously' and 'clearly' alter the truth-conditional
status of the ground-floor proposition in a rather different way. In the case of
'Apparently P', the speaker's commitment to P is suspended, but an
indication is given that there is some evidence for P. We might call the
commitment-suspending evidentials 'weak evidentials'. By contrast, in the
case of 'Obviously P', or 'Clearly P', the speaker's commitment to P is
strengthened, and it is indicated that there is dear evidence for P. We might
call the commitment-strengthening evidentials 'strong evidentials'. The
truth-conditional status of the utterance is altered because the range of
falsifying evidence is altered. Notice the parallel with non-evidential
adverbials such as 'necessarily', 'possibly', 'probably and so on, which are
invariably perceived as contributing to truth conditions. Just as not every
true proposition is necessarily true so not every true proposition is obviously
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true. In both cases, some modification of the truth-conditional status of the
ground floor proposition is achieved. Thus, strong evidentials, like weak
evidentials, will be perceived as making an essential contribution to truth
conditions, and are expected to fall within the scope of factive and non-factive
connectives. As we have seen, they do.
Finally, let us examine how attitudinal adverbials, such as 'surprisingly',
'sadly', 'unfortunately' etc., are interpreted. Recall that, according to our tests,
these are clearly non-truth-conditional. This is so because they indicate the
speaker's attitude to the proposition that falls within their scope; they do not
alter the truth-conditional status of this proposition in any way.. Consider
(105):
(105) a. John is a spy.
b. John is, unfortunately, a spy.
Regardless of the presence of the adverbial, the speaker is committed to the
truth of (106):
(106) John is a spy.
Also, the fact that the speaker regards it as unfortunate that John is a spy
might well be indicated by tone of voice or facial expression, i.e. by non-
linguistic means. The adverbial is inessential both to the truth-conditional
status of the ground-floor proposition, and of the higher-level explicature in
(107):
(107) The speaker regards it as unfortunate that John is a spy.
We would thus expect attitudinal adverbials to be non-truth-conditional when
embedded in factive and non-factive environments. This is, indeed, what we
find. Consider (108):
(108) a. Although, unfortunately, John isspy, he is very charming.
b. Because John is, unfortunately, a spy, we should avoid him.
The speaker of (108) is committed to the truth of both (109) and (110):
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a(109) a. John is1spy.
b. This is unfortunate.
(110) a. Although John isspy, he is very charming.
b. Because John is a spy, we should avoid him.
As (110) shows, the occurrence of 'unfortunately' is perceived as inessential
to the truth conditions of the utterance, even when it takes narrow scope.
In this section, I have tried to explain the truth-conditional status of
parenthetical comments, including sentence adverbials. The argument
developed as follows. A parenthetical comment is truth-conditional when and
only when it alters the truth-conditional status of the proposition it modifies,
i.e. when it makes an essential contribution to the truth conditions of the
utterance in which it occurs. It may do this in one of two ways: first, by
functioning as a marker of interpretive rather than descriptive use. Such
markers necessarily affect the truth-conditional status of propositions that fall
within their scope. This is the reason why hearsay adverbials and hearsay
parentheticals make an essential contribution to truth conditions. Moreover, I
showed why a parenthetical such as 'I think', which indicates that the views
being interpreted are the speaker's own, in fact commits her to the truth of
the proposition that falls within its scope, and may thus be perceived as
roughly equivalent to descriptive use.
fflocutionary adverbials such as 'frankly', 'seriously' do not affect the truth-
conditional status of the proposition that falls within their scope, and hence
are inessential to truth conditions. Their function is to indicate the manner
in which some speech-act is being performed, without altering the truth-
conditional status of this speech act in any way.
Parenthetical comments, and sentence adverbials, may be truth-conditional
in a second way: by altering the speaker's degree of commitment to the
proposition that falls within their scope, and the range of evidence which
would count as falsifying evidence. Thus, evidential adverbials such as
'obviously', 'apparently', do affect the truth-conditional status of the
proposition that falls within their scope. In particular, I distinguished
between weak evidentials, e.g. 'apparently', 'seemingly', which reduce the
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range of falsifying evidence, and strong evidentials, e.g. 'obviously', 'clearly',
which increase the range of falsifying evidence. I drew a parallel with non-
evidential items such as the weak 'possably', 'probably', versus the strong
'necessarily', 'certainly', all of which are clearly truth-conditional. The
relevance-theoretic notion of strength of assumptions played a crucial role in
my account.
Finally, for attitudinal adverbials such as 'unfortunately' and 'sadly', I argued
that they are non-truth-conditional since they are not interpretive-use
markers, and do not affect the speaker's degree of commitment to the
proposition that falls within their scope.
Having sketched the way in which the truth-conditional status of
parenthetical comments is linked to their semantic content, in the next
section, I will return to the pragmatics of parentheticals, and consider their
effect on utterance interpretation.
6.5.4	 Pragmatic interoretafion of genuine parentheticals
In the last section, I suggested that there is a semantic difference between two
classes of parentheticals: 'Bill says', 'The newspaper reported yesterday', on
the one hand, and 'I think', 'I fear', on the other. Parentheticals in the first
group specifically indicate that the views being interpreted are not the
speaker's own. They therefore make an essential contribution to truth
conditions. By contrast, parentheticals in the second group indicate that the
views being interpreted are the speaker's own. For this reason, their presence
may be perceived as inessential to truth conditions.
In this section, 1 intend to investigate how the presence and position in the
sentence of parentheticals affects pragmatic interpretation. I shall continue
my argument that these parentheticals do not always weaken the speaker's
commitment to the proposition that falls within their scope, as speech-act
theorists have claimed. Some of them do generally weaken the speaker's
commitment (e.g. 'I guess'), some others, on the contrary, can strengthen the
speaker's commitment (e.g. 'Chomsky says'), whereas a few may, depending
on the context, have either function (e.g. 'I think'). I shall also look at a range
of attitudinal parentheticals (e.g. 'I hope', 'I fear') which seem to fall midway
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between evidential parentheticals ('I think', 'I know') and attitudinal
adverbials ('sadly', 'unfortunately'), and consider their effects on
interpretation. Finally, I shall continue my argument that where
parentheticals do express an altered strength of, or degree of comniitment to,
the proposition that falls within their scope, this follows from the semantics of
the constructions in question together with considerations of optimal
relevance.
Consider, first, an important difference between the examples in (4) above,
repeated here as (lii):
(ill)	 a. John is in Berlin.	 stronger
b. I think John is in Berlin.	 weaker
c. John is, I think, in Berlin.	 weaker
d. John is in Berlin, I think.	 weaker
There is an obvious difference in the strength of assertions (or speaker
commitment) associated with the presence, absence and syntactic position of
expressions such as 'I think'. Recall that many speech-act theorists regard
(11 lb-d) as equivalent in strength, and weaker than the plain assertion in
(lila). In an earlier section, I have pointed out how variations in syntactic
position of the parenthetical may affect which proposition it takes within its
scope. I have also pointed out a further difference: namely, that the main-
clause construction in (ilib) involves a single speech act, whereas its
genuine parenthetical counterparts in (ii lc) and (ii ld) involve a double
speech-act structure. I would now like to consider briefly how these various
differences in syntactic position and speech-act structure affect the strength
of the resulting assertions.
Consider first the differences between (lila), on the one hand, and (lilb-
d), on the other. (lila) is linguistically the least complex, but contains no
indication as to the intended higher-level explicatures or the degree of
strength with which the speaker is putting forward the proposition
expressed. It follows from relevance theory that the speaker should choose
this utterance as long as she can trust the hearer to recover the intended
higher-level explicature, and the intended degree of strength, with less effort
than would be needed to process an explicit prompt. She would choose one of
the other utterances instead if she feels that without explicit guidance the
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hearer might recover the wrong higher-level explicature, or the wrong degree
of strength, or might be in doubt as to which higher-level explicature, and
which degree of strength, was intended. If we assume that in normal
circumstances the most accessible higher-level explicatures will be drawn
from the set 'she thinks', 'she is fairly certain', 'she is certain' and 'she
knows', it will follow that (11 lb-d) all have a weakening effect.
In fact, as suggested above, it is not always true that parentheticals have a
weakening effect. This is indeed the main function of parentheticals such as
'I think', 'I guess', 'I suppose', as illustrated in (112a-c):
(112)	 a. John is in Berlin, I think.
b. John is in Berlin, I guess.
c. John is in Berlin, I suppose.
However, parentheticals such as 'I know', 'I insist', and often those such as
'Bill thinks', 'Chomsky says', can have a strengthening function. Compare
(113a) and (113b):
(113)	 a. UG provides a fixed system of principles and a finite set of
parameters, each language setting the values for these
parameters.
b. UG provides a fixed system of principles and a finite set of
parameters, each language setting the values for these
parameters, Chomsky says.
Clearly, given an appropriate speaker and hearer, the parenthetical in (113b)
would have a strengthening effect. The fact that Chomsky says something
provides strong evidence for its truth. The use of such commitment-
strengthening parentheticaLs is particularly common in academic speech, as
in all cases where the speaker refers to some authority in order to endorse
her own views. As we have seen, parentheticals of this type are always
perceived as truth-conditionaL
Parentheticals such as 'I know', 'I insist', can also strengthen the speaker's
degree of commitment, as in (114a-c):
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(114)	 a. Susan will win the elections.
b. Susan will win the elections, I know.
c. Susan will win the elections, I insist.
As shown above, according to relevance theory, the speaker should add such
indications only if the hearer cannot be trusted to supply them for himself
without explicit guidance. For example, the speaker should add 'I know' to
(114) only if she thinks that without such guidance some weaker higher-level
explicature (e.g. 'I think') might be supplied. Parentheticals, then, can
encourage the hearer to move away from a default interpretation that would
otherwise be constructed. As (112) and (114) show, movement may be either
towards a weaker or towards a stronger degree of commitment.
Let us consider now the differences in pragmatic interpretation of (11 lb-d)
that result from differences in syntactic position of the parenthetical 'I think'.
Intuitively, the earlier the parenthetical occurs in the utterance, the greater
the effect on interpretation. Thus, where 'I think' has a weakening effect, this
will be greater in (ilib) than (ilic), and in (ilic) than in (hid). How can
these facts be explained?
One point to notice is that genuine parentheticals, as in (ilic) and (hid)
have a characteristic, low-key intonation. While 'I think' in (11 lb) can carry
main stress, and thus constitute the main point of the utterance, 'I think' in
(11 lc-d) are invariably backgrounded. A second point to notice is that the
later the position of the parenthetical expression, the more likely it is to have
a 'repair', or 'afterthought', interpretation. So, for example, as utterance
(hid) proceeds, it may occur to the speaker that the hearer might
misinterpret or be in doubt about how to interpret the intended degree of
strength, and add a parenthetical to clarify her intentions. By contrast, in
planning (11 ib) the speaker must already have foreseen these possibilities of
misinterpretation and have taken steps to eliminate them. Typically, then,
the parenthetical in (ilib) should make a substantial and integrated
contribution to overall relevance, whereas (11 ic-d) will be perceived as
merely 'fine-tuning' an already accessible interpretation.
So far, I have considered evidential parentheticals such as 'I think', 'I know', 'I
guess', whose primary function is to determine the strength of the
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assumptions which fall within their scope. I would now like to look at a further
range of parentheticals, such as £1 hope', 'I fear', which seem to perform two
simultaneous functions: on the one hand they tend to weaken the strength of
assumptions that fall within their scope, and on the other hand, they
determine the speaker's emotional attitude to these assumptions. Thus, they
appear to fall midway between weakening parentheticals such as 'I think' and
attitudinal adverbials such as 'unfortunately', 'sadly'. Consider (liSa-c):
(115)	 a. Susan will win the elections.
b. Susan will win the elections, I hope.
c. Susan will win the elections, I fear.
By adding 'I hope', and 'I fear', the speaker of (115) reduces her commitment
to the truth of the proposition that Susan will win the elections, while
simultaneously expressing her emotional attitude towards the state of affairs
described: positive in (115b) and negative in (115c). As we have seen,
attitudinal adverbials are perceived as truth-conditionally irrelevant, and
evidential adverbials such as 'I think' are also typically perceived as
inessential to truth conditions. We should therefore expect attitudinal
parentheticals such as 'I fear', 'I hope' to be irrelevant to truth conditions too,
and I will argue that this is the case.
Consider (116):
(116)	 I'm afraid that it will rain tomorrow.
This utterance has two possible interpretations: on one interpretation, the
speaker is simply expressing a fear that it will rain, and makes no
commitment to the claim that it will actually rain. On the other interpretation,
the speaker is asserting that it will rain, and simultaneously expressing her
emotional attitude to this fact. The interesting point about the parentheticals
in (llSb) and (uSc) is that they only have this latter interpretation: that is,
in both cases the speaker is putting forward the proposition that it will rain,
with some degree of strength, and simultaneously expressing her emotional
attitude. This supports my claim, made earlier, about the difference between
utterance-initial and utterance-final parentheticals: that an utterance-initial
parenthetical can have a much greater weakening effect than one that occurs
202
utterance-finally. These examples seem to show that, whereas an utterance-
initial parenthetical can suspend the speaker's commitment entirely, its
utterance-final counterpart can not.
It also sheds light on a curious fact about the behaviour of illocutionary
adverbials such as 'frankly', 'confidentially' in the antecedents of
conditionals. Consider (117):
(117) a. If your book has frankly sold very little, you should blame
yourself.
b. If your book has, confidentiafly, sold very little, I don't think you
should blame me.
It has often been noticed that many conditionals have two possible readings:
a 'standard' reading, on which the speaker is not committed to the truth of
the antecedent, and a 'concessive' reading, where the speaker is committed to
the truth of the antecedent. The addition of parentheticals such as 'frankly'
and 'confidentially' forces a concessive reading. Thus, the speaker of (117a-b)
is conceding that the book has indeed sold very little, whereas in the non-
parenthetical counterparts in (11 8a) and (11 8b), no such commitment need
be made:
(118) a. If your book has sold very little, you should blame yourself.
b. If I tell you frankly that your book has sold very little, you should
blame yourself.
Clearly, much more needs to be said about these examples, but they seem to
fit the general pattern noted above.
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CHAPTER 7
EVIDENTIAL PARTICLES
7.1	 Introduction
In the first chapter of this thesis, I argued that the notion olf an evidential
could be more or less narrowly defmed. In its broadest sense, an utterance
has an evidential function if and only if it overtly communicates evidential
information, whether this information is linguistically encoded or
pragmatically inferred. More narrowly, we can regard a linguistic
construction as being evidential if and only if this information is not only
communicated but encoded. More narrowly still, we can regard a construction
as being evidential if and only if it plays a highly restricted syntactic role -
e.g. as a ditic, a particle, 'discourse marker', a bound morpheme or some
other minor syntactic category.
In chapter 4, I discussed the role of pragmatic inference in the
communication of evidential information. In chapters 5 and 6, I have looked
at the evidential role of two types of major syntactic construction: sentence
adverbials and parenthetical clauses. I would now like to turn to evidentials
in the narrowest sense, and examine various particles and 'discourse
markers' with an evidential function. The constructions I have chosen to look
at are those generally seen as performing a 'hearsay' function, indicating that
the information being offered was obtained from someone else..
Preliminary analyses of hearsay particles were offered within the framework
of relevance theory by Blass (1989, 1990). This important work established
many points that will be summarized and adopted here. However, Blass's
work was completed at a time when the conceptuallprocedural distinction,
and its interaction with the explicit/implicit and truth-canditionallnon-
truth-conditional distinctions, was only beginning to be explored. I am
interested in showing how the 'hearsay' partides fit into the more fully
developed framework outhned in this thesis. I will also look briefly at the
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'hearsay' function performed by inflectional morphology, and at the use of
quotation marks in written language, as still further types of 'hearsay' device.
7.2	 'Hearsay' markers as markers of interDretive use
Palmer (1986) treats hearsay markers as a type of 'evidential' (1986: 51, 71)
which indicate reported speech, and hence information for which the speaker
has less evidence than if it was experienced first-hand. In fact, it is not always
clear whether Palmer considers 'hearsay' markers as weakly committing the
speaker to the proposition expressed or not committing the speaker to the
proposition expressed at all. He treats 'hearsay' markers as 'evidential' or
'modal', i.e. as degree-of-commitment indicators (p. 51, 53-54), but
sometimes hints that they actually suspend commitment (p. 7, 51, 53). He
expresses these views as follows:
'...many languages grammaticalize "report" or "hearsay" to indicate that what is said
has been told to the speaker (who is therefore, not committed to its truth). This can be
handled in terms of the modal feature Quotative, ... '(Palmer 1986: 7)
and:
'The Quotative, ... looks prima facie to be wholly objective, indicating not what the
speaker believes, but what has been said by others. But if this is taken together with
other evidentials, e.g. those that indicate the kind of observation (e.g. visual versus
non-visual) on which the statement is based, it becomes clear that their whole purpose
is to provide an indication of the degree of commitment of the speakec he offers a
piece of information, but qualifies its validity for him in terms of the type of evidence
he has. In this sense evidentials are not indications of some objective modality, but are
subjective in that they indicate the status of the proposition in terms of the speaker's
commitment to it.' (ibid. 53-54)
These remarks connect up with the discussion on parentheticals in the
previous chapter, where I argued that genuine parenthetical use of 'I fear', 'I
hope', etc. favours the stronger of two interpretations available for non-
parenthetical uses. Palmer seems to be suggesting that even a hearsay
parenthetical such as 'Bill says' leaves the speaker to some extent committed
to the truth of the host clause: it is put forward on the responsibility of the
speaker, on the basis of a hearsay report. Palmer comments:
'There are at least four ways in which a speaker may indicate that he is not presenting
what he is saying as a fact but rathec
(i) that he is speculating
(ii) that he is presenting it as a deduction
(iii) that he has been told about it
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(iv)	 that it is a matter only of appearance, based on the evidence of (possibly
fallible) senses.
All four types are concerned with the indication by the speaker of his (lack) of
commitment to the truth of the proposition being expressed.' (Palmer 1986: 51)
Blass (1989, 1990) argued against this analysis on several grounds. She
points that conveying the speaker's attitude to reported speech is not the only
function hearsay markers perform. They might indicate attitudes other than
diminished comniltrnent; they might indicate attitudes not to what was said,
but to what was thought, or to the implicatures of an utterance rather than
the proposition directly expressed (Blass 1990: 94). With reference to
Sissala, a Niger-Congo language, and its potential hearsay marker r Blass
showed that ré also occurs in irony and interrogatives. She argued that it
was best analysed not as a hearsay marker but as a marker of interpretive
use. The distinction between descriptive and interpretive use of language
and thought was introduced in chapter 4, section 5. I will use it in examining
Blass's arguments against Palmer's claim.
7.2.1	 Rand interoretive use
Blass (1989, 1990) drew two main conclusions from her analysis of 'hearsay'
markers:
first, that 'hearsay' constructions are best analysed, not as a type of modal or
evidential, weakening the speaker's commnent to the truth of the proposition
expressed, but as a variety of interpretive-use marker, with all the functions attributed
to interpretive use by Sperber and Wilson; second, that other so-called "hearsay"
particles might be usefully re-examined to see whether they, like r. occur in other
than true "hearsay" constructions, and should thus be reanalysed as markers of
interpretive use.' (Blass 1990: 95)
Blass based her claims on r a particle from Sissala, which has, among
others, a 'hearsay' function (Blass 1989: 304-306, 1990: 97-99), i.e. it is a
marker of direct and indirect speech. Re can occur either as a
complementizer (COMP), or a 'hearsay' partide which occurs at the end of the
quoted dause, and which Blass calls an 'interpretive-use marker' (IM). This
use is ifiustrated in (1):
(1)	 Na)a suse. Ba	 kaa	 konni	 yo	 ta
some died they	 took	 cut	 throw leave
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ré
IM
'Some died and were untied and left there RE' (It is said)
However, ré occurs in other, non-hearsay types of constructions too. For
example, in (2) and (3) it co-occurs with verbs of propositional attitude, such
as 'think' and 'know':
(2)	 U	 pio	 bi. mc	 u	 w(	 gbee
he	 took	 thought he	 N83	 play
ri .
IM
'He gathered that he (Kofi) was not joking RE.'
(3) zij	 r(-(	 ká	 ánáwa	 r
you	 know	 COMP-you are	 parents IM
'You know that you are parents RE.'
As Blass observes (1989: 306, 1990: 100), the fact that r occurs with
'think' and 'know' suggests that 'hearsay' markers are not only used for
reporting speech. The fact that it co-occurs with 'I know' suggests that it is not
always used to indicate diminished speaker commitment.
Moreover, r occurs in questions, and their answers. This is also difficult to
reconcile with the view that it is a 'hearsay' marker; or with Palmer's claim
that it weakens the speaker's commitment to the proposition expressed (Blass
1989: 307, 1990: 100). Consider (4) and (5):
(4) J:	 use	 nain(C	 nâ.	 re-C?
you	 taken-out meat	 DEE	 IM-Q
'Have you taken out the meat RE?'
C:	 OO,	 1(s5	 rC hä	 ká
yes	 we	 taken-out IM All and
tá
left
'Yes have taken out (some) RE and left (some).'
(5) S:	 'Ba	 fa-á	 pe	 crC	 rC?
1 The phonological form of the hearsay marker rt (or a') varies depending on both its
syntactic and phonological environment. Thus, it is sometimes realized as rf (i9 (see
Blass 1990: 96-97).
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they	 PAST-IPF sleep	 how	 IM
'How did they sleep RE?'
A:	 'Ba	 fa-á	 pé	 dáhá	 ré
they	 PAST-IPF slept	 standing IM
'They used to sleep standing RE.'
Blass observes that
'The occurrence of	 in questions is unexpected on Palmer's evidential account. In
asking a question, the speaker does not commit himself to the truth of the proposition
expressed, so how could the addition of
	 weaken the speaker's commitment?' (Blass
1990: 100)
Blass claims that ré is more adequately accounted for as an echoic
interpretive use marker (IM), because in this way, its different uses can be
explained. For example, it might be used in an utterance which expresses an
attitude towards an opinion echoed (Blass 1989: 312, 1990: 104-5), as in (6)
and (7):
(6) M:	 'Ba	 dula	 a	 wér(.
they	 this-year done	 well
'They have done well this year.'
A:	 'Ba	 ha	 keU
	
séminré ná
they	 who	 took	 seminar DEF
mu Buro.
go Boura
'They, who conducted the seminar at Boura..'
N:	 'Ba	 fiièná	 a	 wed	 ér(.
they	 really	 done	 well	 F IM
'They have really done well RE.'
(7) D:	 I.	 b(n5	 ná	 ste kerj susifC.
your	 thing	 DFF	 so catch pity much
'Your thing (taperecorder) arouses pity.'
N:	 Susir(.	 U	 ma	 nttsDns.
pity IM its	 also	 make SDM
'Pity RE. It is just its make.' (Things of that make are
always smalL)
Blass points out that N's utterances in (6) and (7) do not report speech, but
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'indicate the speaker's attitude to what has just been said' (Blass 1989: 313,
1990: 105). In (6) N repeats the preceding utterance in order to endorse it,
whereas in (7) N repeats the preceding utterance in order to dissociate
himself from it. These are, clearly, not cases of the speaker's weakened
commitment to the proposition expressed.
Another use of the hearsay marker r' is in echoing an implicature of a
preceding utterance, rather than a proposition explicitly expressed.
Implicatures can be echoed with various attitudes too (Blass 1989: 315,
1990: 107), as in (8):
(8)	 D:	 'Ba	 n	 pôwó	 n.
they	 SDM	 gather-them	 there
kaa Ic	 ba-a	 kaa	 11	 tâ
take leave they-IPF take	 leave	 leave
ká	 baa	 zci	 ja	 btfelc
and	 again	 enter	 house	 new
a	 baa	 ccsc,	 ccsc	 a
and	 again	 break break and
baa	 c( Inc	 le.
again	 carry	 leave
'They (ants) gather them (grains) and take them out and
leave them there. They enter the house again, break
(grains) again and take them out.'
A:	 H	 cuijcumO tuij	 r!
Eh!	 ants	 work	 IM!
'Eli! Ants work RE!.'
Here, A echoes not an utterance, a proposition explicitly expressed by D, but
a contextual implication of D's utterance. This contextual implication is
derived from the following contextual assumption:
(8')	 lfantsbreakgrainsandcarrythemoutofthehouseallthetiine
then they work hard.
A further contextual implication intended by D is that ants are very effective
in destroying his grain. A's utterance conveys this implication too and thus
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reinforces the implicature conveyed by D. Such cases, Blass claims, cannot be
explained by Palmer's evidential account of hearsay markers (Blass 1989:
315, 1990: 107).
Similarly, the interpretive marker ré is used to echo thoughts and beliefs of
people in general, as, for example, in proverbs or wise sayings. Thus,
consider (9):
(9)	 t-t	
"'-u	 w(wie,	 WLL	 WUU
If-you	 learn	 thing-small,	 matter every
PC -	 Ut,	 cie	 é	 di
give-you self
	 tomorrow you	 F	 eat
U	 yuorc	 rc.
your	 fruit	 IM
'Whatever small thing you learn, tomorrow you will eat its fruit RE.'
(You will gain from it.)
Here, the interpretive use marker r' occurs in an utterance that echoes
traditional wisdom, i.e. a thought which is not attributed to anyone in
particular. This case too does not easily fit into an evidential account of
hearsay particles: we often invoke thoughts or beliefs held by people in
general, or an authority, to strengthen our commitment to the proposition
expressed, rather than weaken it (Blass 1989: 314, 1990: 106).
If r is, indeed, an interpretive use marker, it is not surprising that it marks
ironical utterances in Sissala (Blass 1990: 109). Recall that irony is analysed
in the framework of relevance theory as a type of interpretive echoic use (see
chapter 4, section 4.5.2). Consider (10):
(10)	 a.(	 zaa	 iso	 kA
you	 today	 get-up	 and
du)o r(	 ya-a?
alone IM
	 or-Qj
'Are you leaving me alone today?'
b. Anc Luc
	 ha	 s
as	 Luc	 said
d(	 kLlJkaTj
tá	 U
leave	 me
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eat	 a-lot
c.0	 keT)	 taT)a	 ré
he	 has	 wisdom IM
'As Luc said, I eat a lot. He is right RE.'
In (lOc) the speaker did not, in fact, intend to communicate that she eats a
lot. In echoing Luc's comment about her, she is being ironical, i.e. she is
dissociating herself from the proposition expressed and expects her audience
to do the same on the basis of certain assumptions, e. that she was the one
to prepare the meal, started eating later than the others, and thus did not
have as much time as the others had (Blass 1990: 87-88, see also 1989: 109-
110).
The occurrence of r in propositional-attitude constructions, as illustrated in
examples (2)-(3), is also explained naturally on the interpretive-use
hypothesis. As Blass points out:
'For Sperber and Wilson, these (propositional-attitude constructions] are typical cases
of interpretive use: the proposition embedded in such constructions is entertained not
as a description of a state of affairs but as an interpretive representation of an
attributed belief or desire.' (Blass 1989: 3 15-316)
Moreover, the use of r in questions and answers, as illustrated in examples
(4)-(5), fits naturally with the assumption that it is a marker of interpretive
use. Sperber and Wilson analyse interrogative utterances as varieties of
interpretive use, where the thought being represented is a desirable rather
than attributed thought:
'...[we] analyse asking Wh-P, where Wh-P is a Wh-question and P is the less-than-
propositional logical form of the utterance, as communicating that there is some
completion of the thought interpreted by P into a fully propositional form which
would be relevant if true. In other words, interrogative utterances are interpretations of
answers that the speaker would regard as relevant if true.' (Sperber and Wilson 1986:
252)
Note, finlIy, that 'hearsay' partides used in irony, or in other non-evidential
functions, have been reported in other languages too. This seems to be the
case with -mis in Turkish, which is used to convey not only hearsay, but irony,
sarcasm, surprise or compliments (Slobin and Aksu 1982), and with kono,
found in a number of Philippine languages which is used in Bible translation
to convey sarcasm and irony (Ballard 1974). According to Blass, all these uses
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are explained on the assumption that the markers in question are markers of
interpretive use, rather than being 'hearsay' in the strictest sense (Blass
1990: 107-109).
The issue that arises, in fact, is whether all so-called 'hearsay markers' are
better re-analysed as interpretive-use markers, as Blass has proposed for rt
Blass has shown that one particular particle, in one particular language, is not
just a marker of hearsay; this is precisely why it is better analysed as an
interpretive-use marker. The relevant examples are those which show ré
occurring in reporting not only what was said, but also what was thought,
example (9), what was implied, example (8), and in interrogatives, examples
(4)-(5). However, there may be other cases which are genuine 'hearsay'
markers. Itani (1993, UCL manuscript), for example, seems to have shown
that the particle 'tte' in Japanese is a genuine hearsay marker, indicating
that a genuine report of speech (rather than thought) is being attempted. I
will look at her analysis in section 7.6. Another related issue is whether
hearsay markers (or interpretive-use markers) are best analysed, as Palmer
and others have proposed, as indicating weakened speaker-commitment to
the proposition expressed. Blass has argued convincingly that this is not the
case, and the relevant examples are those that show r co-occurring with 'I
know', example (3), and occurring in questions, examples (4)-(5), and irony,
example (10), where no speaker-commitment is involved. It seems, then, that
we can reject Palmer's view, put forward at the beginning of this chapter, that
'hearsay' parentheticals leave the speaker to some extent committed to the
truth of the proposition expressed, so that these propositions would be
descriptively rather than interpretively used.
The issue I intend to examine next is the status of Blass's markers with
respect to our three distinctions, i.e. truth-conditional or non-truth-
conditional, explicit or implicit, conceptual or procedural? Blass simply hinted
at the direction in which answers to these questions are to be sought. She
claims that:
'In this case [particle ii], the contribution is an explicit, truth-conditional one. Sissala
has a means of explicitly indicating whether a certain utterance is intended as an
ordinary assertion or a free indirect report of speech. ... at the level of explicit truth-
conditional content or the proposition expressed.' (Blass 1990: 123)
She did not, however, consider the status of hearsay markers with respect to
212
the conceptual/procedural distinction. Nor did she seriously investigate
whether all 'hearsay' markers can be reanalysed as interpretive-use markers,
or whether there might indeed be a class of genuine hearsay markers,
restricted to the indication of reported speech. I will consider these questions
in turn.
7.3	 'Hearsay' markers: truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional?
In the last chapter, I have shown that hearsay adverbials, e.g. 'allegedly',
'reportedly', are markers of interpretive use, which change the truth-
conditional status of the proposition that falls within their scope. I shall claim
that all interpretive use markers have this function: they indicate that the
thoughts being interpreted are not the speaker's own, and thus they
automatically suspend the speaker's comniitment. In Sperber and Wilson's
terms, the speaker is no longer committed to the truth of a description, but to
the faithfuiness of an interpretation. Consider (11):
(11)	 The president has resigned, I hear.
The use of the parenthetical comment 'I hear' makes an essential difference
to the truth conditions of (11). The speaker is not automatically committed to
the truth of the ground-floor proposition 'The president has resigned'. The
same is true when (11) is embedded into factive and non-factive
environments. Blass's examples which show that rE has a similar effect on
the truth conditions of Sissala utterances fit naturally into this framework.
As we have seen, this suspension of speaker-commitment does not always
result in what speech-act theorists call weakened commitment. Claims of
weakened commitment suggest that the speaker does remain committed to
the truth of the proposition expressed. However, the crucial idea behind
interpretive use is that it automatically suspends the speaker's commitment,
by indicating that the views being interpreted are those of someone other
than the speaker. Different degrees of speaker commitment may be
pragmatically inferred on the basis of assumptions about how trustworthy
that other person is. For example, when attributing a certain belief to
Chomsky, to the Bible or to popular wisdom, we may indirectly indicate a high
degree of commitment to it. By contrast, when attributing a certain belief to
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someone who is known as entirely untrustworthy, we may indirectly indicate
that we have no faith in it at all. Thus, the function of an interpretive use
marker is in no way to indicate a weakened degree of commitment. Where
this is so, it is merely a pragmatic effect, achieved in a certain type of context.
7.4	 'Hearsay' markers: exolidt or implicit?
Blass (1990: 123) suggests that interpretive-use marker ré contributes to
the explicit aspect of communication. I shall argue that this is, indeed, true
for hearsay particles in general: they fall on the explicit rather than the
implicit side, i.e. they contribute to the explicatures of an utterance rather
than its implicatures. In the first place, they automatically suspend the
speaker's commitment to the proposition that falls within their scope. As a
result, this proposition is not (or not necessarily) an explicature. In the
second place, they encode information which contributes to higher-level
explicatures. In both cases, they affect the explicatures of the utterance, and
fall on the explicit rather than the implicit side.
As we have seen, explicatures are recovered by a combination of decoding
and inference: the greater the element of decoding, the greater the degree of
explicitness. It is important to notice that any proposition can be
interpretively used, whether or not this fact is linguistically encoded. For
example, consider (12):
(12)	 Have you seen the headlines? There will be an election next week.
The second part of this utterance can be understood in two rather different
ways: first, descriptively, as an assertion by the speaker that there will be an
election next week; and second, interpretively, as a report of what the
headlines say. In (12), there is no linguistic indication of how the utterance is
to be understood. The function of a hearsay parenthetical, a hearsay
adverbial or a hearsay partide is to indicate explicitly that it is intended as a
case of interpretive rather than descriptive use And as we have seen, the
distinction between interpretive and descriptive use is a genuinely truth-
conditional one, whether or not this is explicitly or implicitly indicated.
7.5	 'Hearsay' markers: conceptual or procedural?
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In sections 5.5.1 and 6.4, 1 argued that hearsay adverbials and
parentheticals are conceptual, i.e. they encode concepts rather than
procedures. In section 6.5.3, I argued that hearsay adverbials such as
'allegedly', 'reportedly', and hearsay parentheticals such as 'Bill says', 'The
newspaper reported yesterday' mark the proposition that falls within their
scope as bemg interpretively rather than descriptively used. In particular,
they indicate that the views being interpreted are not the speaker's own.
Because of this, they make an essential contribution to truth conditions.
Thus, hearsay adverbials and parentheticals are conceptual and truth-
condidonai.
In this section, I shall argue that although hearsay particles such as r in
Sissala, or tte in Japanese (to be discussed in 7.6), are also truth-conditional,
they differ from hearsay adverbials and parentheticals in one major respect:
hearsay particles are procedural, whereas, as we have seen, hearsay
adverbials and parentheticals are conceptual. In particular, I shall argue that
hearsay markers encode procedural constraints on explicatures: they guide
the construction of the intended higher-level explicatures, which mark the
proposition expressed as being interpretively rather than descriptively used.
The notion of constraints on explicatures was introduced by Wilson and
Sperber (1993) with reference to pronouns and mood indicators. Pronouns
were treated as procedural constraints on truth-conditional content, whereas
mood indicators were treated as procedural constraints on non-truth-
conditional content, or higher-level explicatures. I shall argue that hearsay
markers fall into the same category as mood indicators: they are procedural
constraints on higher-level explicatures. Let us examine the issues in more
detail.
In chapter 4,! introduced the distinction between conceptual and procedural
information proposed by Blakemore (1987) and developed in Wilson and
Sperber (1993). Blakemore (1987) was concerned with constraints on
implicatures, i.e. expressions such as discourse connectives which guide the
inferential phase of comprehension by indicating to the hearer what sort of
contextual assumptions and contextual effects the speaker intended him to
recover. Wilson and Sperber (1993) introduced a parallel notion of
constraints on explicatures, which guide the inferential phase of
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comprehension, this time by indicating to the hearer what type of
explicatures he is expected to construct. Recall that explicatures are
recovered by a combination of decoding and inference. The idea is that
certain expressions - for example pronouns and mood indicators - encode
information which constraints the inferential processes used in explicature
construction.
Wilson and Sperber (1993) argue that mood indicators encode information
constraining the inferential process of constructing higher-level explicatures:
declaratives indicate that the state of affairs described is regarded as actual
or possible; imperatives indicate that the state of affairs described is
regarded as potential and desirable. Interrogatives are markers of a certain
type of interpretive use (see Wilson and Sperber 1988 for further
discussion). The differences between declarative sentences and their non-
declarative counterparts are represented in terms of the higher-level
explicatures they communicate. Thus, we might expect that other types of
interpretive-use marker - for example hearsay particles - are analysable along
the same lines as mood indicators, i.e. as procedural constraints on higher-
level explicatures. This is what I will attempt to show.
The fact that an utterance or dause is interrogative, and hence interpretively
rather than descriptively used, can be indicated by a variety of means: for
example, by intonation, by use of a question mark in written texts, by use of
'whether' or 'if in subordinate clauses, and by the presence of wh-words or
subject-aux inversion in main clauses. In several languages, for example
Japanese, it can also be indicated by use of an interrogative particle,
suggesting that partides can be treated jointly with other types of mood
indicator. As Wilson and Sperber point out, given the existence of a
distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding, it would be hard to
justify treating a syntactic construction like subject-aux inversion, or a
phonological phenomenon such as intonation, in conceptual rather than
procedural terms. At worst, it seems to lead to something like the
performative analysis of non-declaratives, which was abandoned many years
ago (see Levinson 1993).
Wilson (1992-93) suggested two further types of argument supporting a
procedural, rather than a conceptual, treatment of mood indicators. The first
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refers to embedded infinitival clauses. In Relevance theory, infinitival clauses
are analysed as representing possible states of affairs. But if this information
is conceptually encoded, then the sentences in (13) should apparently have
the semantic representations in (14):
(13) a.TopasstheexamwouldbegoodforJohn.
b. John wants to pass the exam.
(14) a. For it to be possible for John to pass the exam would be good for
John.
b. John wants it to be possible to pass the exam.
As Wilson observes, these semantic representations do not capture the
meanings of these utterances. For (13a), the meaning is not that it would be
good for John to be able to pass the exam, but that it would be good for John
to pass it. Similarly, for (13 b), the meaning is not that John wants to be able
to pass the exam, but actually to pass it. Such infmitival clauses are better
analysed if we assume that the information they convey is procedurally rather
than conceptually encoded.
As Wilson observes, procedural information does not directly encode
assumptions which the hearer must automatically pay attention to, but
merely activates a range of possibilities which may be confirmed or
independently encoded elsewhere in the sentence, or which provide a basis
for regular inference processes.
The second type of argument is based on the fact that not all the indicators in
a given sentence may point in a consistent direction. If they encode their
associated assumptions, the result should be a contradiction, and yet no
contradiction is perceived. This seems to be the case with declarative
sentences uttered with interrogative intonation. Consider (1 5b):
(15) a. Where will you spend your holidays?
b. I'll go to the Greek islands?
According to relevance theory, declarative syntax marks the utterance as a
case of saying that, whereas interrogative syntax marks it as a case of asking
whether. To the extent that the two speech acts are incompatible, (15b) would
result in a contradiction if this speech-act information were treated as
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conceptually encoded. By contrast, treating mood indicators as encoding
procedural information, i.e. as merely providing hints about the direction in
which the intended relevance is to be sought, would enable such information
to be reconciled in a consistent representation.
Notice now that, according to Wilson and Sperber (1993: 22), in many
languages the functions of mood indicators are performed by particles. For
example, in some dialects of French, the interrogative particle 'ti' performs
the same function as interrogative word-order in other dialects. Itani (1993:
129-147) argues that the interrogative particle 'ka' in Japanese is another
case in point. If the functions of mood indicators are indeed performed by
particles, these are also best analysed as procedural constraints on
explicatures, guiding the hearer towards the construction of a certain type of
higher-level explicature, narrowing down the class of interpretations the
hearer has to consider in identifying the intended interpretation.
These arguments about interrogative particles generalize straightforwardly to
hearsay particles. Reported speech and echoic use can be indicated by a
variety of means - for example, quotation marks in written text, certain types
of intonation in spoken language, various inflectional markings such as the
French 'reportative conditional' which can, among other things, be a marker
of interpretive use. Again, there is no temptation to think of these
phenomena in conceptual terms, given that the alternative of procedural
encoding exists.
In fact, there seems to be no evidence that either interrogative or hearsay
partides encode conceptual information: they cannot be negated, they cannot
be the focus of cleft sentences, they cannot be combined with other words to
create more complex expressions with a compositional semantic structure. All
this suggests that they are better analysed in procedural terms, as encoding
constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension. This leads us to the
final section of this chapter, where I would like to return to the question
raised earlier, about whether there are any strictly hearsay markers, as
opposed to more general markers of interpretive use.
7.6	 Some genuine hearsay markers?
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Itani (1993, UCL manuscript) analyses the Japanese particle 'tte' and argues
that it has a genuine hearsay function. Consider (16)-( 17):
(16) Mary wa kashikoi tte.
Mary is smart, I hear.
(17) Marywakashikoi tte'
Mary is smart, did she say that?
Itani's examples suggest that the function of 'tte' corresponds almost exactly
to that of 'X said' - i.e. it indicates that the proposition that falls within its
scope is a direct or indirect report of speech. It is important to note that 'tte'
marks reports of speech, rather than thought. In fact, it may mark reports of
thought, but only if that thought has been verbally expressed to the speaker.
To illustrate, consider (18):
(18) A: What does Mary's teacher think of her?
B: Mary wa kashikoi tte.
Mary is smart, she thinks.
According to Itani, (18b) could only be used if the teacher had verbally
expressed the thought in question, and this is indicated by the use of 'tte'. As
Itani puts it,
'tte carries a strong aspect of the hearsay or quotative, and in fact covers only a subset
of types of "attributive use": it is used, precisely, to attribte utterances, not thoughts.'
(Itani 1993: 145)
Itani calls 'tte' a subtype of 'attributive interpretive use'. But if 'tte' is, as
Itani claims, a hearsay particle, - i.e. it attributes utterances to someone other
rhn the speaker, or the speaker in the past, then it is misleading to call it so.
Direct quotation involves resemblances of linguistic form not linguistic
content, so strictly speaking it is not a case of interpretive use, which involves
resemblances in content. It is a case of representation by resemblance, but
the resemblance is one of form not content. Only indirect quotation is a
subtype of attributive interpretive use.
Thus, the Japanese partide 'tte' seems to be the best candidate for a genuine
hearsay partide, which can be attached to all and only reports of speech. Such
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a device would have an obvious function: it would inform the hearer about
what someone actually said, rather than thought, and this is what we often
want to know. The 'tte' particle would simply encode this information by
procedural rather than conceptual means: it would act as a set of hints for
constructing a conceptual representation along the lines of 'X said that ...'.
A second possible type of genuine hearsay device would be quotation marks,
discussed briefly above. However, quotation marks are used mainly for direct
quotation: we do not normally put quotation marks round indirect reports of
speech. Moreover, we do use quotation marks for other reasons - for example,
to mention (rather than use) a word or phrase. Consider (19):
(19) How do you spell 'acknowledgement'?
Here, the quotation marks indicate mention rather than use of a word. They
do not indicate that the word was actually uttered by someone. We can
imagine someone introducing a new word that has never been uttered by
anyone, and putting it into quotation marks to show that he was mentioning
rather than using the word. These quotation marks do not function as
'hearsay' devices. Quotation marks can also indicate that a word is being
loosely used. Consider (20):
(20) Your arguments are, so to speak, 'fuzzy'.
Here, the quotation marks indicate some type of loose use or rough
approximation. (20) is not a report of actual speech, but a report of what
someone might say. Again, to call this a hearsay device would not be quite
right.
Notice that this suggests another argument against the idea put forward by
linguists such as Palmer, Chafe etc., that hearsay markers are invariably
markers of weakened commitment. Their analysis presupposes that the whole
proposition is being reported rather than used. But what very often happens
is that most of an utterance is descriptive, with just one word, or phrase, or
clause, being reported speech or interpretive use. This again shows the
importance of distinguishing between the notion of interpretive use and the
notion of diminished commitment.
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In this chapter, I have considered a variety of 'hearsay' particles and other
devices which have often been treated as having evidential function. My
main claim has been that these indicate a shift from descriptive use to some
form of representation by resemblance, of which the most notable subtype is
attributive interpretive use. However, I have argued that though they share
this function with hearsay adverbials and parentheticals, they perform it in a
rather different way: by procedural rather than conceptual encoding. If I am
right, then 'evidentials' in general, and 'hearsay devices' in particular, do not
form a unitary class from the semantic point of view, despite their
similarities in pragmatic function.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
A survey of the literature on 'evidentiality' in the Introduction of this thesis
showed that the notion of 'evidential' has been mostly applied to a class of
linguistic expressions with a particular pragmatic function. This function is
twofold: evidentials indicate the source of knowledge, and the speaker's
degree of certainty about the proposition expressed. In my initial survey of
the literature, I pointed out that these functions could be performed without
being linguistically encoded, and that even linguistically encoded evidentials
require a substantial amount of pragmatic interpretation. I therefore chose to
approach the study of evidentials from the broadest possible perspective,
looking at both semantic and pragmatic questions and trying to develop a
unified approach. The three main questions I set out to answer were the
following: (i) is there a pragmatic framework which adequately accounts for
the role of pragmatic inference in the interpretation of evidentials? (ii) are
evidentials semantically truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional? (iii) is
evidential information explicitly or implicitly communicated? Having
considered the two main existing semantic/pragmatic frameworks, speech-act
theory and Grice's framework of communication, I tried, using the more
recent framework of relevance theory, to develop answers to these questions
which would preserve the insights of earlier approaches while avoiding their
defects. In this conduding chapter, I will briefly sumniarise my result.
1.	 Evidentials and pragmatic inference
The framework of relevance theory, outhned in chapter 4, seems to provide
an adequate account of the role of pragmatic inference in the interpretation
of evidentials. Relevance theory offers a single pragmatic criterion of
consistency with the principle of relevance, which is supposed to shed light
on evely aspect of utterance interpretation, from the identification of explicit
content to the identification of intended contextual assumptions and
contextual effects. At various points in my analysis of evidentials, I have
shown how this criterion interacts with linguistically encoded content and
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available contextual assumptions to yield the expected results.
One important difference between relevance theory and previous frameworks
such as Grice's is that it contains no maxims of Qjiality, i.e. no principle
corresponding to Grice's maxims of truthfulness and evidence. Since these
are precisely the principles that Griceans would use to account for
pragmatically inferred information, this led me to examine the question of
how commitment is ever communicated at all in a framework that lacks them.
Here I looked at two features of the relevance-theoretic framework: first the
notion that assumptions may differ in strength, and second the notion of
optimal relevance itself. My main claim was as follows. An assumption with
no strength (i.e. a totally unevidenced assumption, for example a groundless
speculation) can achieve no relevance. Relevance is achieved by modifying a
set of existing assumptions, by strengthening them, contradicting and
eliminating them, or combining with them to yield contextual implications.
An assumption with no strength can achieve relevance in none of these ways.
Yet a speaker aiming at optimal relevance must intend her utterance to be
relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention. It follows that she must
expect at least some of the assumptions expressed and implied by her
utterance to be strong enough (i.e. evidenced enough) to achieve the
intended effects. The results are similar to those achieved by Grice's maxims
of Quality, but much weaker in particular, in the framework of relevance
theory, a speaker can achieve optimal relevance by saying something false, as
long as enough of the intended implications of her utterance are true.
Regarding pragmatic inference of degrees of speaker commitment, relevance
theorists have repeatedly emphasized that not only the proposition
expressed, but the speaker's intended attitude towards the proposition
expressed is recovered through the process of enrichment, - an inferential
process of fifing in partially specified representations. Thus, propositional-
attitude information is also recovered by the criterion of consistency with the
principle of relevance: the hearer is justified in choosing only the first, i.e.
most accessible interpretation, which yields adequate effects for no
unjustifiable effort, in a way the speaker could manifestly have foreseen.
When no specific linguistic guidance is given, the circumstances of an
utterance will provide dues to the intended degree of commitment. If the
circumstances make highly accessible a particular hypothesis about the
speaker's degree of commitment, and if that hypothesis leads us to a
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manifestly satisfactory interpretation, then this is the only interpretation
consistent with the principle of relevance, and all other interpretations are
disallowed. When there is no single highly accessible hypothesis in the
circumstances, or when the most accessible hypothesis is not the intended
one, then considerations of relevance dictate that additional linguistic clues,
for example some illocutionary force indicator, should be given.
2.	 Evidentials and the explicit/implicit distinction
Coming to the explicit/implicit distinction, Sperber and Wilson introduce a
notion of explicature, parallel to Grice's notion of implicature. The
propositions recovered from developing a linguistically encoded logical form,
either by disambiguating, assigning reference, resolving semantic vagueness,
completing effipsed material, or by optionally embedding the proposition
expressed under a speech-act or propositional-attitude description, are the
explicatures of an utterance. Among these, Sperber and Wilson distinguish
between the proposition expressed and the higher-level explicarures. The
proposition expressed detennines the truth-conditions of the utterance,
whereas its higher-level explicatures, although explicitly communicated,
make no contribution to truth conditions. An utterance may offer the hearer
more or less linguistic guidance as to what explicatures are intended; the
greater the amount of linguistic decoding involved, the greater the
explicitness. I suggested that in this framework, both encoded and inferred
evidentials may be analysed as communicating information about higher-
level explicatures, i.e. about the speaker's attitude to the proposition
expressed or the speech act being performed. Thus, linguistically encoded
evidentials contribute to the explicit aspect of communication. For example,
the speaker of 'Clearly, John is qualified' communicates the higher-level
explicature 'The speaker strongly believes that John is qualified'.
Pragmatically inferred evidential information contributes to higher-level
explicatures too. For example, someone who says firmly 'John is qualified',
communicates the higher-level propositional-attitude explicature 'The
speaker strongly believes that John is qualified', and performs the higher-
level speech-act and explicature 'The speaker asserts that John is qualified'.
This approach fills an obvious gap in Gnce's framework, which I referred to
in several points. Speech-act and propositional-attitude information of the
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type just described satisfies neither Grice's definition of what is said, nor his
defmition of what is (conventionally and convesationally) implicated. Sperber
and Wilson's notion of explicature and higher-level explicature provide a
useful means of filling this gap, into which a large amount of evidential
information falls.
3.	 Evidentials and truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional semantics
Regarding non-truth-conditional meaning, I pointed Out that, for both
speech-act theorists and Grice, all non-truthconditional meaning is of the
same type: mood indicators, sentence adverbials, parentheticals, discourse or
pragmatic connectives are all treated as non-truth-conditional indicators of
the speech act the speaker intends to perform. Sperber and Wilson, following
Blakemore 1987, draw a distinction between conceptual and procedural
meaning, and examine on which side of the distinction each non-truth-
conditional type of linguistic construction falls. The meaning of a word or
other linguistic construction is procedural if it constrains the inferential
phase of comprehension by indicating the type of inference process that the
hearer is expected to go through. In this framework, discourse connectives
have been analysed as encoding constraints on the implicatures of an
utterance. Mood indicators are also dealt with in procedural terms, but these
are analysed as constraints on explicatures: they guide the hearer towards
the intended higher-level explicatures of the type described above.
Chapters 5-7 of this thesis were largely concerned with these distinctions
between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional semantics and
conceptual and procedural meaning. In chapter 5, I looked at four types of
sentence adverbials, ifiocutionary, attitudinal, evidential and hearsay, which,
though syntactically similar, pattern in veiy different ways with respect to the
truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction. Using a standard test for
truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional meaning, I argued that while
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials are non-truth-conditional , as speech-
act theorists would predict, evidential and hearsay adverbials have clearly
truth-conditional readings, contrary to the predictions of speech-act theory,
which treats all these adverbials as external to the proposition expressed.
Despite these differences in truth-conditional status, I showed that all four
dasses of adverbial encode conceptual rather than procedural information,
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thus confirming Sperber and Wilson's claims that not all non-truth-
conditional meaning is procedural, and that the conceptual/procedural
distinction does not coincide exactly with the truth-conditional/non-truth-
conditional distinction.
In the course of chapter 5, it became clear that sentence adverbials had much
in common with a variety of syntactically parenthetical constructions,
including parenthetical evidentials such as 'I think', 'I know'. In chapter 6, I
therefore examined parenthetical constructions in general, with two main
questions in mind: first, can we provide a descriptive framework in which a
unified treatment of evidential adverbials and parentheticals is possible? and
second, is there some explanation for the differences in truth-conditional
status between the various types of adverbial expression investigated in
chapter 5?
The descriptive problems genuine parentheticals present were successfully
dealt with in the framework of relevance theory. I showed that they pattern
like sentence adverbials in two important respects: (1) They encode elements
of conceptual representations, which may be true or false in their own right,
even if they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances in
which they occur. (2) They contribute to explicit, rather than implicit,
communication. To the extent that they are non-truth-conditional, they
contribute not to the proposition expressed, but to higher-level explicatures.
In this framework, where the explicatures of an utterance typically include (a)
the proposition expressed, which determines the truth conditions of an
utterance, and (b) higher-level explicatures, which make no contribution to
its truth conditions, though they may be true or false in their own right, both
the fact that genuine parentheticals encode concepts, and the fact that they
may nonetheless be non-truth-conditional, can be described. For example, if
the parenthetical 'I think' in 'John is, I think, at the airport' is genuinely non-
truth-conditional, it can be analysed as providing the hearer with explicit
guidance as to the intended higher-level explicature 'Mary thinks John is at
the airport'. Main-clause 'parentheticals' encode concepts too, and these
appear to contribute to the truth conditions of utterances in the regular way -
e.g. 'I think that Bill has cheated in the exams' communicates the information
'Mazy thinks that Bill has cheated in the exams'. But this information would
constitute the proposition expressed by the utterance, and hence contribute
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to truth conditions.
It still remained to provide an explanation of why some true parenthetical
constructions appear not to contribute to the truth conditions of utterances,
whereas their main-clause counterparts do. In developing such an
explanation, I adopted the view shared by many linguists that utterances
containing genuine parentheticals create a double speech-act effect, with the
parenthetical constructions being phonologically, syntactically and
semantically independent of their host clauses. On this approach, the
parenthetical is seen as performing a speech act which qualifies or comments
upon the speech act performed by the main clause. Thus, an utterance such
as 'That painting is, I think, the best in the museum' would make two
assertions: (a) 'That painting is the best in the museum' (b) 'The speaker
thinks that painting is the best in the museum'. The function of the assertion
in (b) is to guide the interpretation of the assertion in (a) by encoding
information about the intended higher-level explicature of this 'ground floor'
assertion. The parenthetical comment has a 'fine-tuning' function, narrowing
down the interpretation of the speech act to which it is appended. Similar
remarks apply to the analysis of fflocutionary and attitudinal adverbials.
Without the parenthetical comment, the content of the higher-level
explicature would have to be pragmatically inferred.
In more complex utterances, the speech act whose higher-level explicatures
are 'fine-tuned' is determined by the scope possibilities for parentheticals.
These may vary according to the position of the parenthetical comment in the
utterance: it may occur within an embedded clause, or in complex utterances,
between the two conjuncts, or at the end of each. Thus, the question I raised
was: what is the phrase or clause whose interpretation the parenthetical
comment modifies? Here, the following conclusions were reached. First,
adverbials and parentheticals seem to behave in identical ways, as would be
expected if adverbials are a sub-type of parentheticals. Second, the syntactic
position of the adverbial or parenthetical affects its possibilities of
interpretation. In some cases, only wide-scope interpretation is possible; in
other cases, both wide-scope and narrow-scope interpretations are possible.
Third, there is often a preferred interpretation, which is affected by at least
the following factors: syntactic structure (main-clause vs subordinate clause),
semantic structure (factive vs non-factive) and semantic content (of the
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parenthetical comment and the clause to which it is attached). Fourth, factive
and non-factive structures affect the behaviour of parentheticals and
adverbials: when they appear inside factive clauses, narrow-scope
interpretation is either preferred or mandatory; when they appear inside
non-factive dauses, narrow-scope interpretation becomes much harder. Fifth,
I suggested that the preferred interpretation of the scope of parentheticals
results from an interaction between 'least effort' parsing principles, the
semantic content of parenthetical and host clauses, and the criterion of
consistency with the principle of relevance. Finally, I suggested that even a
narrow-scope interpretation is not necessarily perceived as truth-conditional,
i.e. it need not be perceived as falling within the scope of truth-conditional
connectives to yield a unitary set of truth conditions for the utterance as a
whole.
Precisely because of its unified nature, this analysis shed no light on the
differences in truth-conditional status which the various types of sentence
adverbials and parenthetical construction seem to exhibit. Thus, the question
I raised next was: why is it that some narrow-scope interpretations seem to
fall within the scope of logical connectives and thus contribute to the truth
conditions of the utterance as a whole, while others do not? In speech-act
terms, the question is why for evidential and hearsay adverbials, both speech
acts seem to fall within the scope of embedding connectives, and why, with
illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, only the ground-floor speech act
seems to fall within the scope of embedding connectives? My main claim was
as follows: A parenthetical comment is truth-conditional when and only when
it alters the truth-conditional status of the proposition it modifies. It may do
this in one of two ways: first, by functioning as a marker of interpretive
rather than descriptive use. Such markers necessarily affect the truth-
conditional status of propositions that fall within their scope. This is the
reason why hearsay adverbials and hearsay parentheticals are perceived as
making an essential contribution to truth conditions. Moreover, I showed why
a parenthetical such as 'I think', which indicates that the views being
interpreted are the speaker's own, may be perceived as roughly equivalent to
descriptive use. ifiocutionary adverbials such as 'frankly', 'seriously' do not
affect the truth-conditional status of the proposition that falls within their
scope, and hence are inessential to truth conditions. Their function is to
indicate the manner in which some speech-act is being performed, without
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altering the truth-conditional status of this speech act in any way.
Parenthetical comments, and sentence adverbials, may affect truth conditions
in a second way: by altering the strength of the assumption communicated,
and hence speaker's degree of commitment to the proposition that falls
within their scope. Thus, evidential adverbials such as 'obviously',
'apparently', do affect the truth-conditional status of the proposition that falls
within their scope. In particular, I distinguished between weak evidentials,
e.g. 'apparently', 'seemingly', which reduce the range of potential falsifying
evidence, and strong evidentials, e.g. 'obviously', 'clearly', which increase the
range of such evidence. I drew a parallel with non-evidential items such as
the weak 'possibly', 'probably', versus the strong 'necessarily', 'certainly', all
of which are clearly truth-conditional. Finally, for attitudinal adverbials such
as 'unfortunately' and 'sadly', I argued that they are non-truth conditional
since they are not mterpretive use markers, and do not affect the strength of
the proposition that falls within their scope.
Towards the end of chapter 6, 1 investigated how true parentheticals and
their non-parenthetical counterparts differ pragmatically, i.e. how their
presence and position in the sentence affects utterance interpretation. I
argued that genuine parentheticals do not always weaken the speaker's
commitment to the proposition that falls within their scope, as speech-act
theorists have claimed. Some of them weaken the speaker's commitment,
whereas others may strengthen the speaker's commitment. These effects
follow from an interaction between context, semantic content and the
criterion of consistency with the prindple of relevance. I ended the chapter
by looking at a range of attitudinal parentheticals (e.g. 'I hope', 'I fear'),
which seem to fall midway between evidential parentheticals and attitudinal
adverbials.
Finally, in chapter 7, I turned to evidentials in the narrowest sense - i.e.
various particles and discourse markers. The constructions I looked at are
those generally seen as performing a 'hearsay' function: in particular the
'hearsay' particles 'r' in Sissala and 'tte' in Japanese, which have both been
analysed within the relevance-theoretic framework. I argued that these
should be analysed in much the same way as mood indicators: as procedural
constraints on higher-level explicatures. The main point of this chapter was
to show that not all encoded evidential information is semantically
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homogeneous: whereas hearsay adverbials and parentheticals encode
concepts, hearsay particles ase best analysed in procedural terms. I also
argued that the term 'hearsay particle' has been used to cover a variety of
rather different constructions, some of which (e.g. 'ré' from Sissala) are quite
general markers of interpretive use, or interpretive attributive use, whereas
others (e.g. 'tte' from Japanese) are indeed used only for reporting speech.
The thesis leaves several questions unanswered. In particular, I have only
begun to investigate the very complex scope possibilities for evidential, and
more generally parenthetical, expressions in embedded dauses; and I have
not investigated the scope possibilities for procedural expressions, e.g.
hearsay particles, at all. Moreover, my explanation of the differences in truth-
conditional status between various types of sentence adverbial and
parenthetical is fairly rudimentary and vague in many respects. However, I
hope to have shown that the investigation of evidential expressions can yield
rich and interesting results when pursued within a unified
semantic/pragmatic framework such as that provided by relevance theory.
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